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The '''Vienna Circle''' (in [[German language|German]]: der '''Wiener Kreis''') was a group of philosophers and scientists from various disciplines who gathered around [[Moritz Schlick]] when he was called to the [[Vienna]] University in 1922.  (Loosely associated with the Circle was the '''Verein [[Ernst Mach]]''' ('''Ernst Mach Society'''), as a forum for popular dissemination of its ideas.) The Vienna Circle became the main center of what was later called [[logical positivism]]. Among its members were [[Moritz Schlick]], chairman of the Ernst Mach Society, [[Gustav Bergmann]], [[Rudolf Carnap]], [[Herbert Feigl]], [[Philipp Frank]], [[Kurt Gödel]], [[Hans Hahn]], [[Felix Kaufmann]], [[Victor Kraft]], [[Karl Menger]], [[Marcel Natkin]], [[Otto Neurath]], [[Olga Hahn-Neurath]], [[Theodor Radakovic]], [[Friedrich Waismann]]. It was long thought that the members of the Vienna Circle had a uniform philosophical view, but recent research has emphasized its internal disagreements and controversies.  Most members shared a certain basic [[empiricism]] as well as a preference for construing philosophical problems as technical problems of logic or mathematics.   
The '''Vienna Circle''' (in [[German language|German]]: der '''Wiener Kreis''') was a group of philosophers and scientists from various disciplines who gathered around [[Moritz Schlick]] when he was called to the [[Vienna]] University in 1922.  (Loosely associated with the Circle was the '''Verein [[Ernst Mach]]''' ('''Ernst Mach Society'''), as a forum for popular dissemination of its ideas.) The Vienna Circle became the main center of what was later called [[logical positivism]]. Among its members were [[Moritz Schlick]], chairman of the Ernst Mach Society, [[Gustav Bergmann]], [[Rudolf Carnap]], [[Herbert Feigl]], [[Philipp Frank]], [[Kurt Gödel]], [[Hans Hahn]], [[Felix Kaufmann]], [[Victor Kraft]], [[Karl Menger]], [[Marcel Natkin]], [[Otto Neurath]], [[Olga Hahn-Neurath]], [[Theodor Radakovic]], [[Friedrich Waismann]]. It was long thought that the members of the Vienna Circle had a uniform philosophical view, but recent research has emphasized its internal disagreements and controversies.  Most members shared a certain basic [[empiricism]] as well as a preference for construing philosophical problems as technical problems of logic or mathematics.   


==History of the Vienna Circle==
==History of the Vienna Circle==
The prehistory of the Vienna Circle began with meetings on the [[philosophy of science]] and [[epistemology]] from [[1907]] on, promoted by [[Philipp Frank]], [[Hans Hahn]], [[Richard von Mises]], and [[Otto Neurath]].  
The prehistory of the Vienna Circle began with meetings on the [[philosophy of science]] and [[epistemology]] from 1907 on, promoted by [[Philipp Frank]], [[Hans Hahn]], [[Richard von Mises]], and [[Otto Neurath]].  


[[Hans Hahn]], the eldest of the three ([[1879]]-[[1934]]), was a mathematician. He received his degree in mathematics in [[1902]]. Afterwards he studied under the direction of [[Ludwig Boltzmann]] in [[Vienna]] and [[David Hilbert]], [[Felix Klein]] and [[Hermann Minkowski]] in [[Göttingen]]. In [[1905]] he received the [[Habilitation]] in mathematics. He taught at [[Innsbruck]] ([[1905]]-[[1906]]) and [[Vienna]] (from [[1909]]).  
[[Hans Hahn]], the eldest of the three (1879-1934), was a mathematician. He received his degree in mathematics in 1902. Afterwards he studied under the direction of [[Ludwig Boltzmann]] in [[Vienna]] and [[David Hilbert]], [[Felix Klein]] and [[Hermann Minkowski]] in [[Göttingen]]. In 1905 he received the [[Habilitation]] in mathematics. He taught at [[Innsbruck]] (1905-1906) and [[Vienna]] (from 1909).  


[[Otto Neurath]] ([[1882]]-[[1945]]) studied [[sociology]], [[economics]] and [[philosophy]] in [[Vienna]] and [[Berlin]]. From [[1907]] to [[1914]] he taught in [[Vienna]] at the [[Neuen Wiener Handelsakademie]] (Viennese Commercial Academy). Neurath married Olga, Hahn’s sister, in [[1911]].  
[[Otto Neurath]] (1882-1945) studied [[sociology]], [[economics]] and [[philosophy]] in [[Vienna]] and [[Berlin]]. From 1907 to 1914 he taught in [[Vienna]] at the [[Neuen Wiener Handelsakademie]] (Viennese Commercial Academy). Neurath married Olga, Hahn’s sister, in 1911.  


[[Philipp Frank]], the younger of the group ([[1884]]-[[1966]]), studied [[physics]] at [[Göttingen]] and [[Vienna]] with [[Ludwig Boltzmann]], [[David Hilbert]] and [[Felix Klein]]. From [[1912]], he held the chair of [[theoretical physics]] in the German University in [[Prague]].  
[[Philipp Frank]], the younger of the group (1884-1966), studied [[physics]] at [[Göttingen]] and [[Vienna]] with [[Ludwig Boltzmann]], [[David Hilbert]] and [[Felix Klein]]. From 1912, he held the chair of [[theoretical physics]] in the German University in [[Prague]].  


