Vietnam War: Difference between revisions

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French Indochina Background

At the time of the French invasion, during the Second French Revolution with Louis Napoleon III as President, there were three parts of what is now Vietnam:

Cochinchina in the south, including the Mekong Delta and what was variously named Gia Dinh, Saigon, and Ho Chi Minh City
Annam in the center, but the mountainous Central Highlands, the home of the Montagnard peoples, considered itself autonomous
Tonkin in the North, including the Red River Delta, Hanoi, and Haiphong.

In 1858, France invaded Vietnam, and the ruling Nguyen dynasty accepted protectorate status. Cambodia and Laos also came under French control. Danang, then called Tourane, was captured in late 1858 and Gia Dinh (Saigon and later Ho Chi Minh City) in early 1859. In both cases Vietnamese Christian support for the French, predicted by the missionaries, failed to materialize.

Vietnamese resistance and outbreaks of cholera and typhoid forced the French to abandon Tourane in early 1860. They returned in 1861, with 70 ships and 3,500 men to reinforce Gia Dinh and. In June 1862, Emperor Tu Duc, signed the Treaty of Saigon.

French naval forces under Admiral de la Grandiere, the governor of Cochinchina (as the French renamed Nam Bo), demanded and received a protectorate status for Cambodia, on the grounds that the Treaty of Saigon had made France heir to Vietnamese claims in Cambodia. In June 1867, he seized the last provinces of Cochinchina. The Siamese government, in July, agreed to the Cambodian protectorate in return for receiving the two Cambodian provinces of Angkor and Battambang, to Siam. Siam was never under French control.

With Cochinchina secured, French naval and mercantile interests turned to Tonkin (as the French referred to Bac Bo).

Indochina under the Third French Republic

With the collapse of Napoleon III, in 1870, as a result of the Franco-Prussian War, the French Third Republic formed, and lasted until the Nazi conquest in 1940. Most of the key actions that set the context into which the Empire of Japan moved into the region happened during this period, and in the immediate aftermath under the Vichy goverment.

Few Frenchmen permanently settled in Indochina. Below the top layer of imperial control, the civil service comprised French-speaking Catholic Vietnamese; a nominal "Emperor" resided in Hue, the traditional cultural capital in north central Indonesia.

Little industry developed and 80% of the population lived in villages of about 2000 population; they depended on rice growing. Most were nominally Buddhist; about 10% were Catholic. Minorities included the Chinese merchants who controlled most of the commerce, and Montagnard tribesmen in the thinly populated Central Highlands. Vietnam was a relatively peaceful colony; sporadic independence movements were quickly suppressed by the efficient French secret police.

Indochinese Communist Party forms

Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) and fellow students founded the Indochinese Communist Party in Paris in 1929, but it was of marginal importance until World War II.^[2] In 1940 and 1941 the Vichy regime yielded control of Vietnam to the Japanese, and Ho returned to lead an underground independence movement (which received a little assistance from the O.S.S., the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency CIA).^[3]

World War II

Indochina, a French colony in the spheres of influence of Japan and China, was destined to be drawn into the Second World War both through European and Asian events. See Vietnam War, World War II and immediate postwar. From 1946 to 1948, the French reestablished control, but, in 1948, began to explore a provisional government. While there is no clear start to what ended in 1954, the more serious nationalist movement was clearly underway by 1948.

War of Indochinese independence

1948

Bao Dai participated in discussions about a provisional government, in which he might be an acceptable, if not ideal, head of state. The new government, established with Bao Dai as chief of state, was viewed critically by nationalists as well as communists. Most prominent nationalists, including Ngo Dinh Diem, refused positions in the government. Many went into voluntary exile. ^[4]

1949

Under French sponsorship in July, Bao Dai was named to head a provisional government, creating Vietnam from the Indochinese regions of Tonkin (north), Annam (central) and Cochinchina (south). Bao Dai said of it, "it is not a Bao Dai solution...but just a French solution." Among the many problems were that the non-Communist groups had too many conflicting ties, such as the VNQDD with the Chinese Kuomintang; the Constitutionalists, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen with France; the Dai Viet with Japan. Given this factionalism, the Viet Minh, accurately or not, enjoyed support as an uniquely Vietnamese faction.^[5]

1950

A January 5, 1950 memorandum from the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs described the U.S. policy assumption that ^[6] saw Vietnam as an autonomous state within the French Union, with Bao Dai, the former Emperor of Annam, as chief of state; U.S. policy was to strengthen him. The document said that Ho had been getting supplies from the Chinese Communists, but the extent was not known. A January 17 telegram from the Secretary of State said "Ho Chi Minh is not a patriotic nationalist but a Commie Party member with all the sinister implications in the relationship."^[7]

U.S. diplomatic traffic in January speaks of unpopularity of Bao Dai, and how he could be strengthened. The designated charge d'affaires of the presumed U.S. mission to Vietnam recommended de jure recognition of Bao Dai, "de facto recognition of Bao Dai, in the popular meaning of the term, would mean that Bao Dai was in control of certain areas, and we recognized him to that extent only. The question would certainly arise, and not only in Communist propaganda, as to whether, in fact, Ho Chi Minh was in control of a larger area and a larger number of souls."^[8]

France, on 29 January 1950, designated Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as autonomous "Associated States" within the French Union. Voting in the lower house of Parliament was (396-193) with 181 of the opposing votes coming from French parliamentarians.^[9] This was another example of the strength of the French Communist Party, which was a part of the U.S. geopolitical desire to support the Western-oriented parts of the French government. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. recognized them, which allowed direct military and economic assistance. The People's Republic of China responded by recognizing Ho's Democratic Republic of Vietnam, followed by Soviet recognition. Mao's revolutionary theory was praised in the Viet Minh press.

On 27 February the National Security Council issued memorandum 64 which dealt exclusively with United States policy toward Indochina. Its text included:

The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma
could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard. Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense should prepare as a matter of priority - [a] program of all practicable measures designed to protect U.S. interests in
Indochina. ^[10]

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported aid, they were conservative, saying "United States military aid not be granted unconditionally; rather, that it be carefully controlled and that the aid program be integrated with political and economic programs". Nevertheless, they saw little choice, assessing that Bao Dai's government could not survive without the 140,000 French soldiers in the field.

If the United States were now to insist upon independence for Vietnam and a phased French withdrawal from that country, this might improve the political situation. The French could be expected to interpose objections to, and certainly delays in, such a program. Conditions in Indochina, however, are unstable and the situation is apparently deteriorating rapidly so that the urgent need for at least an initial increment of military and economic aid is psychologically overriding.

They recommended an immediate USD $15,000,000 in aid, with additional funding granted in accordance with still-developing United States policy. ^[11]

President Truman, apparently without consulting any Members of Congress, approved the position on 24 April 1950 and the United States was officially committed to the Indochina war. "^[12]

The Korean War began in June.

As another example of the pattern of the start of an offensive in late fall or winter, in October 1950, the Viet Minh started a campaign against French forts along the Chinese border. Large Viet Minh forces, in divisional strength, defeated isolated forts one by one, until the main base at Lang Son evacuated prematurely. French losses included 6,000 men and huge quantities of supplies. ^[13]

1951

While the Indochinese Communist Party had gone underground, officially dissolved in 1945 to obsecure the Viet Minh's communist base, it resurfaced as the Vietnam Workers' Party in February, at a meeting called the Second National Party Congress of the ICP. Ho was elected chairman and Truong Chinh as general secretary.

Given that the French had fallen back to a line north of Hanoi, the Viet Minh focused on Tonkin and consigned Cochinchina to a lower priority. Giap wanted to free the northern areas to allow easy logistics from China, and launched a major offensive, with newly formed units of divisional strength. Their goal was to be in Hanoi by Tet in mid-February.

Giap did not fully appreciate, while he had tactical initiative, that the French had fallen back to a defensible line, behind which they had significant mobility, as opposed to their situation at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. A new French commander, Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, had taken over the Indochina command in December 1950.

Battle of Vinh Yen

The first Viet Minh attacks, on January 13, went well. On the 14th, however, de Lattre took personal command, called for the airlift into his area of troops 1000 kilometers away, and gathered every aircraft — combat or trainer — that could carry napalm. At the Battle of Vinh Yen, Viet Minh forces, in the open and without anti-aircraft artillery, came under the heaviest air attacks that the French ever delivered. It cost them over 6,000 men. ^[14]

Fall quotes a Viet Minh officer,

However, all of a sudden, hell opens in front of my eyes. Hell comes in the form of large, egg-shaped containers dropping from the first plane, followed by other eggs from the second and third planes. Immense sheets of flmes, extending over hundreds of meters, it seems, strike terror into the ranks of my soldiers. This is napalm, the fire which falls from the skies.

As the oficer fell back, he urged a platoon commander to hold the French as long as possible while he reformed his troops. The junior officer's eyes were wide with terror "What is this? The atomic bomb?"

"No, it is napalm."^[15] urging one of his platoon commanders to hold the advancing French infantry, while under air attack.

On 23 March, Giap tried again, striking at the Hanoi area from the east, across the Day River, towards Haiphong. This time, the French did not meet his open forces with air power, but with the fire from naval forces from the river. ^[16]

North Vietnamese political and organizational changes

These defeats caused low morale and desertions. Giap's political opponent in the Viet Minh, Truong Chinh, attempted to have him relieved, and Giap survived with humiliation. Giap had learned a valuable lesson.

The countryside was to encircle the towns, the mountains were to dominate the rice lands of the plains. ^[17]

He changed to leading the French on futile but costly chases. He encouraged them to defend static positions while he kept mobile, until, in 1954, he could fight a set-piece battle on his terms: Dien Bien Phu.

There were other political changes. While the military force continued, informally, to be called Viet Minh, the Viet Minh was formally absorbed into the "National Union of Viet Nam", or Lam Viet.^[18]

De Lattre ordered an offensive to take Hoa Binh, with a first phase, Operation Tulipe, on November 10, 1951. General Salan had tactical control of the operation. By November 19, the force had taken Hoa Binh.

Giap did not stop his plans for an upcoming attack in the Red River delta, but counterattacked toward Hoa Binh, with the focus on Tu Vu. He took Tu Vu with heavy casualties on both sides.^[19] Using it as a base, he began to reduce French pockets along the Black River, leading to Hoa Binh. The French fell back to the river, with uncomfortable similarities to the site-by-site movement against the norther fort line in October 1950. He also was able to block French river convoys moving to Hoa Binh.^[20]

1952

On February 5, Salan decided to make a fighting withdrawal from Hoa Binh, on the grounds that the troops were needed in the defense of the Red River delta; the retreat was over by the 23rd.^[21] There are suggestions he considered that a strong Delta defense had the chance of producing another Battle of Vinh Yen, where the French were able to mass air power on attacking troops in the open.

In April, Salan was named de Lattries' replacement.

Fall and Winter 1952

On October 17, 1952, the Communist forces opened a fall offensive with a three-division attack in the T'ai hill country of the North, centering on Nghia-Lo, which anchored the French static defense line in the area.

