Talk:Moral hazard: Difference between revisions
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imported>Stephen Saletta No edit summary |
imported>Nick Gardner No edit summary |
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This is some nice work. I would suggest strengthening the behavioral point of the ''moral hazard problem'': individuals may change their behavior in the presence of insurance rather than the weaker claim that individuals will have less of an incentive to avoid accidents. I think the outline is good as well, when you get it filled out a bit more I'll be happy to clean up some of the grammar if you'd like. [[User:Stephen Saletta|Stephen Saletta]] 12:30, 4 December 2007 (CST) | This is some nice work. I would suggest strengthening the behavioral point of the ''moral hazard problem'': individuals may change their behavior in the presence of insurance rather than the weaker claim that individuals will have less of an incentive to avoid accidents. I think the outline is good as well, when you get it filled out a bit more I'll be happy to clean up some of the grammar if you'd like. [[User:Stephen Saletta|Stephen Saletta]] 12:30, 4 December 2007 (CST) | ||
I suggest extending this considerably in view of the current interest in banking crises. See for example [http://samvak.tripod.com/pp150.html] [[User:Nick Gardner|Nick Gardner]] 05:10, 9 March 2008 (CDT) | |||
Revision as of 04:10, 9 March 2008
This is some nice work. I would suggest strengthening the behavioral point of the moral hazard problem: individuals may change their behavior in the presence of insurance rather than the weaker claim that individuals will have less of an incentive to avoid accidents. I think the outline is good as well, when you get it filled out a bit more I'll be happy to clean up some of the grammar if you'd like. Stephen Saletta 12:30, 4 December 2007 (CST)
I suggest extending this considerably in view of the current interest in banking crises. See for example [1] Nick Gardner 05:10, 9 March 2008 (CDT)