Their meetings were held in Viennese coffeehouses from 1907 onward. Frank remembered:
Their meetings were held in Viennese coffeehouses from 1907 onward. Frank remembered:
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<blockquote>After 1910 there began in Vienna a movement which regarded [[Ernst Mach|Mach]]’s [[positivist]] [[philosophy of science]] as having great importance for general intellectual life […] An attempt was made by a group of young men to retain the most essential points of [[Ernst Mach|Mach]]'s [[positivism]], especially his stand against the misuse of [[metaphysics]] in science. […] To this group belonged the mathematician [[Hans Hahn|H. Hahn]], the political economist [[Otto Neurath]], and the author of this book [i.e. Frank], at the time an instructor in [[theoretical physics]] in [[Vienna]]. […] We tried to supplement [[Ernst Mach|Mach]]’s ideas by those of the French philosophy of science of [[Henri Poincaré]] and [[Pierre Duhem]], and also to connect them with the investigations in [[logic]] of such authors as Couturat, Schröder, Hilbert, etc. (cited from Uebel, Thomas, 2003, p.70).</blockquote>
<blockquote>After 1910 there began in Vienna a movement which regarded [[Ernst Mach|Mach]]’s [[positivist]] [[philosophy of science]] as having great importance for general intellectual life […] An attempt was made by a group of young men to retain the most essential points of [[Ernst Mach|Mach]]'s [[positivism]], especially his stand against the misuse of [[metaphysics]] in science. […] To this group belonged the mathematician [[Hans Hahn|H. Hahn]], the political economist [[Otto Neurath]], and the author of this book [i.e. Frank], at the time an instructor in [[theoretical physics]] in [[Vienna]]. […] We tried to supplement [[Ernst Mach|Mach]]’s ideas by those of the French philosophy of science of [[Henri Poincaré]] and [[Pierre Duhem]], and also to connect them with the investigations in [[logic]] of such authors as Couturat, Schröder, Hilbert, etc. (cited from Uebel, Thomas, 2003, p.70).</blockquote>


Presumably the meetings stopped in [[1912]], when Frank went to [[Prague]], where he held the chair of [[theoretical physics]] left vacant by [[Albert Einstein]]. Hahn left [[Vienna]] during the [[World War I]] and returned in [[1921]]. The following year Hahn, with the collaboration of Frank, arranged to bring into the group [[Moritz Schlick]], who held the chair of [[philosophy]] of the inductive sciences at the [[University of Vienna]]. Schlick had already published his two main works ''Raum und Zeit in die gegenwärtigen Physik'' (''Space and Time in contemporary Physics'') in [[1917]] and ''Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre'' (''General Theory of Knowledge'') in [[1918]]. A central frame of reference for the newly founded discussion group was the ''Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung'' ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]), published by [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] in [[1918]].  
Presumably the meetings stopped in 1912, when Frank went to [[Prague]], where he held the chair of [[theoretical physics]] left vacant by [[Albert Einstein]]. Hahn left [[Vienna]] during the [[World War I]] and returned in 1921. The following year Hahn, with the collaboration of Frank, arranged to bring into the group [[Moritz Schlick]], who held the chair of [[philosophy]] of the inductive sciences at the [[University of Vienna]]. Schlick had already published his two main works ''Raum und Zeit in die gegenwärtigen Physik'' (''Space and Time in contemporary Physics'') in 1917 and ''Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre'' (''General Theory of Knowledge'') in 1918. A central frame of reference for the newly founded discussion group was the ''Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung'' ([[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]), published by [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] in 1918.  


Under the direction of Schlick, a new regular series of meetings began. In [[1926]] Schlick and Hahn arranged to bring in [[Rudolf Carnap]] at the University of [[Vienna]]. In [[1928]] the ''Verein Ernst Mach'' (Ernst Mach Society) was founded, with Schlick as chairman. In [[1929]] the Vienna Circle manifesto ''Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis'' (''The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle'') was published. The pamphlet is dedicated to Schlick, and its preface was signed by Hahn, Neurath and Carnap. In the appendix there is the list of the members of the Vienna Circle.
Under the direction of Schlick, a new regular series of meetings began. In 1926 Schlick and Hahn arranged to bring in [[Rudolf Carnap]] at the University of [[Vienna]]. In 1928 the ''Verein Ernst Mach'' (Ernst Mach Society) was founded, with Schlick as chairman. In 1929 the Vienna Circle manifesto ''Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis'' (''The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle'') was published. The pamphlet is dedicated to Schlick, and its preface was signed by Hahn, Neurath and Carnap. In the appendix there is the list of the members of the Vienna Circle.


The Vienna Circle was dispersed when the [[Nazism|Nazi]] party went into power in [[Germany]]; many of its members emigrated to [[United States of America|USA]], where they taught in several universities. [[Moritz Schlick|Schlick]] remained in [[Austria]], but in [[1936]] he was killed by a [[Nazism|Nazi]] sympathizer student in the University of [[Vienna]].
Moritz Schlick was killed in 1936 by a deranged student whose doctoral dissertation had been rejected.  The rest of the Vienna Circle left Austria after the 1938 unification with Germany.  Many of its members emigrated to the United States, where they taught at several universities.


==The Vienna Circle manifesto==
==The Vienna Circle manifesto==
It states the scientific world-conception of the Vienna Circle, which is characterized “essentially by ''two features''. ''First'' it is ''[[empiricism|empiricist]] and [[positivism|positivist]]'': there is knowledge only from experience […] ''Second'', the scientific world-conception is marked by the application of a certain method, namely ''[[logic|logical analysis]]''.” (''The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle'' in Sarkar, Sahotra, 1996, p. 331 – hereinafter ''VC'').  
In 1929 the Vienna Circle published its central manifesto ''Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis'' (''The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle'').  It states the scientific world-conception of the Vienna Circle, which is characterized “essentially by ''two features''. ''First'' it is ''[[empiricism|empiricist]] and [[positivism|positivist]]'': there is knowledge only from experience […] ''Second'', the scientific world-conception is marked by the application of a certain method, namely ''[[logic|logical analysis]]''.” (''The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle'' in Sarkar, Sahotra, 1996, p. 331 – hereinafter ''VC'').  


[[Logic|Logical analysis]] is the method of clarification of philosophical problems; it makes an extensive use of the symbolic [[logic]] and distinguishes the Vienna Circle [[empiricism]] from earlier versions. The task of [[philosophy]] lies in the clarification - through the method of [[logic|logical analysis]] - of problems and assertions.
[[Logic|Logical analysis]] is the method of clarification of philosophical problems; it makes an extensive use of the symbolic [[logic]] and distinguishes the Vienna Circle [[empiricism]] from earlier versions. The task of [[philosophy]] lies in the clarification - through the method of [[logic|logical analysis]] - of problems and assertions.