Senior French commanders, remembering the disastrous results to their border forts in 1950, decided to pull back, having one paratroop battalion jump in as a sacrificial rear guard. There had changes on the French side. Salan had held Na San, in October, trying to repeat the Vinh Yen victory with a strongpoint there, but the wiser Communists bypassed it. They took Nghia Loa in October and Dien Bien Phu in November; Dien Bien Phu had earlier been abandoned by the French. ^[22]

The paratroops held, taking heavy casualties, especially at Tu-Le Pass. The paratroops, in turn, asked a company of irregulars, at Muong-Chen, to hold while they escaped. 16 out of 84 of that unit survived. ^[23]

A deep counterattack, called Operation Lorraine, was prepared, using the largest French force in any one mission, approximately 30,000 men. Airborne and riverine units again surprised the enemy with their speed, as in Operation Lea in 1947.

After another parachute landing and link-up with tanks, in early November, French forces found, at Phu Duan, by no means a major depot new Soviet-built equipment. This included trucks, light through heavy mortars, and up-to-date individual weapons. Colonel Dodelier, commanding the operation, pointed out the strength of this secondary depot even after the Viet Minh had impressed local labor to remove all that cound be removed. He reflected "...how large the Viet Minh main depots in Ŷen Bay and Thai Nguyên must be. This certainly sheds a new light on the enemy's future offensive intentions."^[24]

Giap had refused battle and continued to hold his Black River postions, and it was realized that Operation Lorraine had taken a position that was of no value. Salan ordered the Lorraine troops to begin a retreat, which began successfully but ran into major ambushes on the 17th. On November 23, Giap counterattacked against Na San, taking two outposts, but 308 Division was repulsed at Na San, with heavy losses. ^[25] By December 1, the French had destroyed Black River bridges and fallen back, with casualties equalling the strength of a battalion, yet not establishing — Na San was not it — the strongpoint against which the Communists would smash themselves, as they did at the Battle of Vinh Yen. They were to try once again to establish such a strongpoint, at a place called Dien Bien Phu.^[26].

1953

In April, having completed their tours of duty, Salan and his key staff officers returned to France.^[27] Henri Navarre, a protege of the senior solder of France, Marshal Alphonse Juin, replaced the mortally ill de Lattre on May 28. He had no Asian experience, and there were questions about his choices of staff and subordinates. ^[28]

Politics

The French established Bao Dai, who had called for, in the absence of a legislature, for major political leaders to join in a "National Congress" in Saigon. He thought it might strengthen his hand when he negotiated with the French. Bernard Fall, who attended, wrote: "That National Congress ... became a monumental free-for-all in which nationalists of all hues and shades concentrated on settling long-standing scores and in outbidding each other in extreme demands on the French and on the Vietnamese Government."^[29]

French form a "fire brigade"

After the end of the Korean War, the French transferred their force to Indochina, the Bataillion de Corée, which had distinguished itself, to Indochina. On November 15, 1953, an reaction force, Groupe Mobile 100 (GM100), was created, with a core of the Korean veterans. ^[30]

The Dien Bien Phu strongpoint

Navarre, apparently in response to Thai pressure under the Franco-Thai treaty, decided to reoccupy Dien Bien Phu as a step to pacifying the Thai region of Indochina. Paratroopers jumped into Dien Bien Phu on November 20. Navarre also saw it as defending northern Laos, although General Catroux, the head of the subsequent French investigation into the disaster there, said it was quite limited in the area it could dominate.^[31] It was harder to understand why the French thought it was a valid strongpoint. Navarre, and Pierre Koenig, a distinguished WWII commander, said that a group of U.S. experts had inspected the location and assured the French that plausible Russian anti-aircraft artillery could not interfere with its resupply by air, and that French artillery could defeat any Communist artillery in the surrounding hills. Catroux's investigation put special blame on the northern theater commander, Cogny, for not seriously testing the optimistic assumptions. ^[32]

Giap threatened Lai Chau, in Thailand, in December.^[33]

1954

The North Vietnamese began their attack on Dien Bien Phu on March 12, with a force of 50,000 regular troops, 55,000 support troops, and 100,000 transport workers, versus 15,000 French. They had managed, quite beyond French expectation, to put well-protected artillery and air defenses into the surrounding high ground, making air resupply almost impossible. Brigadier General de Castries, commanding Dien Bien Phu, was a paratroop leader, skilled in the offensive but not an expert in dogged defense.

By March 15, the French realized that it could not be held, and appealed for U.S. intervention. Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff and recommended, on five occasions, that the U.S. do so, but neither the other JCS members nor President Eisenhower supported him.

When Colonel Piroth, the fortress artillery commander, realized the situation in which his weapons were outclassed, he committed suicide on the night of March 16. When the French Defense Minister and Chief of Staff inspected on February 9, he had refused more equipment, saying he had more than he needed; the French had no idea how much the Vietnamese had emplaced. ^[34] While Chinese aid, literally carried 350 kilometers, reached 1,500 tons per month, the Viet Minh artillery closed the Dien Bien Phu airfield, the sole source of spply, on March 27.

Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7; the Geneva Conference began the next day.

GM100 dies

GM 100 had had some success in relieving An Khe in April. On June 24, however, GM100 was ambushed and destroyed.^[35] There was a different outcome at almost the same spot, in 1965.

War's end

Officially, the war ended on July 20. Prisoner exchanges showed an unexpectedly high number of the French captives of the North Vietnamese had died in the prison camps, and that there had been, as in the Korean War, systematic pressure for conversion to the Communist cause.

1954 (post-French)-1956

See also: Vietnam, war, and the United States

See also: Vietnam War, Buddhist crisis and military coup of 1963

This period was begun by the military defeat of the French, with a Geneva meeting that partitioned Vietnam into North and South. Two provisions of the agreement never took place: a referendum on unification in 1956, and also banned foreign military support and intervention.

Also, after the end of French rule, Laos became independent, but with a struggle there among political factions, with neutralists heading the government and a strong Pathet Lao insurgency. Laos, also not to have had foreign military involvement according to the Geneva agreement, quickly had the beginnings of U.S. involvement as well as the continuing effects of North Vietnam sponsoring the Pathet Lao.

In a section titled "The Viet Minh Residue", the Pentagon Papers cited a study of 23 Viet Minh who had, according to U.S. analysts, gave consistent stories of being given stay-behind roles by the Viet Minh leadership going north. Some were given political roles, while others were told to await orders. "It is quite clear that even the activists were not instructed to organize units for guerrilla war, but rather to agitate politically for the promised Geneva elections, and the normalization of relations with the North. They drew much reassurance from the presence of the ICC, and up until mid-1956, most held on to the belief that the elections would take place. They were disappointed in two respects: not only were the promised elections not held, but the amnesty which had been assured by the Geneva Settlement was denied them, and they were hounded by the Anti-Communist campaign. After 1956, for the most part, they went "underground.""^[36]

1954

Ngo Dinh Diem arrived in Saigon from France on 25 June 1954. and, with U.S. and French support, was named Premier of the State of Vietnam by Emperor Bao Dai, who had just won French assent to "treaties of independence and association" on 4 June.

The Saigon regime's major campaign that summer for inducing hundreds of thousands of Northerners to migrate to the South reflected a major political problem facing Diem-that of creating a popular base in the South. He was an Annamite, from Central Vietnam (although not the Central Highlands) in the South upon taking power. In seeking political support from Southerners, Diem was severely handicapped by the French postponement until after World War II of active preparations for Vietnamese self-government.

A major task was to create a viable alternative to the Vietminh in areas controlled by the French Army, especially the cities and towns, but also in pockets of the rural areas inhabited by people of the regional or "folk" religions, such as the Cao Dai. The base of this political alternative would be the small Vietnamese upper class which had been raised up by French colonial institutions. The French had already found, however, that this foundation was shaky; it lacked the coherence and strength of a well-established ruling class, and it was engaged in constant squabbling. ^[37]

Initial covert operations

The initial CIA team in Saigon was the Saigon Military Mission, headed by United States Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale, who arrived on 1 June 1954. His diplomatic cover job was Assistant Air Attache. The broad mission for the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare. ^[38]

Working in close cooperation with the United States Information Agency (USIA), a new psychological warfare campaign was devised for the Vietnamese Army and for the government in Hanoi. Shortly after, a refresher course in combat psychological warfare was constructed and Vietnamese Army personnel were rushed through it.

The second SMM member, MAJ Lucien Conein, arrived on July 1. A paramilitary specialist, well-known to the French for his help with French-operated maquis in Tonkin against the Japanese in 1945, he was the one American guerrilla fighter who had not been a member of the Patti Mission. Conein was to have a continuing role, especially in the coup that overthrew Diem in November 1963. In August, Conein was sent to Hanoi, to begin forming a guerilla organization

A second paramilitary team for the south was formed, with Army LT Edward Williams doing double duty as the only experienced counter-espionage officer, working with revolutionary political groups.

External intelligence analysis

In August, a National Intelligence Estimate, produced by the CIA, predicted that the Communists, legitimized by the Geneva agreement, would take quick control of the North, and plan to take over all of Vietnam. The estimate went on that Diem's government was opposed both by Communist and non-Communist elements. Pro-French factions were seen as preparing to overthrow it, while Viet Minh would take a longer view. Under command of the north, Viet Minh individuals and small units will stay in the south and create an underground, discredit the government, and undermine French-Vietnamese relations. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; invalid names, e.g. too many

US personnel dealing with the Government of Vietnam had difficulty in understanding the politics. The diplomats were not getting clear information in 1954 and early 1955, but the CIA station "had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corruption, connections, and so on." ^[38]

1955

By 31 January 1955, a paramilitary group had cached its supplies in Haiphong, having had them shipped by Civil Air Transport, a CIA proprietary airline belonging to the Directorate of Support

1956-1959 (up to North Vietnamese decision to invade)

As mentioned above, Viet Minh went underground in 1956, but there was no major decision until 1959. A 1964 interrogation report said "The period from the Armistice of 1954 until 1958 was the darkest time for the VC in South Vietnam. The political agitation policy proposed by the Communist Party could not be carried out due to the arrest of a number of party members by RVN authorities...In 1959 the party combined its political agitation with its military operations, and by the end of 1959 the combined operations were progressing smoothly." Note that this prisoner did not deny there were guerilla operations, but the document does not identify specific acts until 1957.

Under the French, the Montagnard tribes of the Central Highlands had had autonomy from the lowland colonial government. In 1956, these areas were absorbed into the Republic of Vietnam, and Diêm moved ethnic Vietnamese, as well as refugees from the North, into "land development centers" in the Central Highlands. Diem intended to assimilate the unwilling tribes, a point of ethnic resentment that was to become one of the many resentments against Diem.^[39] These resentments both cost internal support, and certainly were exploited by the Communists.

