U.S. Intelligence and terrorism in the 1970s: Difference between revisions
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{{seealso|U.S. Intelligence and terrorism in the 1980s}} | {{seealso|U.S. Intelligence and terrorism in the 1980s}} | ||
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While there were no major foreign terror actions in the US during the early part of the 1970s, there were actions against US personnel and facilities in other countries. Terrorism was definitely present as a worldwide phenomenon, and the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] produced regular reports on it, supported by the | While there were no major foreign terror actions in the US during the early part of the 1970s, there were actions against US personnel and facilities in other countries. Terrorism was definitely present as a worldwide phenomenon, and the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] produced regular reports on it, supported by the United States Intelligence Community. | ||
Attacks on US soil started in 1975, for which the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] was the lead agency. | Attacks on US soil started in 1975, for which the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] was the lead agency. | ||
During this decade, there were a variety of domestic and foreign groups using terrorism as a weapon. Some, of course, was earlier. The Egyptian government executed [[Sayyim Qutb]] in 1966, who had been editor of the journal of the | During this decade, there were a variety of domestic and foreign groups using terrorism as a weapon. Some, of course, was earlier. The Egyptian government executed [[Sayyim Qutb]] in 1966, who had been editor of the journal of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb was one of the spiritual mentors of what became al-Qaeda. By no means, however, was radical Islamist terror the dominant driver of terrorism in this period. | ||
===1970=== | ===1970=== | ||
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===1976=== | ===1976=== | ||
The hijacking of an Air France passenger aircraft, eventually arriving at [[Entebbe]], [[Uganda]] pointed to the need for international antiterrorist cooperation, and also demonstrated the ability to rescue hostages at long range (i.e., the Israeli [[Operation Entebbe]]). This became a prototype for other hostage rescue forces, such as those eventually part of | The hijacking of an Air France passenger aircraft, eventually arriving at [[Entebbe]], [[Uganda]] pointed to the need for international antiterrorist cooperation, and also demonstrated the ability to rescue hostages at long range (i.e., the Israeli [[Operation Entebbe]]). This became a prototype for other hostage rescue forces, such as those eventually part of U.S. Special Operations Command. | ||
Terrorism in the US was not necessarily directed at US organizations. Exiled Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier was killed by a car bomb in Washington, D.C. Subsequent investigations suggest the bombers may have had CIA ties in Chile, within the broad context of [[Operation Condor]]. The latter was a cooperation among the military dictatorships of [[Argentina]], [[Brazil]], [[Bolivia]], [[Chile]], [[Paraguay]] and [[Uruguay]] beginning in 1975. | Terrorism in the US was not necessarily directed at US organizations. Exiled Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier was killed by a car bomb in Washington, D.C. Subsequent investigations suggest the bombers may have had CIA ties in Chile, within the broad context of [[Operation Condor]]. The latter was a cooperation among the military dictatorships of [[Argentina]], [[Brazil]], [[Bolivia]], [[Chile]], [[Paraguay]] and [[Uruguay]] beginning in 1975. | ||
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===1979=== | ===1979=== | ||
In January, Iranian militants captured the buildings and staff of the US embassy in | In January, Iranian militants captured the buildings and staff of the US embassy in Tehran. A number of CIA operational documents were reconstructed. Subsequently, [[Operation Eagle Claw]] was launched to rescue the hostages, but failed during the operation in November. As a result, there were major changes in U.S. military special operations and intelligence, including the formation of units that eventually became the U.S. Special Operations Command. Those included a clandestine intelligence group, separate from the CIA and focused on special operations needs, originally called the Intelligence Support Activity but whose name is classified and frequently changes. | ||
In November, there was Muslim-on-Muslim violence with the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. French security forces assisted the Saudis in recapturing the building, indicating that ''ad hoc'' alliances would form for both terrorism and counterterrorism. This took place several weeks after Operation | In November, there was Muslim-on-Muslim violence with the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. French security forces assisted the Saudis in recapturing the building, indicating that ''ad hoc'' alliances would form for both terrorism and counterterrorism. This took place several weeks after Operation Eagle Claw, and U.S. intelligence may have assumed that the Iranians were involved; President [[Ronald Reagan]] made accusations. <ref name=Reason2007-09-27>{{citation | ||
| title = Al-Qaeda's Forerunner: An interview with author and journalist Yaroslav Trofimov, on his latest book describing the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca | | title = Al-Qaeda's Forerunner: An interview with author and journalist Yaroslav Trofimov, on his latest book describing the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca | ||
| author = Michael Young | date = September 27, 2007 | | author = Michael Young | date = September 27, 2007 | ||
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| url = http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE4DE1739F937A3575BC0A961948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all}}</ref> | | url = http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE4DE1739F937A3575BC0A961948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all}}</ref> | ||
In apparent response to | In apparent response to Khomeini's statement, a mob burned the U.S. Embassy in [[Islamabad]], Pakistan. U.S. intelligence had not expected this; the CIA station chief had gone home for lunch. <ref name=Coll>{{citation | ||