[[Logic|Logical analysis]] shows that there are two different kinds of [[statement]]s; one kind includes [[statement]]s reducible to simpler [[statement]]s about the empirically given; the other kind includes [[statement]]s which cannot be reduced to [[statement]]s about [[experience]] and thus they are devoid of meaning. [[Metaphysical]] [[statement]]s belong to this second kind and therefore they are [[meaningless]]. Hence many philosophical problems are rejected as pseudo-problems which arise from [[logic|logical mistakes]], while others are re-interpreted as empirical [[statement]]s and thus becomes the subject of scientific inquiries.
Logical analysis shows that there are two different kinds of [[statement]]s: one kind includes statements reducible to simpler statements about the empirically given; the other kind includes statements which cannot be reduced to statements about experience and thus devoid of meaning. [[Metaphysical]] statements belong to this second kind and therefore they are [[meaningless]]. Hence many philosophical problems are rejected as pseudo-problems which arise from logical mistakes, while others are re-interpreted as empirical statements and thus becomes the subject of scientific inquiries.


One source of the [[logic|logical mistakes]] that are at the origins of [[metaphysics]] is the ambiguity of natural [[language]]. “Ordinary [[language]] for instance uses the same part of speech, the substantive, for [[thing]]s (‘apple’) as well as for [[quality|qualities]] (‘hardness’), [[relation]]s (‘friendship’), and processes (‘sleep’); therefore it misleads one into a thing-like conception of functional [[concept]]s” (''VC'' p. 329). Another source of mistakes is “the notion that ''thinking'' can either lead to knowledge out of its own resources without using any empirical material, or at least arrive at new contents by an [[inference]] from given states of affair” (''VC'' p. 330). The latter notion is typical in [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian philosophy]], according to which there are [[synthetic|synthetic statements]] [[a priori]] that expand knowledge without using the [[experience]]. [[Synthetic proposition|Synthetic knowledge]] [[a priori]] is rejected by the Vienna Circle. [[Mathematics]], which at a first sight seems an example of necessarily valid [[synthetic proposition|synthetic knowledge]] derived from pure [[reason]] alone, has instead a [[tautology|tautological]] character, that is its statements are [[analytic proposition|analytical statements]], thus very different from [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] [[synthetic  proposition|synthetic statements]]. The only two kinds of statements accepted by the Vienna Circle are [[synthetic  proposition|synthetic statements]] [[a posteriori]] (i.e. scientific statements) and [[analytic proposition|analytic statements]] [[a priori]] (i.e. [[logic|logical]] and [[mathematics|mathematical]] statements).
The Vienna Circle holds that the ambiguity of natural language is often the source for the logical mistakes of metaphysics. “Ordinary language for instance uses the same part of speech, the substantive, for things (‘apple’) as well as for qualities (‘hardness’), relations (‘friendship’), and processes (‘sleep’); therefore it misleads one into a thing-like conception of functional concepts” (''VC'' p. 329). Another source of mistakes is “the notion that ''thinking'' can either lead to knowledge out of its own resources without using any empirical material, or at least arrive at new contents by an [[inference]] from given states of affair” (''VC'' p. 330). The latter notion is typical in [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian philosophy]], according to which there are [[synthetic|synthetic a priori statements]] that expand knowledge without experience. [[Synthetic proposition|Synthetic a priori knowledge]] is rejected by the Vienna Circle. [[Mathematics]], which at a first sight seems an example of necessarily valid synthetic knowledge derived from pure reason alone, has instead a [[tautology|tautological]] character, that is its statements are [[analytic proposition|analytical statements]], thus very different from [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] [[synthetic  proposition|synthetic a priori statements]]. The only two kinds of statements accepted by the Vienna Circle are [[synthetic  proposition|synthetic a posteriori statements]] (i.e. scientific statements) and [[analytic proposition|analytic a priori statements]] (i.e. logical and mathematical statements).


However, the persistence of [[metaphysics]] is connected not only with logical mistakes but also with “social and economical struggles” (''VC'' p. 339). [[Metaphysics]] and [[theology]] are allied to traditional social forms, while the group of people who “faces modern times, rejects these views and takes its stand on the ground of empirical sciences” (''VC'' p. 339). Thus the struggle between [[metaphysics]] and [[science|scientific world-conception]] is not only a struggle between different kinds of [[philosophy|philosophies]], but it is also – and perhaps primarily – a struggle between different political, social and economical attitudes. Of course, as the manifesto itself acknowledged, “not every adherent of the scientific world-conception will be a fighter” (VC p. 339). Many historians of the Vienna Circle see in the latter sentence an implicit reference to a contrast between the so called ‘left wing’ of the Vienna Circle, mainly represented by [[Otto Neurath|Neurath]] and [[Rudolf Carnap|Carnap]], and [[Moritz Schlick]]. The aim of the left wing was to facilitate the penetration of the scientific world-conception in “the forms of personal and public life, in [[education]], upbringing, [[architecture]], and the shaping of [[economic]] and social life” (''VC'' p. 339-340). On the contrary, [[Moritz Schlick|Schlick]] was primarily interested in the theoretical study of [[science]] and [[philosophy]]. Perhaps the sentence “Some, glad of solitude, will lead a withdrawn existence on the icy slopes of logic” (''VC'' p. 339) is an ironic reference to [[Moritz Schlick|Schlick]].
However, the persistence of metaphysics is connected not only with logical mistakes but also with “social and economical struggles” (''VC'' p. 339). Metaphysics and [[theology]] are allied to traditional social forms, while the group of people who “faces modern times, rejects these views and takes its stand on the ground of empirical sciences” (''VC'' p. 339). Thus the struggle between metaphysics and scientific world-conception is not only a struggle between different kinds of philosophies, but it is also&mdash;and perhaps primarily&mdash;a struggle between different political, social, and economical attitudes. Of course, as the manifesto itself acknowledged, “not every adherent of the scientific world-conception will be a fighter” (VC p. 339). Many historians of the Vienna Circle see in the latter sentence an implicit reference to a contrast between [[Moritz Schlick]] and the so-called "left wing" of the Vienna Circle, mainly represented by [[Otto Neurath]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]]. The aim of the left wing was to facilitate the penetration of the scientific world-conception in “the forms of personal and public life, in education, upbringing, architecture, and the shaping of economic and social life” (''VC'' p. 339-340). Schlick, on the contrary, was primarily interested in the theoretical study of science and philosoph. Perhaps the sentence “Some, glad of solitude, will lead a withdrawn existence on the icy slopes of logic” (''VC'' p. 339) is an ironic reference to Schlick.