1957

Guerilla attacks reported in 1957 included the killing of a group, not further identified, of 17 people in Chau-Doc in July, 1957. A District chief and his family were killed in September. In October, the clandestine radio of the "National Salvation Movement" began to broadcast support for armed opposition to Diem. Operations appeared to solidify in October, beyond what might have been small group actions:

In Washington, U.S. intelligence indicated that the "Viet Minh underground" had been directed to conduct additional attacks on U.S. personnel "whenever conditions are favorable." U.S. intelligence also noted a total of 30 armed "terrorist incidents initiated by Communist guerillas" in the last quarter of 1957, as well as a "large number" of incidents carried out by "Communist-lead [sic] Hoa Hao and Cao Dai dissident elements," and reported "at least" 75 civilians or civil officials assassinated or kidnapped in the same period.^[40]

1958

Beginning with a plantation raid in January and a truck ambush in Febrary, there was steady guerilla ambushes and raids became more regular in 1958, and of serious concern to the GVN. This intensity level was consistent with Mao's Phase I, "the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive." ^[41] Mao's use of "strategic defensive" refers to the guerilla force making its presence known and building its organization, but not attempting to engage military units. George Carver, the principal CIA analyst on Vietnam, said in a Foreign Affairs article,

A pattern of politically motivated terror began to emerge, directed against the representatives of the Saigon government and concentrated on the very bad and the very good. The former were liquidated to win favor with the peasantry; the latter because their effectiveness was a bar to the achievement of Communist objectives. The terror was directed not only against officials but against all whose operations were essential to the functioning of organized political society, school teachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc. The scale and scope of this terrorist and insurrectionary activity mounted slowly and steadily. By the end of 1958 the participants in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon quite accurately termed the "Viet Cong," constituted a serious threat to South Viet Nam's political stability"

Fall reported that the GVN lost almost 20% of its village chiefs through 1958.^[40]

1959-1964 (up to Gulf of Tonkin incident)

To put the situation in a strategic perspective, remember that North and South Vietnam were artificial constructs of the 1954 Geneva agreements. While there had been several regions of Vietnam, when roughly a million northerners, of different religion and ethnicity than in the south, migrated into a population of four to five million, there were identity conflicts. Communism has been called a secular religion, and the North Vietnamese government officials responsible for psychological warfare and prisoner-of-war indoctrination were Military Proselytizing cadre. Communism, for its converts, was an organizing belief system that had no equivalent in the South. At best, the southern leadership intended to have a prosperous nation, although leaders were all too often focused on personal prosperity. Their Communist counterparts, however, had a mission of conversion by the sword — or the AK-47 assault rifle.

Traditional ethnic geography of Vietnam

Between the 1954 Geneva accords and 1956, the two countries were still forming; the influence of major powers, especially France and the United States, and to a lesser extent China and the Soviet Union, were as much an influence as any internal matters. There is little question that in 1957-1958, there was a definite early guerilla movement against the Diem government, involving individual assassinations, expropriations, recruiting, shadow government, and other things characteristic of Mao's Phase I. The actual insurgents, however, were primarily native to the south or had been there for some time. While there was clearly communications and perhaps arms supply from the north, there is little evidence of any Northern units in the South, although organizers may well have infiltrated.

It is now confirmed that North Vietnam made a firm commitment, May 1959, to war in the South. Diem, well before that point, had constantly pushed a generic anticommunism, but how much of this was considered a real threat, and how much a nucleus around which he justified his controls, is less clear. Those controls, and the shutdown of most indigenous opposition by 1959, was clearly alienating the Diem government from significant parts of the Southern population, was massively mismanaging rural reforms and overemphasizing the power base in the cities, and might have had an independent rebellion. North Vietnam, however, clearly began to exploit that alienation. The U.S., however, did not recognize a significant threat, even with such information as intelligence on the formation of the logistics structure for infiltration. The presentation of hard evidence — communications intelligence about the organization building the Ho Chi Minh trail — Hanoi's involvement in the developing strife became evident. Not until 1960, however, did the U.S. recognize both Diem was in danger, that the Diem structure was inadequate to deal with the problems, and present the first "Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam (CIP)"

It can be established that there was endemic insurgency in South Vietnam throughout the period 1954-1960. It can also be established-but less surely- that the Diem regime alienated itself from one after another of those elements within Vietnam which might have offered it political support, and was grievously at fault in its rural programs. That these conditions engendered animosity toward the GVN seems almost certain, and they could have underwritten a major resistance movement even without North Vietnamese help.

There is little doubt that there was some kind of Viet Minh-derived "stay behind" organization betweeen 1954 and 1960, but it is unclear that they were directed to take over action until 1957 or later. Before that, they were unquestionably recruiting and building infrastructure, a basic first step in a Maoist protracted war mode.

While the visible guerilla incidents increased gradually, the key policy decisions by the North were made in 1959. Early in this period, there was a greater degree of conflict in Laos than in South Vietnam. U.S. combat involvement was, at first, greater in Laos, but the activity of advisors, and increasingly U.S. direct support to South Vietnamese soldiers, increased, under U.S. military authority, in late 1959 and early 1960. Communications intercepts in 1959, for example, confirmed the start of the Ho Chi Minh trail and other preparation for large-scale fighting.

Guerilla attacks increased in the early 1960s, at the same time as the new John F. Kennedy administration made Presidential decisions to increase its influence. Diem, as other powers were deciding their policies, was clearly facing disorganized attacks and internal political dissent. There were unquestioned conflicts between the government, dominated by minority Northern Catholics, and both the majority Buddhists and minorities such as the Montagnards, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao. These conflicts were exploited, initially at the level of propaganda and recruiting, by stay-behind Viet Minh receiving orders from the North.

Republic of Vietnam strategy

Quite separate from its internal problems, South Vietnam faced an unusual military challenge. On the one hand, there was a threat of a conventional, cross-border strike from the North, reminiscent of the Korean War. In the fifties, the U.S. advisors focused on building a "mirror image" of the U.S. Army, designed to meet and defeat a conventional invasion. ^[36]

Diem (and his successors) were primarily interested in using the ARVN as a device to secure power, rather than as a tool to unify the nation and defeat its enemies. Province and District Chiefs in the rural areas were usually military officers, but reported to political leadership in Saigon rather than the military operational chain of command. The 1960 "Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam (CIP)" from the U.S. MAAG was a proposal to change what appeared to be a dysfunctional structure. ^[36] Further analysis showed the situation was not only jockeying for power, but also reflected that the province chief indeed had security authority that could conflict with that of tactical military operations in progress, but also had responsibility for the civil administration of the province. That civil administration function became more and more intertwined, starting in 1964 and with acceleration in 1966, of the "other war" of rural development.^[42]

Communist strategy

The North had clearly defined political objectives, and a grand strategy, involving military, diplomatic, covert action and psychological operations to achieve those objectives. Whether or not one agreed with those objectives, there was a clear relationship between long-term goals and short-term actions. Its military first focused on guerilla and raid warfare in the south (i.e., Mao's "Phase I"), simultaneously improving the air defensives of the north. By the mid-sixties, they were operating in battalion and larger military formation that would remain in contact as long as the correlation of forces was to their advantage, and then retreat &mdash Mao's "Phase II".

Eventually, following the Maoist doctrine of protracted war, the final "Phase III" offensive was by conventional forces, the sort that the U.S. had tried to build a defense against when the threat was from guerrillas. T-54 tanks that broke down the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon were not driven by ragged guerrillas.

In the Viet Cong, and in the North Vietnam regular army (PAVN), every unit had political officers, or Proselytizing Cadre. The Viet Cong had many unwilling draftees of its own; tens of thousands deserted to the government, which promised them protection. The Viet Cong executed deserters if it could, and threatened their families, all the while closely monitoring the ranks for any sign of defeatism or deviation from the party line.^[43]

1959

Diem,in early 1959, felt under attack and broadly reacted against all forms of opposition, which was presented as a "Communist Denunciation Campaign", as well as some significant and unwelcome rural resettlement, the latter to be distinguished from land reform.

Increased activity in Laos

In May, the North Vietnamese made the commitment to an armed overthrow of the South, creating the 559th Transportation Group, named after the creation date, to operate the land route that became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Additional transportation groups were created for maritime supply to the South: Group 759 ran sea-based operations, while Group 959 supplied the Pathet Lao by land routes. ^[44]. Group 959 also provided secure communications to the Pathet Lao. ^[45]

The Pathet Lao both were operating against the Laotian government, but also working with NVA Group 959 to supply the southern insurgency; much of the original Trail was in Laos, first supplying the Pathet Lao. Nevertheless. the Laotian government did not want it known that it was being assisted by the US in the Laotian Civil War against the Pathet Lao. U.S. military assistance could also be considered a violation of the Geneva agreement, although North Vietnam, and its suppliers, were equally in violation.

In July, CIA sent a unit from United States Army Special Forces, who arrived on CIA proprietary airline Air America, wearing civilian clothes and having no obvious US connection. These soldiers led Meo and Hmong tribesmen against Communist forces. The covert program was called Operation Hotfoot. At the US Embassy, BG John Heintges was called the head of the "Program Evaluation Office."^[46]

CIA directed Air America, in August 1959, to train two helicopter pilots. Originally, this was believed to be a short-term requirement, but "this would be the beginning of a major rotary-wing operation in Laos.

Escalation and respons in the South

Cause and effect are unclear, but it is also accurate that the individual and small group actions, by the latter part of 1959, included raids by irregulars in battalion strength.

Vietnam was a significant part of the agenda of the U.S. Pacific commanders' conference in April. Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, chief of the U.S. Militiary Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam,^[47] cited the key concerns as:

absence of a national plan for control of the situation
no rotation of military units in the field
the need for a central surveillance plan
the proliferation of Ranger-type counterinsurgency units without central direction and without a civil-military contetx
inadequate intelligence
inadequate military communications
lack of centralized direction of the war effort.

LTG Williams pointed to the dual chain of command of the ARVN, as distinct from the Civil Guard. The latter was commanded by the Department of the Interior, and controlled by province and district chiefs. This structure let the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM, the contemporary term for non-military foreign aid from the Agency for International Development financially aid the Guard, they were so dispersed that there could be no systematic advice, much less to the combination of Guard and Army. ^[48]

Under the authority of the commander of United States Pacific Command, it was ordered that Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAG-V) assign advisors to the infantry regiment and special troops regiment level, who were not to participate directly in combat. advisers be provided down to infantry regiment and to artillery, armored, and separate Marine battalion level. This move would enable advisers to give on-the-spot advice and effectively assess the end result of the advisory effort. He also requested United States Army Special Forces (SF) mobile training teams (MTT) to assist in training ARVN units in counterinsurgency.

Structural barriers to effectiveness of RVN forces

When the MAAG was instructed to improve the effectiveness of the RVN, the most fundamental problem was that the Diem government had organized the military and paramilitary forces not for effectiveness, but for political control and patronage. The most obvious manifestation of Diem's goal was that there were two parallel organizations, the regular military under the Department of National Defense and the local defense forces under the Ministry of the Interior. Diem was the only person who could give orders to both.