| author = Steve Coll | title = Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin | | author = Steve Coll | title = Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin | ||
| year = 2004| publisher = Penguin Press | | year = 2004| publisher = Penguin Press | ||
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==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
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Latest revision as of 16:01, 31 October 2024
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While there were no major foreign terror actions in the US during the early part of the 1970s, there were actions against US personnel and facilities in other countries. Terrorism was definitely present as a worldwide phenomenon, and the Central Intelligence Agency produced regular reports on it, supported by the United States Intelligence Community. Attacks on US soil started in 1975, for which the Federal Bureau of Investigation was the lead agency. During this decade, there were a variety of domestic and foreign groups using terrorism as a weapon. Some, of course, was earlier. The Egyptian government executed Sayyim Qutb in 1966, who had been editor of the journal of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb was one of the spiritual mentors of what became al-Qaeda. By no means, however, was radical Islamist terror the dominant driver of terrorism in this period. 1970The Uruguayan Tupamaros terrorist group kidnapped and killed Agency for International Development Police adviser Dan Mitrione; his body was found on August 10. 1972Within the context of nationalist terror, multiple Irish Republican Army bombings, starting on "Bloody Friday" (July 21), took place in Northern Ireland. The best known terrorist in 1972 was the kidnapping and killing of Israeli Olympic team members, in the Munich massacre by the Palestinian group, Black September. West German response was ad hoc and poorly executed, resulting in the deaths of all hostages, several terrorists, and a German police officer. This incident focused world attention on the need for early warning, hostage rescue, and, with great controversy, preemptive and retaliatory attacks on terrorists. 1973Black September attacked the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. The terrorists killed the US ambassador, Cleo Noel and other diplomats. In Guadalajara, Mexico, the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces killed the US consul general. Between 1973 and 1975, the Symbionese Liberation Army, a group with an unclear but radical agenda, operated domestically. 1974At Los Angeles Airport, 17 people were injured and 2 were killed at LAX when a bomb exploded near the Pan Am ticket area. 1975In January, Puerto Rican nationalists bombed a Wall Street bar, killing four and injuring 60; 2 days later, the Weather Underground claims responsibility for an explosion in a bathroom at the U.S. Department of State in Washington. 1976The hijacking of an Air France passenger aircraft, eventually arriving at Entebbe, Uganda pointed to the need for international antiterrorist cooperation, and also demonstrated the ability to rescue hostages at long range (i.e., the Israeli Operation Entebbe). This became a prototype for other hostage rescue forces, such as those eventually part of U.S. Special Operations Command. Terrorism in the US was not necessarily directed at US organizations. Exiled Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier was killed by a car bomb in Washington, D.C. Subsequent investigations suggest the bombers may have had CIA ties in Chile, within the broad context of Operation Condor. The latter was a cooperation among the military dictatorships of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay beginning in 1975. "... in February 1976, President Gerald Ford signed Executive Order (EO) 11905 which forbade all U.S. government employees from engaging in or conspiring to engage in political assassination" (Section 5(g)). Ford's EO was superseded by President Jimmy Carter's EO 12036, which tightened restrictions on intelligence agencies. The ban on assassinations was continued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, (EO 12333, Sec 2.11) and extended to apply specifically to intelligence agencies. This ban remains in effect today, although challenges have been mounted in each of the last two years by Rep. Bob Barr, R-Ga.[1] 1978Executive Order 12036, signed by President Carter in 1978, and the current Executive Order, EO 12333, signed by President Reagan in 1981, continued the requirement for oversight to maintain the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information by the Intelligence Community, and the protection of individuals' constitutional and statutory rights. Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro was seized by the Red Brigades later killed. This brought additional NATO attention to the problem. 1979In January, Iranian militants captured the buildings and staff of the US embassy in Tehran. A number of CIA operational documents were reconstructed. Subsequently, Operation Eagle Claw was launched to rescue the hostages, but failed during the operation in November. As a result, there were major changes in U.S. military special operations and intelligence, including the formation of units that eventually became the U.S. Special Operations Command. Those included a clandestine intelligence group, separate from the CIA and focused on special operations needs, originally called the Intelligence Support Activity but whose name is classified and frequently changes. In November, there was Muslim-on-Muslim violence with the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. French security forces assisted the Saudis in recapturing the building, indicating that ad hoc alliances would form for both terrorism and counterterrorism. This took place several weeks after Operation Eagle Claw, and U.S. intelligence may have assumed that the Iranians were involved; President Ronald Reagan made accusations. [2] Angered by U.S. suggestions, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini blamed the Americans in a radio address: "We hold America responsible for all these crimes. God willing, at an opportune time we shall deal with her." [3] In apparent response to Khomeini's statement, a mob burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. U.S. intelligence had not expected this; the CIA station chief had gone home for lunch. [4] References
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