Public expenditure: Difference between revisions

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====Freedom  of choice====
====Freedom  of choice====
Public expenditure can be thought of as the expression of the transfer of freedom of choice from individuals to government. The concept of a political system under which the people  delegate powers to the state on condition that it uses those powers in their interest was put forward  in the 17th century by [[John Locke]] <ref>[http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81s/ John Locke ''On Civil Government''] </ref>, and the actions to be undertaken in the exercise of those delegated powers were described by [[Adam Smith]] in the 18th century as "erecting or maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, although they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could not repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain."<ref>[http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b5-c1-pt-3.htm Adam Smith: ''An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations'', Book 5, Chapter 1, Part 3, (first published 1776)]</ref>. The concept was further developed in the 19th century by [[John Stuart Mill]], who termed it "[[Representative Government]]" <ref>[http://philosophy.eserver.org/mill-representative-govt.txt John Stuart Mill Representative Government]</ref>.
Public expenditure can be thought of as the expression of the transfer of freedom of choice from individuals to government. The concept of a political system under which the people  delegate powers to the state on condition that it uses those powers in their interest was put forward  in the 17th century by [[John Locke]] <ref>[http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81s/ John Locke ''On Civil Government''] </ref>, and the actions to be undertaken in the exercise of those delegated powers were described by [[Adam Smith]] in the 18th century as "erecting or maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, although they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could not repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain."<ref>[http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b5-c1-pt-3.htm Adam Smith: ''An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations'', Book 5, Chapter 1, Part 3, (first published 1776)]</ref>. The concept was further developed in the 19th century by [[John Stuart Mill]], who termed it "[[Representative Government]]" <ref>[http://philosophy.eserver.org/mill-representative-govt.txt John Stuart Mill Representative Government]</ref>.
It can be argued that a person's freedom of choice is not reduced when the state makes a choice that he would otherwise have made, and Kenneth Arrow has argued that state-provided insurance has the effect of increasing individual freedom of choice when market-provided insurance is not available, or when the market's provision differs from the competitive norm <ref>[http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/82/2/PHCBP.pdf Kenneth Arrow: ''Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care''. American Economic Review, December 1963]</ref>. Arrow identifies departures from the competitive norm in the provision of medical insurance, and Akerlov has argued that such departures can occur whenever there is ''asymmetric information''
<ref>Akerlof G. (1970), "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488-500.
[http://books.google.com/books?id=zqLCvPhQcg0C&pg=PA175&lpg=PA175&dq=akerlof%E2%80%99s+market+for+lemons&source=bl&ots=swotxzjRbw&sig=eXjExEkkWOx8UuFffWibufYQXek&hl=en&ei=TgPrSus048qMB_bvxZgN&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CCEQ6AEwBzge#v=onepage&q=&f=false] (Google abstract)</ref>


===Economic effects===
===Economic effects===

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Overview

Definitions

Public expenditure may be understood as spending by central (federal), state and local governments and by the public corporations, or simply as spending by the public sector.

(For statistical purposes, however, those terms are open to differing interpretations, and to promote comparability in the construction of national accounts, the OECD has published the following definitions[1]

  • The public sector comprises the general government sector plus all public corporations including the central bank.
  • The government sector consists of the following resident institutional units: all units of central, state or local government; all social security funds at each level of government; all non-market non-profit institutions that are controlled and financed by government units.
  • The general government sector consists of the totality of institutional units which, in addition to fulfilling their political responsibilities and their role of economic regulation, produce principally non-market services (possibly goods) for individual or collective consumption and redistribute income and wealth.)