==Unified Science==
==Unified Science==
A goal pursued by the Vienna Circle was [[Unified Science|unified science]]. In the beginning this goal meant the construction of a "constitutive system" in which every legitimate [[statement]] is reduced to the [[concept]]s of lower level which refer directly to the given [[experience]]. "The endeavour is to link and harmonise the achievements of individual investigators in their various fields of [[science]]" (''VC'' p. 328). The idea of this constitutional system can also be found in Carnapűs Aufbau. From this aim follows the search for clarity, neatness, intersubjectivity, and for a neutral symbolic [[language]] that eliminates the problems arising from the ambiguity of natural [[language]].
A goal pursued by the Vienna Circle was [[Unified Science|unified science]]. In the beginning this goal meant the construction of a "constitutive system" in which every legitimate statement is reduced to the concepts of lower level which refer directly to the given experience. "The endeavour is to link and harmonise the achievements of individual investigators in their various fields of science" (''VC'' p. 328). The idea of this constitutional system can also be found in ''Carnapűs Aufbau''. From this aim follows the search for clarity, neatness, intersubjectivity, and for a neutral symbolic language that eliminates the problems arising from the ambiguity of natural language.
Later Carnap's interrests changed form a constitutional system to a universal language. As an influence of Neurath this language was the physicalistic language. In Carnap's conception translatability to physical language was the basis of unified science. Neurath later emphasised that his concept of unity is not any stricktly formal system. In Nuerath's view the unity of science means a "mosaic of everything".  
Later, Carnap's interests changed form a constitutional system to a universal language. As an influence of Neurath this language was the physicalistic language. In Carnap's conception translatability to physical language was the basis of unified science. Neurath later emphasised that his concept of unity is not any strictly formal system. In Nuerath's view the unity of science means a "mosaic of everything".  


The Vienna Circle published a collection, called ''Einheitswissenschaft'' (''Unified science''), edit by [[Rudolf Carnap]], [[Philipp Frank]], [[Hans Hahn]], [[Otto Neurath]], [[Joergen Joergensen]] (after [[Hans Hahn|Hahn]]'s death) and [[Charles Morris]] (from [[1938]]), whose aim was to present an unified vision of [[science]]. After the publication in [[Europe]] of seven monographs from [[1933]] to [[1939]], the collection was dismissed, because of the problems arising from the [[World War II]]. In [[1938]] a new series of publications started in [[United States of America|USA]]. It was the [[International Encyclopedia of Unified Science]], an ambitious project never completed devoted to [[Unified Science|unified science]]. Only the first section ''Foundations of the Unity of Sciences'' was published; it contains two volumes for a total of twenty monographs published from [[1938]] to [[1969]]. As remembered by [[Rudolf Carnap]] and [[Charles Morris]] in the ''Preface'' to the 1969 edition of the [[International Encyclopedia of Unified Science]]:
The Vienna Circle published a collection, called ''Einheitswissenschaft'' (''Unified science''), edit by [[Rudolf Carnap]], [[Philipp Frank]], [[Hans Hahn]], [[Otto Neurath]], [[Joergen Joergensen]] (after Hahn's death) and [[Charles Morris]] (from 1938), the aim of which was to present an unified vision of science. With the start of [[World War II]], the authors suspended the project.  They had published seven monographs between 1933 and 1939. In 1938, American philosophers started a new series of publications called the [[International Encyclopedia of Unified Science]], and while an ambitious project it was never completely devoted to unified science. Only the first section. ''Foundations of the Unity of Sciences'', was published.  It contains two volumes for a total of twenty monographs published from 1938 to 1969. As remembered by Rudolf Carnap and [[Charles Morris]] in the ''Preface'' to the 1969 edition:


<blockquote>The ''Encyclopedia'' was in origin the idea of [[Otto Neurath]]. It was meant as a manifestation of the unity of science movement […] Original plans for the Encyclopedia were ambitious. In addition to the two introductory volumes, there was to be a section on the methodology of the sciences, one on the existing state of the unification of sciences, and possibly a section on the application of the sciences. It was planned that the work in its entirety would comprise about twenty-six volumes (260 monographs) (''Foundations of the Unity of Sciences'', vol. 1, The University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. vii).</blockquote>
<blockquote>The ''Encyclopedia'' was in origin the idea of [[Otto Neurath]]. It was meant as a manifestation of the unity of science movement […] Original plans for the Encyclopedia were ambitious. In addition to the two introductory volumes, there was to be a section on the methodology of the sciences, one on the existing state of the unification of sciences, and possibly a section on the application of the sciences. It was planned that the work in its entirety would comprise about twenty-six volumes (260 monographs) (''Foundations of the Unity of Sciences'', vol. 1, The University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. vii).</blockquote>


The well known [[Thomas Kuhn]]’s work, ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'', was published in this Encyclopedia in [[1962]], as the number two in the second volume.
[[Thomas Kuhn]]’s well-known ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'' was published in this Encyclopedia in 1962 as the number two in the second volume.


