General Intelligence Department (Saudi Arabia): Difference between revisions
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imported>Howard C. Berkowitz No edit summary |
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz No edit summary |
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| author = Steve Coll | | author = Steve Coll | ||
| publisher = Penguin | year = 2004 | | publisher = Penguin | year = 2004 | ||
| title = Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001}},pp. 79-82</ref> The general impression is that it does not have a direct action capability of its own, but recruits foreign individuals or groups. | | title = Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001}},pp. 79-82</ref> The general impression is that it does not have a direct action capability of its own, but recruits foreign individuals or groups; Turki was said to have told a CIA colleague "We don't do operations. We don't know how. All we know how to do is write checks."<ref>Quote attributed to Frank Anderson, a retired CIA officer and partner of journalist Nat Kern, quoted by Coll, p. 72</ref> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist}} | ||
Revision as of 18:21, 13 June 2009
Saudi Arabia's national intelligence service, the General Intelligence Department (GID), grew to substantial size in the 1970s, under the directorship of Prince Turki al-Faisal.
It was described as organizationally modeled after the Central Intelligence Agency, with directorates including operations and intelligence, as well as signals intelligence. [1] The general impression is that it does not have a direct action capability of its own, but recruits foreign individuals or groups; Turki was said to have told a CIA colleague "We don't do operations. We don't know how. All we know how to do is write checks."[2]