Command and control

President Diem appointed the Secretary of State for National Defense and the Minister of the Interior. The Defense Secretary directed of General Staff chief and several special sub-departments. The General staff chief, in turn, commanded the Joint General Staff (JGS), which was both the top-level staff and the top of the military chain of command.

There were problems with the military structure, even before considering the paramilitary forces under the Interior Ministry. The JGS itself had conflicting components with no clear authority. For example, support for the Air Force came both from a Director of Air Technical Service and a Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Matériel. The Director was, in principle, under the Chief of Staff., but actually reported to the Director General of Administration, Budget, and Comptroller for fiscal matters).

Combat units also had conflicting chains of command. A division commander might receive orders both from the corps-level tactical commander who actually carried out the operational art role of corps commanders in most militaries, but also from the regional commander of the home base of the division — even if the division was operating in another area. The chiefs of branches of service (e.g., infantry, artillery), who in most armies were responsible only for preparation and training of personnel of their branch, and orders only before they were deployed, would give direct operational orders to units in the field.

Diem himself, who had no significant military background, could be the worst micromanager of all, getting on a radio in the garden of the Presidential Palace, and issuing orders to regiments, bypassing the Department of National Defense, Joint General Staff, operational commanders, and division commanders. In fairness to Diem, Lyndon Johnson and his political advisors would do detailed air operations planning for attacks in the North, with no input from experienced air officers. Henry Kissinger, in the Mayaguez incident, got onto the tactical radio net and confused the local commanders with German-accented and obscure commands. Of course, Johnson and Kissinger had more military experience than Diem; Johnson had briefly worn a Navy uniform on an inspection trip before returning to Congress, and Kissinger lectured on politics at the end of WWII and the start of the Occupation, with a high status but an actual rank of Private, United States Army.

"The Department of National Defense and most of the central organizations and the ministerial services were located in downtown Saigon, while the General Staff (less air and navy elements) was inefficiently located in a series of company-size troop barracks on the edge of the city. The chief of the General Staff was thus removed several miles from the Department of National Defense. The navy and air staffs were also separately located in downtown Saigon. With such a physical layout, staff action and decision-making unduly delayed on even the simplest of matters.

"The over-all ministerial structure described above was originally set up by the French and slightly modified by presidential decree on 3 October 1957. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, had proposed a different command structure which would have placed the ministry and the "general staff" in closer proximity both physically and in command relationship. But the proposal was not accepted by President Diem, perhaps because he wished to continue to maintain a division of power and prevent any one individual--other than himself--from having too much authority. Thus, during the period in question, the existing system was accepted by the advisory group which, in turn, served as lubrication for its more delicate components.

The chain of command of both the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, went from the Ministry of the Interior to the province chiefs, district chiefs, and village councils. Even though the province chiefs and district chiefs were often military officers, ARVN units operating in a province or district could not give orders to these units. Instead, they had to pass a request through military channels to the Ministry of Defense in Saigon. If the officials there agreed, they would convey the request to their counterparts in the Ministry of the Interior, who would then send orders down its chain of command to the local units.

Regular military

Three corps headquarters and a special military district:^[49]
- I Corps at Da Nang for the northern and central areas; the Central Highlands were separate
- II Corps at Pleiku for the Central Highlands provinces
- III Corps at Saigon for the southern part of the country
- Saigon city special military district.
Seven divisions of 10,450 men
- three infantry regiments
- artillery battalion
- mortar battalion
- engineer battalion
- company-size support elements
Airborne group of five battalion groups
four armored cavalry "regiments" (approximately the equivalent of a U.S. Army cavalry squadron)
- one squadron (U.S. troop) of M24 light tanks
- two squadrons of M8 self-propelled 75-mm. howitzers
Eight independent artillery battalions with U.S. 105-mm, and 155-mm. pieces.

Local defense forces

Created by presidential decree in April 1955, and originally under the direct control of President Diem, with control passed to the Ministry of the Interior in September 1958, the Civil Guard was made up of wartime paramilitary veterans. Its major duty was to relieve the ARVN of static security missions, freeing it for mobile operations, with additional responsibility for local intelligence collection and counterintelligence. in 1956, had 68,000 men organized into rganized into companies and platoons, the Civil Guard was represented by two to eight companies in each province. It had a centrally controlled reserve of eight mobile battalions of 500 men each, .

Operating on a local basis since 1955 and formally created in 1956, the Self-Defense corps was a village-level police organization, for protection against intimidation and subversion. It put units of 4-10 men into villages of 1,000 or more residents. In 1956, it had 48,000 non-uniformed troops armed with French weapons. The Self-Defense Corps, like the Civil Guard, was established to free regular forces from internal security duties by providing a police organization at village level to protect the population from subversion and intimidation. Units of four to ten men each were organized in villages of 1,000 or more inhabitants.

The Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps were poorly trained and ill-equipped to perform their missions, and by 1959 their numbers had declined to about 46,000 and 40,000, respectively.

1960

As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the U.S. was urging the RVN to revise its parallel province/district command and military operations command structure; the Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) was the first of several such proposals.

Laotian operations

After the 180 day assignment of the Special Forces personnel in Laos, the name changed to Operation White Star, under COL Arthur "Bull" Simons.

Beginning of Phase II raids

On 25 January 1960, a Communist force of 300 to 500 men escalated with a direct raid on an ARVN base at Tay Ninh, killing 23 soldiers and taking large quantities of munitions. Four days later, a guerilla group seized a town for several hours, and stole cash from a French citizen. These were still in the first Maoist stage, as raids rather than hit-and-run battles. Still, larger guerilla forces broke lines of communications within areas of South Vietnam.

There was uncertainty, expressed by Bernard Fall and in a March U.S. intelligence assessment, that there were distinct plans to conduct larger-scale operations "under the flag of the People's Liberation Movement," which was identified as "red, with a blue star." It was uncertain if their intent was to continue to build bases in the Mekong Delta, or to isolate Saigon. The Pentagon Papers stated the guerillas were establishing three options, of which they could exercise one or more;

incite an ARVN revolt
set up a popular front government in the lower Delta
force the GVN into such repressive countermeasures that popular uprisings will follow.

Formation of the NLF

In December, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) formally declared its existence, although it did not hold its first full congress until 1962.

The NLF platform recognized some of the internal stresses under the Diem government, and put language in its platform to create autonomous regions in minority areas and for the abolition of the "U.S.-Diêm clique's present policy of ill-treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationalities". ^[39] Such zones, with a sense of identity although certainly not political autonomy, did exist in the North. In the early 60s, NLF political organizers went to the Montagnard ares in the Central Highlands, and worked both to increase alienation from the GVN and directly recruit supporters.

1961

Not surprisingly, with a change in U.S. administration, there were changes in policy, and also continuations of some existing activities. There were changes in outlook. Kennedy was unquestionably anti-Communist, but his administration did not treat it as the existential crusade that Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, had waged.

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara (in office 1961-68) told President John F. Kennedy (in office 1961-63) in 1961 it was "absurd to think that a nation of 20 million people can be subverted by 15-20 thousand active guerrillas if the government and the people of that country do not wish to be subverted."^[50] McNamara, a manufacturing executive and expert in statistical management, had no background in guerilla warfare or other than Western culture, and rejected advice from area specialists and military officers. He preferred to consult with his personal team, often called the "Whiz Kids"; his key foreign policy advisor was a law professor, John McNaughton, while economist Alain Enthoven was perhaps his closest colleague.

Still trying to resolve the problems of GVN conflicting command, a new reorganizational proposal, the "Geographically Phased Plan". The goal was to have a coherent national plan, which was, in 1962, to be expressed as the Strategic Hamlet Program.

Kennedy pushes for covert operations against the North

On January 28, 1961, shortly after his inauguration, John F. Kennedy told a National Security Council meeting that he wanted covert operations launched against North Vietnam, in retaliation for their equivalent actions in the South.^[51]. This is not argue that this was an inappropriate decision, but the existence of covert operations against the North, has to be understood in analyzing later events, especially the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

Even earlier, he issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 2, directing the military to prepare counterinsurgency forces, although not yet targeting the North. ^[52]

Kennedy discovered that little had progressed by mid-March, and issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 28, ordering the CIA respond to his desire to launch guerilla operations against the North. Herb Weisshart, deputy chief of the Saigon CIA station, observed the actual CIA action plan was "very modest". Given the Presidential priority, Weisshart said it was modest because William Colby, then Saigon station chief, said it would consume too many resources needed in the South. He further directed, in April, a presidential task force to draft a "Program of Action for Vietnam".

In April, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, under the CIA, had failed, and Kennedy lost confidence in the CIA's paramilitary opeations. Kennedy himself had some responsibility for largely cutting the Joint Chiefs of Staff out of operational planning. The JCS believed the operation was ill-advised, but, if it was to be done, American air support was absolutely essential. Kennedy, however, had made a number of changes to create plausible deniability, only allowing limited air strikes by CIA-sponsored pilots acting as Cuban dissidents. After it was learned that the main strike had left behind a few jet aircraft, he refused a followup strike; those aircraft savaged the poorly organized amphibious ships and their propeller-driven air support.

The U.S. Air Force, however, responded to NSAM 2 by creating, on April 14, 1961, the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS), code named “Jungle Jim.” The unit, of about 350 men, had 16 C-47 transports, eight B-26 bombers, and eight T-28 trainers (equipped for ground attack), wih an official of training indigenous air forces in counterinsurgency and conduct air operations. A volunteer unit, they would deploy in October, to begin FARM GATE missions.

The task force reported back in May, with a glum assessment of the situation in the South, and a wide-ranging but general plan of action, which becam NSAM 52. In June, Kennedy issued a set of NSAMs transferring paramilitary operations to the Department of Defense. ^[53]. These transfers of responsibility should be considered not only in respect to the specific operations against the North, but in the level of covert military operation in the South in the upcoming months. This transfer also cut the experienced MG Edward Lansdale out of the process, as while he was an U.S. Air Force officer, the military saw him as belonging to CIA.

Intelligence support

Also in May, the first U.S. signals intelligence unit, from the Army Security Agency under National Security Agency control, the unit, operating under the cover name of the 3rd Radio Research Unit. Organizationally, it provided support to MAAG-V, and trained ARVN personnel, the latter within security constraints. The general policy, throughout the war, was that ARVN intelligence personnel were not given access above the collateral SECRET (i.e., with no access to material with the additional special restrictions of "code word" communications intelligence (CCO or SI)".

Their principal initial responsibility was direction finding of Viet Cong radio transmitters, which they started doing from vehicles equipped with sensors. On December 22, 1961, an Army Security Agency soldier, SP4 James T. Davis, was killed in an ambush, the first American soldier to die in Vietnam.

