Arab Spring: Difference between revisions
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==National protest movements== | ==National protest movements== | ||
Protesters [[/Addendum#Tunisia|in Tunisia]] and [[/Addendum#Egypt|in Egypt]] succeeded within a few months in ousting their governments, and regime change was achieved in Libya after eight months of [[/Addendum#Civil war in Libya|civil war]]. The governments of Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Oman responded to more limited protests with promises of political and constitutional reform. [[/Addendum#Saudi Arabia|In Saudi Arabia]] the administration sought to avoid confrontation by a programme of infrastructure investment, and its forces were used to suppress dissent [[/Addendum#Bahrain|in Bahrain]]. Political instability in Lebanon inhibited governmental response to demonstrations for constitutional change. [[/Addendum#Yemen| | Protesters [[/Addendum#Tunisia|in Tunisia]] and [[/Addendum#Egypt|in Egypt]] succeeded within a few months in ousting their governments, and regime change was achieved in Libya after eight months of [[/Addendum#Civil war in Libya|civil war]]. The governments of Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Oman responded to more limited protests with promises of political and constitutional reform. [[/Addendum#Saudi Arabia|In Saudi Arabia]] the administration sought to avoid confrontation by a programme of infrastructure investment, and its forces were used to suppress dissent [[/Addendum#Bahrain|in Bahrain]]. Political instability in Lebanon inhibited governmental response to demonstrations for constitutional change. The protests in [[/Addendum#Yemen|Yemen]] led to the removal from power of its existing president and arrangements for a presidential electin in February 2012. In [[/Addendum#Syria|in Syria]], continuing protests are being met by violent military opposition, and the armed support of army defectors threatens a transition from peaceful protest to civil war. | ||
The process of establishing new constitutions and governments has advanced furthest in Tunisia, with the creation of a [[representative government]] led by a coalition of [[secularism|secularists]] and moderate [[Islamist]]s, and in Egypt, with the election of a predminantly Islamist assembly. In Libya it may be hampered by the need to disarm its local militias. The undeterred vigour of the protest | The process of establishing new constitutions and governments has advanced furthest in Tunisia, with the creation of a [[representative government]] led by a coalition of [[secularism|secularists]] and moderate [[Islamist]]s, and in Egypt, with the election of a predminantly Islamist assembly. In Libya it may be hampered by the need to disarm its local militias. The undeterred vigour of the protest movement in Syria suggests a continuing prospect of democratic transition there. Elsewhere in the Arab Spring countries, the prospects appear to be limited to partial relaxations of authoritarian governance. | ||
==Transition prospects== | ==Transition prospects== |
Revision as of 09:48, 22 January 2012
This article consists of: - the summary below; It was last updated (re Egypt) on 22 January 2012. |
The term Arab Spring (also known as the "Arab Awakening") refers to the sequence of protest movements that started in Tunisia in December 2010. The protests there, and subsequently in other Arab countries, were intended to put an end to government oppression, corruption and incompetence. They have led to the overthrow of existing regimes in Tunisia, in Egypt and in Libya, and to parliamentary elections in Tunisia and Egypt. The protest movement in Syria has so far been frustrated by governmental violence, and protest movements elsewhere in the Arab world have achieved little more than promises of minor reforms.
Background: the Arab condition
Before the uprisings, the political structures of nearly all of the countries involved had been categorised as authoritarian (with Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia ranking among the 15 least democratic countries[1]), and the governments of five of them have been categorised as exceptionally corrupt (Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Yemen appeared among the upper half in the ranking of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index) [2]. Their populations were predominately ethnically Arab with small native Berber minorities. Oil production had accounted for more than 20 percent of 2004 GDP in Libya (63), Oman and Saudi Arabia (42), Algeria (38), Yemen (32), Bahrain (28) and Syria (21). In Egypt the percentage was 12 and in Jordan, Lebanon, Morrcco and Tunis it was less than 4. [3]. The oil-producing countries of Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Libya had been among the world's more prosperous countries, but the prosperity of each of the others had been below, or well below the world average in terms of GDP per head, with Syria ranking 153rd out of a total of 228. According to the staff of the International Monetary Fund many of their economies were characterised by "stifling economic regulations, state involvement in production and employment, a private sector based on privilege rather than competitiveness, generalized price subsidies instead of targeted social protection, and an educational system that no longer delivers on the expectations of students or their potential employers". Unemployment rates were generally among the highest in the world and youth unemployment rates range from 21 percent in Lebanon to 30 percent in Tunisia[4]. At least 19% of the population lived below the poverty line at the end of the 1990s according to an estimate based upon data from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen,.[5].