Categorisation

The principal categories of public expenditure are:

  • government investment,
  • government consumption,
  • transfer payments

The effects of public spending

Social effects

Social justice

It is generally accepted that public expenditure can have a major influence upon social justice, but there is no consensus concerning the operational meaning of that term. The utilitarian criterion of welfare maximisation proposed by Jeremy Bentham [2] is implicit in the widespread application of cost/benefit criteria to investment and consumption expenditure, but it is held not to be applicable to transfer payments because it has implications for income distribution that could have damaging effects upon motivation. The philosopher John Rawls claims to meet that objection by requiring only that there should be no more inequality than would be required for the benefit of the least well off [3], but the political philosopher Will Kymlicka argues that that, too, could have averse motivational consequences[4]. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin proposes the adoption of an "equality of resources" criterion[5], and the eminent economist Amartya Sen proposed instead the criterion of "equality of capability"[6], but the libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick rejects the entire concept of redistribution on the grounds that it would infringe every person's inalienable right to benefit from the employment of the talents with which he is endowed[7].

International differences in income distribution are revealed by comparisons of Gini indexes, which indicate a tendency toward less inequality in Europe than elsewhere (see the tutorials subpage). However, it is the general practice in all the developed countries to provide protection against extreme poverty by means of income-support payments or food supplements. The levels of those "safety-net" provisions are generally sufficient to eliminate life-threatening poverty, but provision above that level is influenced by perceptions of the danger of dependency[8] (sometimes known as the Samaritan's dilemma).

Freedom of choice

Public expenditure can be thought of as the expression of the transfer of freedom of choice from individuals to government. The concept of a political system under which the people delegate powers to the state on condition that it uses those powers in their interest was put forward in the 17th century by John Locke [9], and the actions to be undertaken in the exercise of those delegated powers were described by Adam Smith in the 18th century as "erecting or maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, although they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could not repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain."[10]. The concept was further developed in the 19th century by John Stuart Mill, who termed it "Representative Government" [11].

It can be argued that a person's freedom of choice is not reduced when the state makes a choice that he would otherwise have made, and Kenneth Arrow has argued that state-provided insurance has the effect of increasing individual freedom of choice when market-provided insurance is not available, or when the market's provision differs from the competitive norm [12]. Arrow identifies departures from the competitive norm in the provision of medical insurance, and Akerlov has argued that such departures can occur whenever there is asymmetric information [13]

Economic effects

Crowding-out and crowding-in

Under normal circumstances, private sector spending on government bonds is to some extent at the expense of spending on private sector bonds, with the consequence that some private-sector investment is "crowded out". To the extent that government bonds are used to finance consumption rather than investment, the total of the country's investment is diminished, leading in time to a loss of potential output. Crowding-out is seldom complete, however, but depends upon a range of factors including elasticities of demand for investment and for money [14]. During a recession, crowding-out may to some extent be offset by "crowding-in" as government spending makes up for the deficiency in private sector spending, leading to a recovery of demand and an increase in private-sector investment. The balance between crowding out under particular circumstances is a matter of controversy [15] .

Growth

[16]

Notes and references

  1. Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD, 2009
  2. Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford University Press, 1970
  3. John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971
  4. Will Kymlicka: Contemporary Political Philosophy, Clarendon Press, 1989
  5. Ronald Dworkin: Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2002
  6. Amartya Sen: The Idea of Justice, Alan Lane, 2009
  7. Robert Nozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974
  8. Marion Smiley: "Dependence, Autonomy, and the Welfare State", Chapter Two (excerpted) of Welfare Dependence': The Power of a Concept, Thesis Eleven.2001; 64: 21-38[1]
  9. John Locke On Civil Government
  10. Adam Smith: An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 5, Chapter 1, Part 3, (first published 1776)
  11. John Stuart Mill Representative Government
  12. Kenneth Arrow: Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American Economic Review, December 1963
  13. Akerlof G. (1970), "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488-500. [2] (Google abstract)
  14. See Frederick Fourie: How to Think and Reason in Economics, Juta 2001
  15. See "The Crowding-out Controversy" on page 248 of William Baumol and Alan Blinder: Economics, Principles and Policy, Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich, 1979
  16. Oscar Alfeanca and Miguel-Angel Galindo:Public Expenditure, Income Distribution, and Growth in OECD Countries, Int’ernational Advances in Economics, May 2003