Covert U.S. air support enters the South

More U.S. personnel, officially designated as advisors, arrived in the South and took an increasingly active, although covert, role. In October, a U.S. Air Force special operations squadron,, part of the 4400th CCTS deployed to SVN, officially in a role of advising and training. The aircraft were painted in South Vietnamese colors, and the aircrew wore uniforms without insignia and without U.S. ID. Sending military forces to South Vietnam was a violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954, and the U.S. wanted plausible deniability.

The deployment package consisted of 155 airmen, eight T-28s, and four modified and redesignated SC-47s and subsequently received B-26s. U.S. personnel flew combat as long as a VNAF person was aboard. FARMGATE stayed covert until after the Gulf of Tonkin incident.^[52]

Building the South Vietnamese Civil Irregular Defense Groups

Under the operational control of the Central Intelligence Agency,^[54] initial U.S. Army Special Forces involvement came in October, with the Rhade. ^[55] The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), were under Central Intelligence Agency operational control until July 1, 1963, when MACV took control. ^[56]. Army documents refer to control by "CAS Saigon", a cover name for the CIA station. According to Kelly, the SF and CIA rationale for establishing the CIDG program with the Montagnards was that minority participation would broaden the GVN counterinsurgency program, but, more critically,

the Montagnards and other minority groups were prime targets for Communist propaganda, partly because of their dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese government, and it was important to prevent the Viet Cong from recruiting them and taking complete control of their large and strategic land holdings.^[57]

It was in mid-November when Kennedy decided to take on operational as well as advisory roles. Under U.S. a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), such as the senior U.S. military organization in Vietnam, is a support and advisory organization. A Military Assistance Command (MAC) is designed to carry out MAAG duties, but also to command combat troops. ^[58]. There was considerable discussion about the reporting structure of this of the organization: a separate theater reporting to the National Command Authority or part of United States Pacific Command.

First Honolulu Conference

After meetings in Vietnam by GEN Taylor, the Secretaries of State and Defense issued a set of recommendations, on November 11. ^[59] Kenbnedy accepted all except the use of large U.S. combat forces.

McNamara held the first Honolulu Conference, at United States Pacific Command headquarters, with the Vietnam commanders present. He addressed short-term possibilities, urging concentration on stabilizing one province: "I'll guarantee it (the money and equipment) provided you have a plan based on one province. Take one place, sweep it and hold it in a plan." Or, put another way, let us demonstrate that in some place, in some way, we can achieve demonstrable gains. ^[36]

First U.S. direct support to an ARVN combat operation

On 11 December 1961 the United States aircraft carrier USNS Card docked in downtown Saigon with 82 U. S. Army H-21 helicopters and 400 men. organized into two Transportation Companies (Light Helicopter); Army aviation had not yet become a separate branch.

Twelve days later these helicopters were committed into the first airmobile combat action in Vietnam, Operation CHOPPER. It was the first time U.S. forces directly and overtly supported ARVN units in combat, although the American forces did not directly attack the guerillas.Approximately 1,000 Vietnamese paratroopers were airlifted into a suspected Viet Cong headquarters complex about ten miles west of the Vietnamese capital, achieving tactical surprise and capturing a radio station. ^[60]

1962

From the U.S. perspective, the Strategic Hamlet Program was the consensus approach to pacifying the countryside.^[36] There was a sense, however, that this was simply not a high priority for Diem, who considered his power base to be in the cities. The Communists, willing to fill a vacuum, became more and more active in rural areas where the GVN was invisible, irrelevant, or actively a hindrance.

Unfortunately, the Strategic Hamlet Program meant different things to various South Vietnamese and American groups. It was not simply building the hamlet that would carry out a strategy, but the context in which they were built. There was a good deal of agreement that it had to be phased:

Clearing enemy forces, the responsibility of the regular ARVN, coupled with some level of "holding"
Maintaining security, by various civil guard organizations and regional reaction forces
Hamlet self-defense capability, enabling economic development and strengthened local government

The U.S. political leadership focused on the latter part of the program. The U.S. military somewhat regretfully focused on the first, with concern that the ARVN would bog down in "holding", when the ARVN was needed to take the initiative away from the enemy, so the VC were defending, not attacking. Both, however, did not see long-term success without reforms in the Diem government. Diem, however, was more concerned with preserving than reforming his government. American appeals to form a "partnership" may not have been seriously considered. See Operation SUNRISE for a representative early attempt to create a hamlet (March 1962).

Absentee landlords formed a significant part of Diem's power base, in a quasi-feudal system that contained resentments the NLF could exploit. Much of Vietnamese rural culture was tied to the ancestral lands where they were located, yet the villagers did not own their fields and homes.^[61] Gibson quotes a landlord interviewed by Samson:

In the past, the relationship between the landlord and his tenants was paternalistic. The landlord considered the tenant as an inferior member of his extended family. When the tenant's father dieed, it was the duty of the landlord to give money to the tenant for the funeral; if his wife was pregnamt, the landlord gave mone for the birth; if he was in financial ruin, the landlord gave assistance; therefore, the tenant had to behave as an inferior member of the extended family. The landlord enjoyed great prestige vis-a-vis the tenant. ^[62]

During this period of paternalism, the landlord also received 40 to 60 percent of the tenants' crops as rent. When the Viet Minh fought the French, they also fought an economic war, and drove large landowners into the cities, or variously lowered or ended rent payments. According to Gibson, when Diem's ARVN forces established security, they put landlords back in control, often demanding back rent. ^[63]

Separarately from the land reform and economic issues, the Government of Vietnam were unable to provide security for the villages. The Diem government response was to create defensible "strategic hamlets" and forcibly move the villagers to them. The strategic hamlet might have government-appointed or military leaders; the villagers' locally chosen leadership was destroyed. The tombs of ancestors was abandoned, in a culture where it was proper to show ancestral respect.

Special Forces operations

In 1962, the U.S. Military Command–Vietnam (MACV) established Army Special Forces camps near villages. The Americans wanted a military presence there to block the infiltration of enemy forces from Laos, to provide a base for launching patrols into Laos to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and to serve as a western anchor for defense along the DMZ.^[64] These defended villages were not part of the Strategic Hamlet Program, but did provide examples that were relevant.

U.S. ground command structure established

U.S. command structures continued to emerge. On February 8, Paul D. Harkins, then Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, under Pacific Command, was promoted to general and assigned to command the new Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAC-V).

Military Assistance Command-Thailand was created on May 15, 1962, but reported to Harkins at MAC-V. In a departure from usual practice, the MAAG was retained as an organization subordinate to MAC-V, rather than being absorbed into it. The MAAG continued to command U.S. advisors and direct support to the ARVN. At first, MAC-V delegated control of U.S. combat units to the MAAG. While it was not an immediate concern, MAC-V never controlled all the Air Force and Navy units that would operate in Vietnam, but from outside its borders. These remained under the control of Pacific Command, or, in some cases, the Strategic Air Command.

No regular ARVN units were under the command of U.S. military commanders, although there were exceptions for irregular units under Special Forces. Indeed, there could be situations where, in a joint operation, U.S. combat troops were under a U.S. commander, while the ARVN units were under an ARVN officer with a U.S. advisor. Relationships in particular operations often were more a matter of personalities and politics rather than ideal command. U.S troops also did not report to ARVN officers; while many RVN officers had their post through political connections, others would have been outstanding commanders in any army.

At the same time, the U.S. was beginning to explore withdrawing forces. ^[65]

Intelligence support refines

The USMC 1st Composite Radio Company deployed, on January 2, 1962, to Pleiku, South Vietnam as Detachment One. After Davis' death in December, it became obvious to the Army Security Agency that thick jungle made tactical ground collection exceptionally dangerous, and direction-finding moved principally to aircraft platforms.^[66] See first-generation Army tactical SIGINT.

Additional allied support

In addition to the U.S. advisers, in August 1962, 30 Australian Army advisers was sent to Vietnam to operate within the United States military advisory system. As with most American advisors, their initial orders were to train, but not go on operations.^[67]

1963

South Vietnamese forces, with U.S. advisors, took severe defeats at the Battle of Ap Bac in January,^[68]. This has been considered the trigger for an increasingly skeptical, although small, American press corps in Vietnam. and the Battle of Go Cong in September. Ap Bac was of particular political sensitivity, as John Paul Vann, a highly visible American officer, was the advisor, and the U.S. press took note of what he considered to be ARVN shortcomings.

While the Buddhist crisis and military coup that ended with the killing of Diem was an obvious major event, it was by no means the only event of the year. In keeping with the President's expressed desires, covert operations against the North were escalated. Of course, the assassination of Kennedy himself brought Lyndon Baines Johnson, with a different philosophy toward the war. Kennedy was an activist, but had a sense of unconventional warfare and geopolitics, and, as is seen in the documentary record, discussed policy development with a wide range of advisors, specifically including military leaders. Johnson tended to view the situation from the standpoint of U.S. domestic policy, and, probably from his immensely successful experience as a deal-maker in the U.S. Senate, believed that everything was negotiable. When the North Vietnamese did not respond as Johnson wanted, he took it personally, and may have made some judgments based on his emotional responses to Ho. He also spoke with a much smaller advisory circle than Kennedy, and excluded active military officers. ^[69]

Intelligence support

On September 17, 1963, Detachment One, 1st Composite Radio Company, U.S. Marines, was redesignated as 1st Radio Company, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, but still put detachments into Vietnam.

May 1963 Honolulu conference; covert warfare a major issue

At the May 6 Honolulu conference, the decision was made to increase, as the President had been pushing, covert operations against the North. A detailed plan for covert operations, Pacific Command Operations Plan 34A (OPPLAN 34A) went to GEN Taylor, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not approve it until September 9. Shultz suggests the delay had three aspects:

Washington was preoccupied with the Buddhist crisis
MACV had no established covert operations force, so even if he approved a plan, there was no one to execute it
Taylor, although a distinguished Airborne (paratroopers once being believed special operators) officer, disagreed with Kennedy's emphasis on covert operations, did not have the appropriate resources in the Department of Defense, and he did not believe it was a proper job for soldiers.
Diem, fighting for survival, was not interested

It is unclear if Taylor did not believe covert operations should not be attempted at all, or if he regarded it as a CIA mission. If the latter, Kennedy would have been unlikely to support him, given the President's loss of confidence after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. ^[70]

After two assassinations

Kennedy and Diem both died in November 1963. Since Diem was killed by a military junta, there was no immediate successor, but Lyndon Johnson became the new President of the United States. Johnson was far more focused on domestic politics than the international activist, Kennedy. Some of the Kennedy team left quickly, while others, sometimes surprisingly given extremely different personalities, stayed on; the formal and logical Robert McNamara quickly bonded with the emotional and deal-making Johnson.