==The elimination of metaphysics==
==The elimination of metaphysics==
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The attitude of [[Logical Positivism]] towards [[metaphysics]] in the eraly period is well expressed by [[Carnap]] in the article 'Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache' in ''Erkenntnis'', vol. 2, 1932 (English translation 'The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language' in Sarkar, Sahotra, ed., ''Logical empiricism at its peak: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath'', New York : Garland Pub., 1996, pp. 10-31).
The attitude of [[Logical Positivism]] towards [[metaphysics]] in the eraly period is well expressed by [[Carnap]] in the article 'Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache' in ''Erkenntnis'', vol. 2, 1932 (English translation 'The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language' in Sarkar, Sahotra, ed., ''Logical empiricism at its peak: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath'', New York : Garland Pub., 1996, pp. 10-31).


A [[language]] – says Carnap – consists of a [[vocabulary]], i.e. a set of meaningful words, and a [[syntax]], i.e. a set of rules governing the formation of sentences from the words of the vocabulary. Pseudo-statements, i.e. sequences of words that at first sight resemble [[statement]]s but in reality have no [[meaning]], are formed in two ways: either meaningless words occur in them, or they are formed in an invalid syntactical way. According to Carnap, pseudo-statements of both kinds occur in [[metaphysics]].  
A [[language]] – says Carnap – consists of a [[vocabulary]], i.e. a set of meaningful words, and a [[syntax]], i.e. a set of rules governing the formation of sentences from the words of the vocabulary. Pseudo-statements, i.e. sequences of words that at first sight resemble [[statement]]s but in reality have no meaning, are formed in two ways: either meaningless words occur in them, or they are formed in an invalid syntactical way. According to Carnap, pseudo-statements of both kinds occur in [[metaphysics]].  




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External questions however can be put as practical questions "is the system of arythmetic useful in science? I.e. shall we accept the system as a tool?"
External questions however can be put as practical questions "is the system of arythmetic useful in science? I.e. shall we accept the system as a tool?"


==Congresses and publications==
.
Vienna Circle was very active in advertising the new philosophical ideas. Several congresses on [[epistemology]] and [[philosophy of science]] were organized, with the help of the [[Berlin Circle]]. There were some preparatory congresses: [[Prague]] ([[1929]]), [[Königsberg]] ([[1930]]), [[Prague]] ([[1934]]) and then the first congress on scientific philosophy held in [[Paris]] ([[1935]]), followed by congresses in [[Copenhagen]] ([[1936]]), [[Paris]] ([[1937]]), [[Cambridge, UK]] ([[1938]]), [[Cambridge, Massachusetts|Cambridge, Mass]]. ([[1939]]). The [[Königsberg]] congress ([[1930]]) was very important, for [[Kurt Gödel]] announced that he has proved the [[completeness]] of [[first-order logic]] and the [[Gödel's incompleteness theorem|incompleteness]] of formal [[arithmetic]]. Another very interesting congress was the one held in [[Copenhagen]] ([[1936]]), which was dedicated to [[quantum physics]] and [[causality]].
 
Between [[1928]] and [[1937]], the Vienna Circle published ten books in a collection named ''Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung'' (''Monographs on the Scientific World-Conception''), edited by [[Moritz Schlick|Schlick]] and [[Philipp Frank|Frank]]. [[Karl Raimund Popper]]’s book ''Logik der Forschung'' was published in this collection. Seven works were published in another collection, called ''Einheitswissenschaft'' (''Unified Science''). In 1930 [[Rudolf Carnap]] and [[Hans Reichenbach]] undertook the editorship of the journal ''[[Erkenntnis]]'', which was published between [[1930]] and [[1940]] (from [[1939]] the editors were [[Otto Neurath]], [[Rudolf Carnap]] and [[Charles Morris]]).
 
The following is the list of works published in the two collections edit by the Vienna Circle.
 
''Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung'' (''Monographs on the Scientific World-Conception''), edit by Schlick and Frank:
*[[Richard von Mises]], ''Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit'', 1928 (''Probability, Statistics, and Truth'', New York : Macmillan company, 1939)
*[[Rudolf Carnap]], ''Abriss der Logistik'', 1929
*[[Moritz Schlick]], ''Fragen der Ethik'', 1930 (''Problems of Ethics'', New York : Prentice-Hall, 1939)
*[[Otto Neurath]], ''Empirische Soziologie'', 1931
*[[Philipp Frank]], ''Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen'', 1932 (''The Law of Causality and its Limits'', Dordrecth ; Boston : Kluwer, 1997)
*[[Otto Kant]], ''Zur Biologie der Ethik'', 1932
*[[Rudolf Carnap]], ''Logische Syntax der Sprache'', 1934 (''The Logical Syntax of Language'', New York : Humanities, 1937)
*[[Karl Raimund Popper]], ''Logik der Forschung'', 1934 (''The Logic of Scientific Discovery'', New York : Basic Books, 1959)
*[[Josef Schächeter]], ''Prolegomena zu einer kritischen Grammatik'', 1935 (''Prolegomena to a Critical Grammar'', Dordrecth ; Boston : D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1973)
*[[Victor Kraft]], ''Die Grundlagen einer wissenschaftliche Wertlehre'', 1937 (''Foundations for a Scientific Analysis of Value'', Dordrecth ; Boston : D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1981)
 
''Einheitswissenschaft'' (''Unified Science''), edit by Carnap, Frank, Hahn, Neurath, Joergensen (after Hahn's death), Morris (from 1938):
*[[Hans Hahn]], ''Logik, Mathematik und Naturerkennen'', 1933
*[[Otto Neurath]], ''Einheitswissenschaft und Psychologie'', 1933
*[[Rudolf Carnap]], ''Die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftlogik'', 1934
*[[Philipp Frank]], ''Das Ende der mechanistischen Physik'', 1935
*[[Otto Neurath]], ''Was bedeutet rationale Wirtschaftsbetrachtung'', 1935
*[[Otto Neurath]], [[Egon Brunswik | E. Brunswik]], C. Hull, G. Mannoury, J. Woodger, ''Zur Enzyklopädie der Einheitswissenschaft''. Vorträge, 1938
*[[Richard von Mises]], ''Ernst Mach und die empiristische Wissenschaftauffassung'', 1939
 
These works are translated in ''Unified Science: The Vienna Circle Monograph Series Originally Edited by Otto Neurath'', Kluwer, 1987.
 