National protest movements
Protesters in Tunisia and in Egypt succeeded within a few months in ousting their governments, and regime change was achieved in Libya after eight months of civil war. The governments of Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Oman responded to more limited protests with promises of political and constitutional reform. In Saudi Arabia the administration sought to avoid confrontation by a programme of infrastructure investment, and its forces were used to suppress dissent in Bahrain. Political instability in Lebanon inhibited governmental response to demonstrations for constitutional change. The protests in Yemen led to the removal from power of its existing president and arrangements for a presidential electin in February 2012. In in Syria, continuing protests are being met by violent military opposition, and the armed support of army defectors threatens a transition from peaceful protest to civil war.
The process of establishing new constitutions and governments has advanced furthest in Tunisia, with the creation of a representative government led by a coalition of secularists and moderate Islamists, and in Egypt, with the election of a predminantly Islamist assembly. In Libya it may be hampered by the need to disarm its local militias. The undeterred vigour of the protest movement in Syria suggests a continuing prospect of democratic transition there. Elsewhere in the Arab Spring countries, the prospects appear to be limited to partial relaxations of authoritarian governance.
Transition prospects
Political change
While there is little evidence that any of the protest movements had a predominately religious motivation, it is likely that religious organisations will influence the political and constitutional changes that are to follow. A variety of religiously-motivated political parties, collectively referred to as Islamist, are set to be opposed by a spectrum of secularist groups. In the Tunisian election of October 2011, a single Islamist party gained more assembly seats than any other party, but the majority of seats were shared among its four secularist opponents. In Egypt, the parliament is set to be dominated by moderate Islamists. In Libya, the process of forming political parties is in progress following the end of the civil war, in preparation for the election of a constitutional council and for the parliamentary elections that are to follow. The political outcome is everywhere uncertain.
Reconstruction
Reconstruction is considered to be a matter of some urgency because of the danger of further uprisings if conditions do not improve. According to a May 2011 report by the staff of the International Monetary Fund,[4] a substantial increase in economic growth rates will be needed, to achieve which the oil-importing countries will need external finance of at least $160 billion. The report recommended international support in the form of market access, credit guarantees, debt relief, and concessional lending. Provision for such support by means of the Deauville Partnership has since been agreed by the Group of Eight major industrialised countries; and an Arab Financing Facility for Infrastructure (AFFI)[6] has been created in order to supply the necessary external finance. For Libya, with its severely-damaged economy, the immediate task is to prevent a humanitarian tragedy, after which there is an urgent need to restart oil production.
As things stand, the economies of the MENA oil-exporting countries, (including Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, but excluding Libya), are forecast to expand by 4.9 percent in 2011, but those of the region’s oil importers (including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) are expected to grow by less than 2 percent[7].
The international response
The killing of civilians by Arab Spring governments drew strong protests by the United Nations and adverse reports by its agencies. The Security Council's authorisation of military intervention had a decisive influence on the civil war in Libya, but the United Nations had little influence on events elsewhere in the Arab world. Military interventionin Libya was undertaken by Nato with decisive participation by the United States, France and Britain. In what was termed a "new chapter in American diplomacy the United States undertook to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy. There was a similar undertaking by the European Union, although there were internal policy differences concerning military intervention in Libya. Opposition to military interventin was expressed by Russia and by China but both countries have given formal recognition to Libya's National Transitional Council. An undertaking to provide financial and technical support to Arab Spring transition programmes has been given by the governments of the Group of Eight major industrialised countries in the form of the Deauville Partnership.
References
- ↑ The Democracy Index 2010, Economist Intelligence Unit
- ↑ Corruption Perception :Index[1]
- ↑ Majid Al-Moneef: The Contribution of the Oil Sector to Arab Economic Development, IMF 2006
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Economic Transformation in MENA: Delivering on the Promise of Shared Prosperity, - a report prepared for the G8 Summit of 26 May 2011 by Staff of the International Monetary Fund
- ↑ Ali Abdel Gadir Ali: Poverty in the Arab Region: A Selective Review, (Background paper prepared for the IFPRI / API Collaborative Research Project on: Public Policy and Poverty Reduction in the Arab Region.) page 26
- ↑ Joint Declaration of the International Financial Institutions, G8 Information Centre, September 10, 2011
- ↑ Mideast Outlook Varies Markedly Across Region, IMF Survey, October 26, 2011