McNamara was insistent that a rational enemy would not accept the massive casualties that indeed were inflicted on the Communists. The enemy, however, was willing to accept those casualties. ^[71] McNamara was insistent that the enemy would comply with his concepts of cost-effectiveness, of which Ho and Giap were unaware. They were, however, quite familiar with attritional strategies.^[72] While they were not politically Maoist, they were also well versed in Mao's concepts of protracted war (see insurgency).^[41]

Johnson approval of covert operations

OPPLAN 34A was finalized around December 20, under joint MACV-CIA leadership; the subsequent MACV-SOG organization had not yet been created. There were five broad categories, to be planned in three periods of 4 months each,over a year:^[73]

Clandestine human-source and signals intelligence collection from locations in the north
Psychological operations against the north to increase tension and division; Colby had already started such operations
Paramilitary operations,such as raids and sabotage against facilities that were significant to the admittedly weak economy, and stronger security, of North Vietnam
Encouraging the development of an underground resistance movement
Selected raids as well as reconnaissance to direct air strikes, with more of a tactical goal than the economic and security actions of category 3

Lyndon Johnson agreed with the idea, but was cautious. He created an interdepartmental review committee, under MG Victor Krulak, on December 21, to select the least risky operations on December 21, which delivered a report on January 2, 1964, for the first operational phase to begin on February 1. It was hardly an expression of the motto of David Stirling, founder of Britain's legendary Special Air Service: "Who dares, wins."

North Vietnam decides on escalation

In December 1963, a decisive meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee in Hanoi set basic policy. Le Duan (1907-86) was in full control; Ho Chi Minh had become a figurehead. ^[74] COL Bui Tin led a reconnaissance mission of specialists reporting directly to the Politburo, who said, in an 1981 interview with Stanley Karnow, that he saw the only choice was escalation including the use of conventional troops, capitalizing on the unrest and inefficiency from the series of coups in the South. The Politburo ordered infrastructure improvements to start in 1964.^[75]

1964 (before Gulf of Tonkin Incident)

Low-level guerilla warfare has been called the "war of the flea", but enough flea bites can weaken a strong body that loses too much blood. Until the major escalations of midyear, the war was still of swarms of fleas, with, perhaps an occasional action by stronger predators. As yet, there were no pursuits by packs of killers; either the prey would hide, or the pursuers would not have the strength or ability to continue long contact — or avoid becoming a target.

There were numerous ARVN and VC raids, of battalion size, for which only RVN losses or body count is available. They took place roughly monthly. In the great casualty lists of a war, 100-300 casualties may not seem an immense number, but these have to be considered as happening at least once a month, with a population of perhaps 5 million. It was a grinding war of attrition, with no decision, as death and destruction ground along.^[76]

Organizations and personnel

Organizations and commands would change with time. In January, for example, Major General Don became Commander-in-Chief of the RVN armed forces, GEN William Westmoreland was named deputy to GEN Paul Harkins to replace him later. In a structural reorganization, the ARVN made the Saigon Special Region part of the III Corps.^[76]

U.S. and GVN covert action planning and preparation

For more information, see: MACV-SOG.

Before the operations scheduled by the Krulak committee could be attempted, there had to be an organization to carry them out. An obscure group called MACV-SOG appeared on the organization charts. Its overt name was "MACV Studies and Operations Group". In reality, it was the Special Operations Group, with CIA agent programs for the North gradually moving under MACV control — although SOG almost always had a CIA deputy commander. The U.S. had a shortage of covert operators, with Asian experience. in general. Ironically, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman, who had been a guerilla in Asia during the Second World War, was forced out of office on February 24.^[76]

MG Jack Singlaub, to become the third commander of SOG, argued that special operators needed to form their own identity;^[77] while today's United States Special Operations Command has components from all the services, there is a regional Special Operations Component, alongside Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Components, in every geographic Unified Combatant Command. Today, officers from the special operations community have risen to four-star rank, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but special operators were regarded as outcasts, unlikely to rise high in rank, during the Vietnam War.

North Vietnamese buildup

COL Don Si Nguyen brought in battalions of engineers to improve the Trail, principally in Laos, with up-to-date Soviet and Chinese construction equipment, with a goal, over several years, of building a supply route that could pass 10 to 20,000 soldiers per monthAt this time, the U.S. had little intelligence collection capability to detect the start of this project. Specifically, MACV-SOG, under Russell, was prohibited from any operations in Laos.^[78]

OPPLAN 34A Operations preceding the Gulf of Tonkin incident

To understand factors that contributed to the heightened readiness in the Gulf, it must be understood that OPPLAN 34A naval operations had been striking the coast in the days immediately before the incident, and at least some North Vietnamese naval patrols were deployed against these.

Possible consequences of such actions, although not explicitly addressing the OPPLAN34A operations, were assessed by the [[United States intelligence community in late May, on the assumption

The actions to be taken, primarily air and naval, with the GVN (US-assisted) operations against the DRV and Communist-held Laos, and might subsequently include overt US military actions. They would be on a graduated scale of intensity, ranging from reconnaissance, threats, cross-border operations, and limited strikes on logistical targets supporting DRV operations against South Vietnam and Laos, to strikes (if necessary) on a growing number of DRV military and economic targets. In the absence of all-out strikes by the DRV or Communist China, the measures foreseen would not include attacks on population centers or the use of nuclear weapons.^[79]

Further assumptions is that the U.S. would inform the DRV, China, and the Soviet Union that these attacks were of limited purpose, but show serious intent by additional measures including sending a new 5,000 troops and air elements to Thailand; deploying strong air, naval, and ground strike forces to the Western Pacific and South China Sea; and providing substantial reinforcement to the South. The U.S. would avoid further Geneva talks until it was established that they would not improve the Communist position.

It was estimated that while there would be a strong diplomatic and propaganda response, the DRV and its allies would "refrain from dramatic new attacks, and refrain from raising the level of insurrection for the moment."

Gulf of Tonkin incident

See Gulf of Tonkin incident

Changes in U.S. commitment following Johnson's election

For more information, see: Vietnam, war, and the United States.

More important to Johnson than what happened in Asia was what was happening at home, especially in the minds of the voters.^[69] To Johnson, Vietnam was a "political war" only in the sense of U.S. domestic politics, not a political settlement for the Vietnamese.

He was concerned about what was called the "falling domino" effect; he thought the fall of neighboring states would be rapid, but others looked for great damage in slow motion, as in a a 1964 CIA estimate:

We do not believe that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos would be followed by the rapid, successive communization of other states of Southeast Asia. Instead of a shock wave passing from one to the next, there would be a simultaneous, direct effect on all Far Eastern countries. With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation of the area would quickly succumb to communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Further, a spread of communism in the area would not be inexorable, and any spread that would happen would take time — time in which the situation might change in any of a number of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause....The loss of South Vietnam and Laos to the Communists would be profoundly damaging to the US position in the Far East, most especially because the US has committed itself persistently, emphatically, and publicly to preventing Communist takeover of the two countries.^[80]

1965

On 13 April 1965, joint RVN-US discussions agreed that the ARVN force levels were inadequate. The manning level was increased, to increase RVN infantry battalions from 119 (93 infantry, 20 Ranger, and 6 airborne) to 150. The new battalions were generally added to existing regiments, to avoid the need of creating more headquarters units. By the end of 1965, twenty-four were either in the field or in training areas.^[81]

In July 1965, McNamara sent Johnson a set of notes proposing escalation of what he saw as a deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. "The situation in SVN is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. . . . The central highlands could well be lost to the NLF during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken...The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" for a directorate of generals."^[82]

McNamara saw the correlation of forces between the ARVN and the VC is quite unfavorable. "The Govt-to-VC ratio overall is now only a little better than 3-to-1, and in combat battalions little better than 1.5-to-1." A historical rule of thumb for counterinsurgency has been that a 10 to 1 ratio is desirable, but, like all rules of thumb, it is not applicable to all situations. Even a critic of that generalization, "indeed, that ratio was often cited by critics of the U.S. policy in Vietnam", who cite a number of other revolutionary wars where the insurgency was defeated by less overwhelming ratios (e.g., Eritrea against Ethiopia) or where an acceptable goal was partition (e.g., Second Sudanese Civil War), cite the conventional wisdom as primarily relevant to situations of ideological insurgency against a central government, such as the Communist takeover of Vietnam, where the insurgents want complete victory.^[83] The current U.S. Army doctrine on counterinsurgency also recognizes there is no simple ratio, "During previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win. However, no predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN...A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants...Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation." ^[84] None of these sources, however, see a 3:1 to 1.5:1 as favorable.

McNamara also observed that the Administration's approach to air war against the North, Rolling Thunder, had not " produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that SVN is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than complete takeover."^[82]

Johnson and McNamara adopted a three-tier strategy to save SVN.

Protect US bases and repel enemy ground attacks with U.S. ground troops
Attack the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.
Initiate Operation ROLLING THUNDER bombing over North Vietnam.

After his reelection, Johnson sent in the first American combat troops in March, 1965, to protect the air bases; he and McNamara saw air power as decisive, but they had a very different theory than the JCS.

Johnson and McNamara, however, had launched an alternative air power strategy called Operation ROLLING THUNDER, nased entailed retaliatory bombing anytime Communists struck at American forces, together with a gradual buildup of 22 bombing attacks against small military targets in the North, in complete opposition to the JCS recommendations that if there were to be air strikes, they be intense.

Despite some shortages, the US Army had never been in nearly as good shape at the start of a war. At peak Westmoreland had 100 infantry battalions, the main maneuver and fighting unit of the war. Routinely it received 500 hours a month of helicopter support from corps' command. Above the battalion were brigades and divisions; in this war they handled paperwork, letting the battalions do the fighting. Overall, 20% of the soldiers were in "teeth" (combat) roles; the rest were "tail," assigned to advisory missions, logistics, maintenance, construction, medicine and administration.

Westmoreland's first challenge was figuring out a strategy to defeat the Viet Cong.

Phase I: stabilize the situation (by the end of 1965)
Phase II: (scheduled for 1966-67) would push the enemy back in key areas
Phase III: total victory (1968)

His strategy conflicted with alternatives from the U.S. Marines (both the III Marine Amphibious Force in the northern South Vietnamese I Corps, as well as the higher command of the U.S. Marine Corps, and from Maxwell Taylor, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, former [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and General, U.S. Army. He also was suggesting to fight a war of attrition against a Communist force guided by the Maoist doctrine of Protracted War, which specifically included attrition as one strategic option. ^[85]

Westmoreland's attritional strategy

To reverse the downhill slide in the villages, Westmoreland called for 24 more U.S. maneuver battalions (of approximately 800-1000 men each) added to the 20 he had, plus more artillery, aviation (helicopters), and support units. McNamara rounded the total to 175,000 troops, with 27 more maneuver battalions to come in 1966; there would then be approximately 150 ARVN and 47 US infantry battalions in 1966. Westmoreland's "ultimate aim", was:

"To pacify the Republic of [South] Vietnam by destroying the VC—his forces, organization, terrorists, agents, and propagandists—while at the same time reestablishing the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the administrative machinery, and re-instituting the services of the Government. During this process security must be provided to all of the people on a progressive basis." Source: Directive 525-4 (MACJ3) 17 September 1965: Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam ^[86]

Westmoreland complained that, "we are not engaging the VC with sufficient frequency or effectiveness to win the war in Vietnam." He said that American troops had shown themselves to be superb soldiers, adept at carrying out attacks against base areas and mounting sustained operations in populated areas. Yet, the operational initiative— decisions to engage and disengage—continued to be with the enemy. ^[86]

Westmoreland vs. Marines

The Marines, with responsibility for "I Corps," the northern third of the country, had a plan for Phase I. It reflected their historic experience in pacification programs in Haiti and Nicaragua early in the century. ^[87]

Noting that 80% of the population lived in 10% of the land, they proposed to separate the Viet Cong from the populace. It was a major challenge, since the NLF controlled the great majority of villages in I Corps. Working outward from Da Nang and two other enclaves, 25,000 Marines of the III Marine Amphibious Force^[88] systematically eliminated Viet Cong soldiers and guerrilla forces, and sought to weed out NLF cadres from the villages.