Monographs, arranged in chronological order, published in the ''International Encyclopedia of Unified Science'':
*[[Otto Neurath]], [[Niels Bohr]], [[John Dewey]], [[Bertrand Russell]], [[Rudolf Carnap]], [[Charles Morris]], ''Encyclopedia and unified science'', 1938, vol.1 n.1
*[[Charles Morris]], ''Foundations of the theory of signs'', 1938, vol.1 n.2
*[[Victor Lenzen]], ''Procedures of empirical sciences'', 1938, vol.1 n.5
*[[Rudolf Carnap]], ''Foundations of logic and mathematics'', 1939, vol.1 n.3
*[[Leonard Bloomfield]], ''Linguistic aspects of science'', 1939, vol.1 n.4
*[[Ernest Nagel]], ''Principles of the theory of probability'', 1939, vol.1 n.6
*[[John Dewey]], ''Theory of valuation'', 1939, vol.2 n.4
*[[Giorgio De Santillana]] and [[Egdard Zilsel]], ''The development of rationalism and empiricism'', 1941, vol.2 n.8
*[[Otto Neurath]], ''Foundations of social sciences'', 1944, vol.2 n.1
*[[Joseph Henri Woodger]], ''The technique of theory construction'', 1949, vol.2 n.5
*[[Philipp Frank]], ''Foundations of physics'', 1946, vol.1 n.7
*[[Erwin Frinlay-Freundlich]], ''Cosmology'', 1951, vol.1 n.8
*[[Joergen Joergensen]], ''The development of logical empiricism'', 1951, vol.2 n.9
*[[Egon Brunswik]], ''The conceptual framework of psychology'', 1952, vol.1 n.10
*[[Carl Hempel]], ''Fundamentals of concept formation in empirical science'', 1952, vol.2 n.7
*[[Felix Mainx]], ''Foundations of biology'', 1955, vol.1 n.9
*[[Abraham Edel]], ''Science and the structure of ethics'', 1961, vol.2 n.3
*[[Thomas Kuhn]], ''The structure of scientific revolutions'', 1962, vol.2 n.2
*[[Gherard Tintner]], ''Methodology of mathematical economics and econometrics'', 1968, vol.2 n.6
*[[Herbert Feigl]] and [[Charles Morris]], ''Bibliography and index'', 1969, vol.2 n.10
 
==Quoted works==
*''Foundations of the Unity of Sciences'', vol. 1, Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1969
*Uebel, Thomas, "On the Austrian Roots of Logical Empiricism" in ''Logical Empiricism - Historical and contemporary Perspectives'', ed. Paolo Parrini, Wesley C. Salmon, Merrilee H. Salmon, Pittsburgh : University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003, pp. 76-93
*''Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis'', 1929. English translation ''The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle'' in Sarkar, Sahotra, ed., ''The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: from 1900 to the Vienna Circle'', New York : Garland Publishing, 1996, pp. 321-340
*[[Rudolf Carnap]], "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache" in ''Erkenntnis'', vol. 2, 1932 (English translation "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language" in Sarkar, Sahotra, ed., ''Logical empiricism at its peak: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath'', New York : Garland Pub., 1996, pp. 10-31)
 
 
==Reception in the U.S.==
The spread of [[logical positivism]] in the USA occurred throughout the 1920s-1930s. In 1929 and in 1932 Schlick was a Visiting Professor at Stanford, while Feigl, who immigrated to the USA in 1930, became lecturer (1931) and professor (1933) at the University of Iowa. The definite diffusion of logical positivism in the U.S. was due to [[Carl Hempel]], [[Hans Reichenbach]], [[Rudolf Carnap]], [[Philipp Frank]] and [[Herbert Feigl]], who emigrated and taught in the [[U.S.]]
 
* E. Nagel, ''Nature and Convention'' in: The Journal of Philosophy, 26, 1929, in which Nagel discussed Reichenbach's interpretation of the theory of relativity;
* S. Hook, ''Personal Impression of Contemporary German Philosophy'' in: The Journal of Philosophy, 27, 1930, in which Hook presented a favorable report on logical positivism;
* A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl, ''Logical Positivism: A New Movement in European Philosophy'' in: The Journal of Philosophy, 28, 1931.
 
Another link to the U.S. is [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] who traveled in [[1932]]-[[1933]] as Sheldon Traveling Fellow to [[Vienna]], [[Prag]], and [[Warsaw]].
 
==Reception in the UK==
 
[[Alfred Jules Ayer]] acquainted British acedeme with the work of the Vienna Circle. Also [[Karl Popper]] was important for the reception and critique of their work, even though he never participated in the meetings of the Vienna Circle.
 
 
== References ==
*Ayer, Alfred Jules. ''Logical Positivism''. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1959.
*Barone, Francesco. ''Il neopositivismo logico''. Roma Bari: Laterza, 1986.
*Bergmann, Gustav. ''The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism''. New York: Longmans Green, 1954.
*Cirera, Ramon. ''Carnap and the Vienna Circle: Empiricism and Logical Syntax''. Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994.
*Friedman, Michael, ''Reconsidering Logical Positivism''. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
*Gadol, Eugene T. ''Rationality and Science: A Memorial Volume for Moritz Schlick in Celebration of the Centennial of his Birth''. Wien: Springer, 1982.
*Geymonat, Ludovico. ''La nuova filosofia della natura in Germania''. Torino, 1934.
*Giere, Ronald N. and Richardson, Alan W. ''Origins of Logical Empiricism''. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
*Kraft, Victor. The Vienna Circle: ''The Origin of Neo-positivism, a Chapter in the History of Recent Philosophy''. New York: Greenwood Press, 1953.
*McGuinness, Brian. ''Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann''. Trans. by Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1979.
*Parrini, Paolo; Salmon, Wesley C.; Salmon, Merrilee H. (ed.) ''Logical Empiricism - Historical and Contemporary Perspectives'', Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003.
*Salmon, Wesley and Wolters, Gereon (ed.), ''Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories: Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, 21-24 May 1991'', Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994.
*Sarkar, Sahotra. ''The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: From 1900 to the Vienna Circle''. New York: Garland Publishing, 1996.
*Sarkar, Sahotra. ''Logical Empiricism at its Peak: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath''. New York: Garland Pub., 1996.
*Sarkar, Sahotra. ''Logical Empiricism and the Special Sciences: Reichenbach, Feigl, and Nagel''. New York: Garland Pub., 1996.
*Sarkar, Sahotra. ''Decline and Obsolescence of Logical Empiricism: Carnap vs. Quine and the Critics''. New York: Garland Pub., 1996.
*Sarkar, Sahotra. ''The Legacy of the Vienna Circle: Modern Reappraisals''. New York: Garland Pub., 1996.
*Spohn, Wolfgang (ed.), ''Erkenntnis Orientated: A Centennial Volume for Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach'', Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
 
