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| '''Intelligence,''' in the context of '''information gathering''', refers to a wide range of techniques for [[intelligence cycle management|picking and prioritizing]] the subjects of interest, [[intelligence collection management|collecting and validating]] raw information, and inferring meaning by [[intelligence analysis management|analyzing]] (ideally) multiple sources of information on a given subject. Once the analytical results are available, they must be [[intelligence dissemination management|disseminated]] to the people that need it. | | '''Intelligence,''' in the context of '''information gathering''', refers to a wide range of techniques for picking and prioritizing the subjects of interest, collecting and validating raw information, and inferring meaning by analyzing (ideally) multiple sources of information on a given subject. Once the analytical results are available, they must be disseminated to the people that need it. |
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| In a military, law enforcement, business, and national intelligence process, some of the means of collection, and possibly analysis, may be secret, for if the opponent knew the methods were in use, that person or organization could take precautions against them. Therefore, there is a delicate balance between the number of people that receive the analyzed material, and the risk of revealing "sources and methods". The discipline of [[counterintelligence]] focuses on protecting one's own sensitive information, not just one's intelligence processes, from an opponent. | | In a military, law enforcement, business, and national intelligence process, some of the means of collection, and possibly analysis, may be secret, for if the opponent knew the methods were in use, that person or organization could take precautions against them. Therefore, there is a delicate balance between the number of people that receive the analyzed material, and the risk of revealing "sources and methods". The discipline of counterintelligence focuses on protecting one's own sensitive information, not just one's intelligence processes, from an opponent. |
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| ==Intelligence collection==
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| While methods and their selection are discussed, at length, in [[intelligence collection management]] and discipline-specific models of technique, the major categories are:
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| *[[Human-source intelligence]] ('''HUMINT'''): Information collected from humans, including [[interrogation]], documents, and willing cooperation; the latter includes such things as scouts and diplomats as well as spies
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| *[[Signals intelligence]] ('''SIGINT'''): Information collected from deliberate signals, including human-understandable (e.g., radio messages and captured encrypted documents) and machine-to-machine (e.g., radar analysis)
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| *[[Measurement and signature intelligence]] ('''MASINT'''): Information extracted from inadvertent signals, environmental disturbances (e.g., acoustic noise, chemical emissions, magnetic fields)
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| *[[Imagery intelligence]] ('''IMIINT'''): Information generically from picture-taking, although it extends to exact placement of the images with respect to location ([[geospatial intelligence]]) and the analysis of non-image components of the picture (e.g., heat or color)
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| *[[Open source intelligence]] ('''OSINT'''): Information obtained from published or broadcast sources; '''verified OSINT (V-OSINT)''' confirms it with non-public methods
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| *[[Financial intelligence]] ('''FININT'''): Information obtained from formal and informal financial transactions, analysis of expenditures, etc.
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| *[[Technical intelligence]] (('''TECHINT'''): Information obtained from the detailed engineering analysis of captured, purchased, or stolen equipment and supplies
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| *[[Counterintelligence]] is a related discipline that attempts to defeat the process of collection; it overlaps but is subtly different from [[deception]], where one creates information to be collected but that will give the wrong impression.
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| ==Intelligence analysis: models==
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| Broadly speaking, there are four major paradigms for intelligence analysis:
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| #Social and experimental science with hypothesis testing, first formulated by [[Sherman Kent]], <ref>{{cite book
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| | author = Kent, Sherman
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| | authorlink = Sherman Kent
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| | title = Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy
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| | publisher = Princeton Univ Press
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| | year = 1947 (2000 reprint)
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| | ISBN = 0691021600}}
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| </ref>, elaborated into specifying requirements<ref name = DavisV1I5>{{cite web
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| | author = Davis, Jack
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| | work = The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis
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| | title = Occasional Papers: Volume 1, Number 5: Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis
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| | url = https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/pdf/OPNo5.pdf
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| }}</ref> and analytic techniques. It includes, as introduced by [[Dick Heuer]], examining [[cognitive traps for intelligence analysis]] based on knowledge of error in the social sciences.<ref name=CIA-Heuer-1999-2>{{cite web
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| | author = Heuer, Richards J. Jr.
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| | title = Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Chapter 2. Perception: Why Can't We See What Is There To Be Seen?
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| | work = History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
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| | year = 1999
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| | url = http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/psych-intel/art5.html
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| | accessdate = 2007-10-29
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| }}</ref>
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| #Social science with philosophical and ideological assessment of intentions, based on understanding of the actors rather than specific knowledge. [[Abram Shulsky]] and Gary Schmitt, make sophisticated, as he points out that the classical social science do not routinely deal with the deliberate [[deception]] faced by intelligence analysts, and cite [[counterintelligence]] as absolutely vital to reliable analysis. <ref name=Shulsky>{{citation
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| | title = Silent Warfare: Understanding the world of intelligence
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| | author = Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt
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| | year = 2002
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| | edition = Third Edition
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| | publisher = Potomac Books
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| | isbn = 1574883453}}, pp. 171-172</ref> Following this argument, they show that [[counterintelligence]] is inherent to the [[intelligence cycle management|intelligence cycle]].This makes a firm distinction from social science, where the sources are not deliberately trying to deceive; [[deception]] is an advanced doctrine with many nations. <ref>{{cite journal
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| | journal = Airpower Journal
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| | date = Spring 1988
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| | title = Soviet Maskirovko
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| | author = Smith, Charles L.
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| | url = http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj88/spr88/smith.html
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| }}</ref> Another difference from social science is that the adversary may try to overload the analyst, making the [[signal-to-noise ratio]] infeasible for structured analysis.<ref>{{cite book
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| | author = Luttwak, Edward
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| | title = Coup D'Etat: A Practical Handbook
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| | publisher = Harvard University Press
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| | year = 1997
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| }} </ref> Pessimistic "red teaming" considers the enemy not thinking by one's own assumptions.<ref name=APJ>{{citation
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| | title = The "Red Team": forging a well-conceived contingency plan
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| | journal = Aerospace Power Journal
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| | date = Summer, 2002 | author = Timothy G. Malone, Reagan E. Schaupp
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| | url = http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0ICK/is_2_16/ai_90529724/?tag=content;col1}}</ref> This sort of red teaming can, however, be overwhelmed if one's own ideology convinces analysts that the enemy must be up to something, for which there is no evidence.
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| #Law, where the "is it possible" comes into play: Vice President Cheney expressed a guiding principle shortly after 9/11: <blockquote>if there was even a 1 percent chance of terrorists getting a weapon of mass destruction — and there has been a small probability of such an occurrence for some time — the United States must now act as if it were a certainty.<ref name=Suskind-One>{{citation
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| | author = Ron Suskind
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| | title = The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11
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| | publisher = Simon and Schuster
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| | year= 2006
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| | isbn = 9780743271097}}, p. 62</ref></blockquote>
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| #Engineering, where the emphasis is on capability rather than assessment. Another aspect of "red teaming" is to do pessimistic analysis of what the enemy could do had he perfect knowledge of one's own systems. <ref name=LATimes>{{citation
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| | 'Red Team' Gets Into Soviet Frame of Mind in 'Star Wars' Planning
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| | journal = Associated Press | author = Bryan Brumley
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| | url = http://articles.latimes.com/1986-08-31/local/me-15072_1
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| | date = 31 August 1986 }}</ref> A classic example of where Paradigm 2 failed is [[Douglas MacArthur]]'s belief that while the Chinese could intervene in the [[Korean War]], they would not do so.
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| ==References== | | ==References== |
| {{reflist|2}} | | {{reflist|2}} |
