General Intelligence Department (Saudi Arabia): Difference between revisions

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[[Saudi Arabia]]'s national intelligence service, the '''General Intelligence Department (GID)''', grew to substantial size in the 1970s, under the directorship of Prince [[Turki al-Faisal]].
Saudi Arabia's national intelligence service, the '''General Intelligence Department (GID)''', grew to substantial size in the 1970s, under the directorship of Prince Turki al-Faisal.


It was described as organizationally modeled after the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], with directorates including operations and intelligence, as well as [[signals intelligence]]. <ref name=Coll>{{citation
It was described as organizationally modeled after the CIA, with directorates including operations and intelligence, as well as signals intelligence.<ref name=Coll>{{citation
  | author = [[Steve Coll]]
  | author = [[Steve Coll]]
  | publisher = Penguin | year = 2004
  | publisher = Penguin | year = 2004
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==References==
==References==
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{{reflist}}[[Category:Suggestion Bot Tag]]

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Saudi Arabia's national intelligence service, the General Intelligence Department (GID), grew to substantial size in the 1970s, under the directorship of Prince Turki al-Faisal.

It was described as organizationally modeled after the CIA, with directorates including operations and intelligence, as well as signals intelligence.[1] The general impression is that it does not have a direct action capability of its own, but recruits foreign individuals or groups; Turki was said to have told a CIA colleague "We don't do operations. We don't know how. All we know how to do is write checks."[2]

References

  1. Steve Coll (2004), Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, Penguin,pp. 79-82
  2. Quote attributed to Frank Anderson, a retired CIA officer and partner of journalist Nat Kern, quoted by Coll, p. 72