==See also==
[[Logical positivism]]


==External links==
[[Category:Suggestion Bot Tag]]
* [http://www.phil.gu.se/vienna.html Friends of the Vienna Circle]
* [http://www.murzim.net/LP/LP00.html The Philosophy of Logical Positivism]
* [http://www.univie.ac.at/ivc Institute Vienna Circle]
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry]

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The Vienna Circle (in German: der Wiener Kreis) was a group of philosophers and scientists from various disciplines who gathered around Moritz Schlick when he was called to the Vienna University in 1922. (Loosely associated with the Circle was the Verein Ernst Mach (Ernst Mach Society), as a forum for popular dissemination of its ideas.) The Vienna Circle became the main center of what was later called logical positivism. Among its members were Moritz Schlick, chairman of the Ernst Mach Society, Gustav Bergmann, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Kurt Gödel, Hans Hahn, Felix Kaufmann, Victor Kraft, Karl Menger, Marcel Natkin, Otto Neurath, Olga Hahn-Neurath, Theodor Radakovic, Friedrich Waismann. It was long thought that the members of the Vienna Circle had a uniform philosophical view, but recent research has emphasized its internal disagreements and controversies. Most members shared a certain basic empiricism as well as a preference for construing philosophical problems as technical problems of logic or mathematics.

History of the Vienna Circle

The prehistory of the Vienna Circle began with meetings on the philosophy of science and epistemology from 1907 on, promoted by Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Richard von Mises, and Otto Neurath.

Hans Hahn, the eldest of the three (1879-1934), was a mathematician. He received his degree in mathematics in 1902. Afterwards he studied under the direction of Ludwig Boltzmann in Vienna and David Hilbert, Felix Klein and Hermann Minkowski in Göttingen. In 1905 he received the Habilitation in mathematics. He taught at Innsbruck (1905-1906) and Vienna (from 1909).

Otto Neurath (1882-1945) studied sociology, economics and philosophy in Vienna and Berlin. From 1907 to 1914 he taught in Vienna at the Neuen Wiener Handelsakademie (Viennese Commercial Academy). Neurath married Olga, Hahn’s sister, in 1911.

Philipp Frank, the younger of the group (1884-1966), studied physics at Göttingen and Vienna with Ludwig Boltzmann, David Hilbert and Felix Klein. From 1912, he held the chair of theoretical physics in the German University in Prague.

Their meetings were held in Viennese coffeehouses from 1907 onward. Frank remembered:

After 1910 there began in Vienna a movement which regarded Mach’s positivist philosophy of science as having great importance for general intellectual life […] An attempt was made by a group of young men to retain the most essential points of Mach's positivism, especially his stand against the misuse of metaphysics in science. […] To this group belonged the mathematician H. Hahn, the political economist Otto Neurath, and the author of this book [i.e. Frank], at the time an instructor in theoretical physics in Vienna. […] We tried to supplement Mach’s ideas by those of the French philosophy of science of Henri Poincaré and Pierre Duhem, and also to connect them with the investigations in logic of such authors as Couturat, Schröder, Hilbert, etc. (cited from Uebel, Thomas, 2003, p.70).

Presumably the meetings stopped in 1912, when Frank went to Prague, where he held the chair of theoretical physics left vacant by Albert Einstein. Hahn left Vienna during the World War I and returned in 1921. The following year Hahn, with the collaboration of Frank, arranged to bring into the group Moritz Schlick, who held the chair of philosophy of the inductive sciences at the University of Vienna. Schlick had already published his two main works Raum und Zeit in die gegenwärtigen Physik (Space and Time in contemporary Physics) in 1917 and Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (General Theory of Knowledge) in 1918. A central frame of reference for the newly founded discussion group was the Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), published by Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1918.

Under the direction of Schlick, a new regular series of meetings began. In 1926 Schlick and Hahn arranged to bring in Rudolf Carnap at the University of Vienna. In 1928 the Verein Ernst Mach (Ernst Mach Society) was founded, with Schlick as chairman. In 1929 the Vienna Circle manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis (The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle) was published. The pamphlet is dedicated to Schlick, and its preface was signed by Hahn, Neurath and Carnap. In the appendix there is the list of the members of the Vienna Circle.

Moritz Schlick was killed in 1936 by a deranged student whose doctoral dissertation had been rejected. The rest of the Vienna Circle left Austria after the 1938 unification with Germany. Many of its members emigrated to the United States, where they taught at several universities.

The Vienna Circle manifesto

In 1929 the Vienna Circle published its central manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis (The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle). It states the scientific world-conception of the Vienna Circle, which is characterized “essentially by two features. First it is empiricist and positivist: there is knowledge only from experience […] Second, the scientific world-conception is marked by the application of a certain method, namely logical analysis.” (The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle in Sarkar, Sahotra, 1996, p. 331 – hereinafter VC).

Logical analysis is the method of clarification of philosophical problems; it makes an extensive use of the symbolic logic and distinguishes the Vienna Circle empiricism from earlier versions. The task of philosophy lies in the clarification - through the method of logical analysis - of problems and assertions.