The main device was the Combined Action Platoon, with a 15-man rifle squad and 34 local militia. Rather than having separate "advisory" units, the bulk of the CAP members served alongside the local militia, building personal relationships. It would "capture and hold" hamlets and villages. The Marines put heavy stress on honesty in local government, land reform (giving more to the peasants) and MEDCAP patrols that offered immediate medical assistance to villagers. In some respects, the CAP volunteers had assignments similar to the much more highly trained United States Army Special Forces, but they would make use of whatever skills they had. One young Marine, for example, was a graduate of a high school in an agricultural area in the U.S., came from a family hog farm that went back several generations, and won competitions for teenagers who raised prized hogs. While he was no military expert, he was recognized as helping enormously with the critical pork production in villages.

Marines in CAP had the highest proportion of volunteering for successive Vietnam tours of any branch of the Marine Corps. Many villages considered the CAP personnel part of their extended family. Westmoreland distrusted the Marine village-oriented policy as too defensive for Phase II--only offense can win a war, he insisted. The official slogan about "winning hearts and minds" gave way to the Army's "Get the people by the balls, and their hearts and minds will follow." Ambassador Taylor welcomed the Marine strategy as the best solution for a basically political problem; it would also minimize American casualties.^[89]

While the Army and Marines had their approaches to the village, yet another came from a joint project of the CIA and United States Army Special Forces. The CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Groups) program was created for the Montagnard peoples in the sparsely populated mountanous areas of the Central Highlands. The Montagnards disliked all Vietnamese, and had supported first the French, then the Americans. About 45,000 were enrolled in militias whose main role was defending their villages from the Communists. In 1970 the CIDG became part of the ARVN Rangers.^[90] Indeed, the tensions were high between the Army (which was in charge) and the Marines.

Westmoreland vs. Taylor

Taylor's strategy was to use superior American mobility and firepower to locate, attack and destroy the Viet Cong main forces. Once they were destroyed, he reasoned, the villages would be easy to pacify. Westmoreland proposed instead a "search and destroy" strategy that would win the war by attrition. The idea was to track down and fight the larger Viet Cong units, hoping to grind them down faster than they could be replaced. The measure of success in a war of attrition was not battles won or territory held or villages pacified, it was the body count of dead enemy soldiers. The body counts often were demanded by the chain of command, under pressure from Washington, even though the numbers were guesses and had little to do with realistic battle damage assessment. A number of field commanders and CIA analysts found that a much better predictor was the number of weapons recovered from a battlefield.

Westmoreland promised his three phase strategy could get the job done--whereas the defensive enclaves would prolong the conflict indefinitely into the future. Johnson could not wait forever, so he bought Westmoreland's plan and removed Taylor.

Air war in the south

Vietnamese jungle caused much military difficulty. In the 1964 election, Barry Goldwater never recovered from speculation about possibility of using low-yield nuclear weapons to defoliate infiltration routes in Vietnam, he never actually advocated the use of nuclear weapons against the North Vietnamese. Nevertheless, the Democrats easily painted Goldwater as a warmonger who would drop atomic bombs on Hanoi.^[91]

Under Operation RANCH HAND, the U.S. military sprayed large areas with a defoliant called Agent Orange. While Agent Orange itself was considered nontoxic to humans, and was primarily composed of conventional herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, many batches had an exceptionally toxic byproduct of the manufacturing process, which caused caused significant contamination, and long-term health consequences, including defects, on both Vietnamese and Americans. This was also used by Canadian Forces in Canada, who documented the later-understood health effects. ^[92]

Moscow sent in sophisticated air defense systems; 922 planes went down. Rolling Thunder dropped 640,000 tons of bombs, but pilots protested angrily that political restrictions radically reduced their effectiveness. As one Navy flier growled in his diary:

We fly a limited aircraft, drop limited ordnance, on rare targets in a severely limited amount of time. Worst of all we do this in a limited and highly unpopular war....What I've got is personal pride pushing against a tangled web of frustration.^[93]

Rolling Thunder did reduce the southward flow of arms somewhat, and definitely forced Hanoi to divert more and more of its resources to logistics, air defense and rebuilding. More than half of the North's electric power, oil storage, bridges and railroad yards had to be rebuilt. Supplies were hidden in small caches or buried underground, which further attenuated Hanoi's logistics capability. The suffering of its people held a lower priority for the Politburo than its quest for victory, and its actions were consistent with its goals, especially considered in Mao's concept of protracted war.

After Nixon replaced Johnson, the new national security team reviewed the situation. Henry Kissinger asked the Rand Corporation to provide a list of policy options, prepared by Daniel Ellsberg. On receiving the report, Kissinger and Schelling asked Ellsberg about the apparent absence of a victory option; Ellsberg said "I don't believe there is a win option in Vietnam." While Ellsberg eventually did send a withdrawal option, Kissinger would not circulate something that could be perceived as defeat. ^[94].

First Airmobile Battles: Ia Drang and Bong Son

Giap's new plan was to use three regiments, but with a new controlling divisional headquarters, across the neck of SVN, cutting the country in two. The division threatened the Plei Me special forces camp with one regiment, but put a second regiment across the road over which South Vietnamese forces, without helicopters, would have to drive to Plei Me from the larger base in Pleiku. Intelligence identified the presence, but at first not the position, of a third regiment, which could attack Pleiku if the reserve based there went to the assistance of Plei Me.

The PAVN preferred hit-and-run ambushes, or what they called "catch and grab." When their retreat was blocked, their next tactic was called "hugging the belt" ^[95] the Americans hesitated to use artillery and gunships because of the risk of friendly fire casualties. The surprise attack would give a short window of opportunity before superior American mobility could be brought to bear. Moore's after-action reports suggested that "danger close" air and artillery could be a reasonable calculated risk when used competently.

The South Vietnamese recognized they were stretched too thin, and asked for U.S. help. The U.S. Field Force (corps equivalent) commander for the area, MG Stanley Larsen, told GEN Westmoreland that he thought the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was ready, and got permission for it to use its mobility to bypass the road ambushes. Since the PAVN along the road had planned to ambush trucks, there was not an issue of not being able to find the relieving troops. Helicopters could be heard, but their landing zones were unpredictable until they actually landed — fake landings were not uncommon. In the Battle of the Ia Drang, the first true airmobile force met PAVN regulars.

It should be noted that the PAVN's practice of listening for helicopters was realized by Harold Moore, promoted to brigade command after leading a battalion in the Ia Drang. In the larger Battle of Bong Son approximately a month later, which extended into 1966, Moore used obvious helicopters to cause the PAVN to retreat onto very reasonable paths to break away from the Americans — but different Americans had silently set ambushes, earlier, across those escape routes.

Heavy doses of tactical air power, including area, then radar-controlled saturation bombing from B-52s, overwhelmed the PAVN. The invasion was stopped; the survivors fled back into their Cambodian sanctuaries. Giap excused his failure by saying he only wanted to discover the American's tactics; he convinced the Politburo that it was necessary to return to low-level guerrilla tactics because he could not beat the Americans in battle. The 101st Airborne Division converted to an airmobile formation, but the true airmobile structure was not used by other units. Nevertheless, helicopter augmentation became far more common.

The results of Westmoreland's attritional strategy

Of two million small unit operations, 99% never encountered the enemy. What are now called improvised explosive devices, "booby traps" at the time, and land mines together caused a third of American deaths. The war was fought out in the other one percent, and most of the time combat was initiated by Communist forces. The "hot landing zone" (enemy attacking choppers as they landed) accounted for 13% of the fights. American platoons on patrol were hit by ambush in 23% of the engagements, and their camps were hit by rocket or grenade attacks in 30%. In 27% of the battles the Americans took the initiative, including 9% ambushes, 5% planned attacks on known positions, and 13% attacks on unsuspected enemy positions. In 7% of the engagements both sides were surprised as they stumbled upon each other in the jungle.

By the end of the war, 30,600 soldiers and 12,900 Marines had been killed in combat, together with 1,400 sailors and Navy pilots, and 1,000 Air Force fliers. As is classic guerilla doctrine, when units with heavier power arrived, the weaker force dispersed. By American standards, they could not win, they could scarcely replace their losses, yet they kept trudging down the Ho Chi Minh Trail day after day. Given that the current government of Vietnam is directly descended from the same government that Westmoreland claimed he would defeat by attrition, his analysis was demonstrated to be incorrect. His deputy and immediate successor, GEN Creighton Abrams, changed strategies when he took command of MACV, to a broader strategy that put as much emphasis on securing and building the countryside as it did killing the main force.

With more aggressive pursuit, including airmobile operations (see also Vietnam War Ground Technology, Westmoreland's tactics worked in terms of defeating the threat of larger enemy units (i.e., battalion or larger) to South Vietnam.

The Viet Cong dispersed into smaller and smaller units, and so too did the US forces, until they were running platoon and even squad operations that blanketed far more of the countryside, chasing the fragmented enemy back into remote, uninhabited areas or out of the South altogether. Not only low-level NLF sympathizers but even Viet Cong officers and NLF political cadres started to surrender, accepting the resettlement terms offered by the GVN. At the end of 1964, the Pentagon estimated that only 42% of the South Vietnamese people lived in cities or villages that were securely under GVN control. (20% were in villages controlled by the NLF, and 37% were in contested zones.) At the end of 1967, 67% of the population was "secure," and only a few remote villages with less than 2% of the population were still ruled by the NLF.

1966

1966 was the year of considerable improvement of command relationships, still under Westmoreland, for what Westmoreland considered the less interesting "other war" of rural development. There were frequent changes of names of aspects of this mission, starting in 1964, but eventually, the GVN and US agreed on the term Revolutionary Development (RD), which was to continue in a variety of development activities. The term, apparently coined by Premier and general Nguyen Cao Ky, was agreed to be defined as

RD is the integrated military and civil process to restore, consolidate and expand government control so that nation building can progress throughout the Republic of Vietnam. It consists of those coordinated military and civil actions to liberate the people from Viet Cong control; restore public security; initiate political, economic and social development; extend effective Government of Vietnam authority; and win the willing support of people toward these ends.^[96]

"Search and Destroy" gave way after 1968 to "clear and hold", when Creighton Abrams replaced Westmoreland.