Logical analysis shows that there are two different kinds of statements: one kind includes statements reducible to simpler statements about the empirically given; the other kind includes statements which cannot be reduced to statements about experience and thus devoid of meaning. Metaphysical statements belong to this second kind and therefore they are meaningless. Hence many philosophical problems are rejected as pseudo-problems which arise from logical mistakes, while others are re-interpreted as empirical statements and thus becomes the subject of scientific inquiries.

The Vienna Circle holds that the ambiguity of natural language is often the source for the logical mistakes of metaphysics. “Ordinary language for instance uses the same part of speech, the substantive, for things (‘apple’) as well as for qualities (‘hardness’), relations (‘friendship’), and processes (‘sleep’); therefore it misleads one into a thing-like conception of functional concepts” (VC p. 329). Another source of mistakes is “the notion that thinking can either lead to knowledge out of its own resources without using any empirical material, or at least arrive at new contents by an inference from given states of affair” (VC p. 330). The latter notion is typical in Kantian philosophy, according to which there are synthetic a priori statements that expand knowledge without experience. Synthetic a priori knowledge is rejected by the Vienna Circle. Mathematics, which at a first sight seems an example of necessarily valid synthetic knowledge derived from pure reason alone, has instead a tautological character, that is its statements are analytical statements, thus very different from Kantian synthetic a priori statements. The only two kinds of statements accepted by the Vienna Circle are synthetic a posteriori statements (i.e. scientific statements) and analytic a priori statements (i.e. logical and mathematical statements).

However, the persistence of metaphysics is connected not only with logical mistakes but also with “social and economical struggles” (VC p. 339). Metaphysics and theology are allied to traditional social forms, while the group of people who “faces modern times, rejects these views and takes its stand on the ground of empirical sciences” (VC p. 339). Thus the struggle between metaphysics and scientific world-conception is not only a struggle between different kinds of philosophies, but it is also—and perhaps primarily—a struggle between different political, social, and economical attitudes. Of course, as the manifesto itself acknowledged, “not every adherent of the scientific world-conception will be a fighter” (VC p. 339). Many historians of the Vienna Circle see in the latter sentence an implicit reference to a contrast between Moritz Schlick and the so-called "left wing" of the Vienna Circle, mainly represented by Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap. The aim of the left wing was to facilitate the penetration of the scientific world-conception in “the forms of personal and public life, in education, upbringing, architecture, and the shaping of economic and social life” (VC p. 339-340). Schlick, on the contrary, was primarily interested in the theoretical study of science and philosoph. Perhaps the sentence “Some, glad of solitude, will lead a withdrawn existence on the icy slopes of logic” (VC p. 339) is an ironic reference to Schlick.

Unified Science

A goal pursued by the Vienna Circle was unified science. In the beginning this goal meant the construction of a "constitutive system" in which every legitimate statement is reduced to the concepts of lower level which refer directly to the given experience. "The endeavour is to link and harmonise the achievements of individual investigators in their various fields of science" (VC p. 328). The idea of this constitutional system can also be found in Carnapűs Aufbau. From this aim follows the search for clarity, neatness, intersubjectivity, and for a neutral symbolic language that eliminates the problems arising from the ambiguity of natural language. Later, Carnap's interests changed form a constitutional system to a universal language. As an influence of Neurath this language was the physicalistic language. In Carnap's conception translatability to physical language was the basis of unified science. Neurath later emphasised that his concept of unity is not any strictly formal system. In Nuerath's view the unity of science means a "mosaic of everything".

The Vienna Circle published a collection, called Einheitswissenschaft (Unified science), edit by Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Joergen Joergensen (after Hahn's death) and Charles Morris (from 1938), the aim of which was to present an unified vision of science. With the start of World War II, the authors suspended the project. They had published seven monographs between 1933 and 1939. In 1938, American philosophers started a new series of publications called the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and while an ambitious project it was never completely devoted to unified science. Only the first section. Foundations of the Unity of Sciences, was published. It contains two volumes for a total of twenty monographs published from 1938 to 1969. As remembered by Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris in the Preface to the 1969 edition:

The Encyclopedia was in origin the idea of Otto Neurath. It was meant as a manifestation of the unity of science movement […] Original plans for the Encyclopedia were ambitious. In addition to the two introductory volumes, there was to be a section on the methodology of the sciences, one on the existing state of the unification of sciences, and possibly a section on the application of the sciences. It was planned that the work in its entirety would comprise about twenty-six volumes (260 monographs) (Foundations of the Unity of Sciences, vol. 1, The University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. vii).

Thomas Kuhn’s well-known The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published in this Encyclopedia in 1962 as the number two in the second volume.

The elimination of metaphysics

For more information, see: The elimination of metaphysics.


The attitude of Logical Positivism towards metaphysics in the eraly period is well expressed by Carnap in the article 'Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache' in Erkenntnis, vol. 2, 1932 (English translation 'The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language' in Sarkar, Sahotra, ed., Logical empiricism at its peak: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath, New York : Garland Pub., 1996, pp. 10-31).

A language – says Carnap – consists of a vocabulary, i.e. a set of meaningful words, and a syntax, i.e. a set of rules governing the formation of sentences from the words of the vocabulary. Pseudo-statements, i.e. sequences of words that at first sight resemble statements but in reality have no meaning, are formed in two ways: either meaningless words occur in them, or they are formed in an invalid syntactical way. According to Carnap, pseudo-statements of both kinds occur in metaphysics.


In the late 30's Carnap emphasyzed the distinction of formal and material mode of speech. Metaphisics was characterized in this era by Carnap as sentences, formulated in material mode of speech, which usually can be corrected by putting them in formal mode of speech.

Later, in Empiricism, Semantics and Ontollogy Carnap developed a theory of frameworks. He distingishued external and internal questions relative to the framwework. According to Carnap internal theoretical questions can be answered. Fopr example in arithmetic, one can decide and prove that "there exists no even prime number larger than 2". On the other hand the question "Are numbers really existing?" is not an internal question. This question as an external theoreticasl question is meaningles and usually these are the methaphysical questions.

External questions however can be put as practical questions "is the system of arythmetic useful in science? I.e. shall we accept the system as a tool?"

.

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