Pacification/Revolutionary Development

Westmoreland was principally interested only in overt military operations, while Abrams looked at a broader picture. MACV advisors did work closely with 900,000 local GVN officials in a well-organized pacification program called CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development.) It stressed technical aid, local self government, and land distribution to peasant farmers. A majority of tenant farmers received title to their own land in one of the most successful transfer projects in any nation. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of peasants entered squalid refugee camps when CORDS moved them out of villages that could not be protected.^[97] In the Phoenix Program (part of CORDS with a strong CIA component) GVN police identified and arrested (and sometimes killed) the NLF secret police agents engaged in assassination.

1967

General Nguyen Van Thieu (1923-2001), a competent, Catholic, became president (in office 1967-75). The NLF failed to disrupt the national legislative election of 1966, or the presidential elections of 1967, which consolidated Thieu-ARVN control over GVN. Thieu, however, failed to eliminate the systematic internal inefficiencies and corruption the ARVN.

1968

While there have been exceptions, especially in recent wars, Marines and Army troops do not always mix well, as they have some very different doctrinal assumptions. Army troops have much heavier artillery, and will wait for it to suppress the enemy before attacking on the ground, while Marines rely both on fast movement, and their own air support substituting for heavy artillery (i.e.,Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, which put land and air elements under a common commander). In 1968, Westmoreland sent his deputy Creighton Abrams to take command of I Corps, and gave his Air Force commander control of Marine aviation. The Marines protested vehemently but were rebuffed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The flow rose from 3,000 a month in 1965 to 8,000 a month throughout 1966 and 1967, and then 10,000 in 1968. By November 1965 the enemy had 110 battalions in the field, with 64,000 combat troops, 17,000 in combat support, and 54,000 part- time militia.

Psychological tension and breakdown of discipline

The more the American soldiers worked in the hamlets, the more they came to despise the corruption, inefficiency and even cowardice of GVN and ARVN. The basic problem was that despite the decline of the NLF, the GVN still failed to pick up popular support. Most peasants, refugees and city people remained alienated and skeptical. The superior motivation of the enemy troubled the Americans (especially in contrast with South Koreans, who fought fiercely for their independence.) "Why can't our Vietnamese do as well as Ho's?" Soldiers resented the peasants (ridiculing them as "gooks") who seemed sullen, unappreciative, unpatriotic and untrustworthy. The Viet Cong resorted more and more to booby-traps that (during the whole war) killed about 4,000 Americans and injured perhaps 30,000 (and killed or injured many thousands of peasants.)

It became more and more likely that after an ambush or boobytrap angry GIs would take out their frustrations against the nearest Vietnamese they perceived as potential enemies. MACV did not appreciate the danger that atrocities might be committed by Americans. In March 1968, just after the Tet offensive, one Army company massacred several hundred women and children at the hamlet of My Lai. High ranking American officers wre not charged, but the company captain was tried and acquitted. Platoon commander Lt. William Calley was sentenced to life imprisonment by a 1971 court martial. His sentence was reduced and he was released in 1975. The case became a focus of national guilt and self-doubt, with antiwar leaders alleging there were many atrocities that had been successfully covered up.^[98]

Other factors contributed to reduced U.S. discipline and efficiency. Recreational drugs were readily available; this may not have been critical in rear areas, but a combat patrol cannot afford any reduction of its situational awareness. General social changes, including racial tension, also challenged authority. The practice of "fragging" involved U.S. soldiers killing their own leaders with a fragmentation grenade or other weapon. Fragging sometimes was a response to a crackdown on rebellion, but, in some cases, it was a way to remove a thoroughly incompetent leader that could get his men killed.

Marine control of I Corps supplanted

By mid-January 1968, III MAF was the size of a U.S. corps or field army, consisting of what amounted to two Army divisions, two reinforced Marine Divisions, a Marine aircraft wing, and supporting forces, numbering well over 100,000. GEN Westmoreland believed that Marine LTG Robert E. Cushman, Jr., who had relieved General Walt, was "unduly complacent."A Soldier Reports</ref> worried about what he perceived as the Marine command's ``lack of followup in supervision, its employment of helicopters, and its generalship. ^[99]Westmoreland sent his deputy Creighton Abrams to take command of I Corps, and gave his Air Force commander control of Marine aviation. The Marines protested vehemently but were rebuffed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.^[100]

Khe Sanh

As a diversion, PAVN sent a corps-strength unit to start the Battle of Khe Sanh, at what had been an isolated U.S. Marine location. Johnson personally took control of the defense. When the media back home warned darkly of another disaster like Dien Bien Phu, LBJ made his generals swear they would never surrender Khe Sanh. They committed 5% of their ground strength to the outpost (about 6,000 men) and held another 15-20% in reserve just in case. The enemy was blasted with 22,000 airstrikes and massive artillery bombardments. When the siege was lifted, the Marines had lost 205 killed, the PAVN probably 10,000.^[101]

Tet Offensive

Hoping that Khe Sanh had tied down Westmoreland, the PAVN and Viet Cong struck on January 31, throwing 100,000 regular and militia troops against 36 of 44 provincial capitals and 5 of 6 major cities. They avoided American strongholds and targeted GVN government offices and ARVN installations, other than "media opportunities" such as attempting to a fight, by a small but determined squad, of the U.S. Embassy.

In February 1968, during the truce usually observed during the "Tet" holiday season, Hanoi attempted to destroy the government of South Vietnam an incite a popular uprising. It was decisively defeated by U.S. standards, as it had been apparently defeated again and again.^[71] However, the Tet Offensive had a devastating impact on Johnson's political position in the U.S., and in that sense was a strategic victory for the Communists.^[102]

Tet Offensive Map

The harshest fighting came in the old imperial capital of Hue. The city fell to the PAVN, which immediately set out to identify and execute thousands of government supporters among the civilian population. The allies fought back with all the firepower at their command. House to house fighting recaptured Hue on February 24. In Hue, Five thousand enemy bodies were recovered, with 216 U.S. dead, and 384 ARVN fatalities. A number of civilians had been executed while the PAVN held the city.

Nationwide, the enemy lost tens of thousands killed, and many more who were wounded or totally demoralized. US lost 1,100 dead, ARVN 2,300. The people of South Vietnam did not rise up. However, the pacification program temporarily collapsed in half the country, and a half million more people became refugees. Despite the enormous damage done to the GVN at all levels, the NLF was in even worse shape, and it never recovered.

1969

Nixon and his chief adviser Henry Kissinger were basically "realists" in world affairs, interested in the broader constellation of forces, and the biggest powers. H Melvin Laird, Nixon's Secretary of Defense, was a career politician keenly aware that Americans had soured on the war. His solution was to make troop withdrawal announcements a measure of the administration's progress. Laird worried that further involvement would postpone modernization of the military and hasten the deterioration of morale.

Nixon's plan to end the war was to make it irrelevant, by moving the basic American strategy from containment to detente. Instead of perpetual cold war, Nixon and Kissinger believed the time had come to narrow foreign policy to a realistic and limited view of the nation's own interests. It was necessary to maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent, and, since Western Europe was considered critical to U.S. interests, NATO would continue as a safeguard against Warsaw Pact attack. However, the US would seek detente, even friendship, with both the Soviet Union and China, would try to stop the arms race, and would tell countries threatened by subversion to defend themselves. By 1969 Saigon forces were able to sustain the pressure on the NLF and Viet Cong and dramatically expand their control over both population and territory.^[103] Indeed, for the first time GVN found itself in control of more than 90% of the population. The Tet objectives were beyond our strength, concluded General Tran Van Tra, the commander of Vietcong forces in the South:

We suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel, especially cadres at the various echelons, which clearly weakened us. Afterwards, we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970.^[104] ^[105]

Air attacks on Cambodia

In 1969, Nixon ordered B-52 strikes against PAVN supply routes in Cambodia. The orders for U.S. bombing of Cambodia were classified, and thus kept from the U.S. media and Congress. In a given strike, each B-52 normally dropped 42,000 pounds of bombs, and the strike consistedflying in groups of 3 or 6. Surviving personnel in the target area were apt to know they had been bombed, and, since the U.S. had the only aircraft capable of that volume, would know the U.S. had done it.

The "secrecy" may have been meant to be face-saving for Sihanouk, but there is substantial reason to believe that the secrecy, in U.S. military channels, was to keep knowledge of the bombing from the U.S. Congress and public. Actually, a reasonable case could be made that the bombing fell under the "hot pursuit" doctrine of international law, where if a neutral (Sihanouk) could not stop one country from attacking another from the neutral sanctuary, the attacked country(ies) had every right to counterattack.

Intelligence and security

The first American soldier to die in Vietnam was a member of a communications intelligence unit. The U.S. intelligence collection systems, a significant amount of which (especially the techniques) were not shared with the ARVN, and, while not fully declassified, examples have been mentioned earlier in this article. The Communist side's intelligence operations, beyond the spies that were discovered, are much less known.

While there had been many assumptions that the South Vietnamese government was penetrated by many spies, and there indeed were many, a December 1969 capture of a Viet Cong communications intelligence center and documents revealed that they had been getting a huge amount of information using simple technology and smart people, as well as sloppy U.S. communications security. ^[106] This specific discovery was by U.S. Army infantry, with interpretation by regular communications officers; the matter infuriated GEN Abrams &mdash at the communications specialists. Before and after, there had been a much more highly classified, and only now available in heavily censored form, National Security Agency analysis of how the Communists were getting their information, which has led to a good deal of modern counterintelligence and operations security. ^[107]

Some of the material from Touchdown also gave insight into the North Vietnamese intelligence system. For example, the NVA equivalent of the Defense Intelligence Agency was the Central Research Directorate (CRD) in Hanoi. COSVN intelligence staff, however, disseminated the tactically useful material. ^[108] Their espionage was under the control of the Military Intelligence Sections (MIS), which were directed by the Strategic Intelligence Section (SIS) of CRD.

1970

Nixon's larger strategy was to convince Moscow and Bejing they could curry American favor by reducing or ending their military support of Hanoi. He assumed that would drastically reduce Hanoi's threat. Second, "Vietnamization" would replace attrition. Let the Vietnamese fight and die for their own freedom. Vietnamization meant heavily arming the ARVN and turning all military operations over to it; all American troops would go home.

Henry Kissinger began secret talks with the North Vietnamese official, Le Duc Tho, in February 1970. ^[109]

General Lon Nol overthrew Prince Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970, creating a new governement that was, in turn, overthrown by the Communist Khmer Rouge om April 1975.

The Communists making a direct bid to seize Cambodia. Nixon in April 1970 authorized a large scale (but temporary) US-ARVN incursion into Cambodia to directly hit the PAVN headquarters and supply dumps. The forewarned PAVN had evacuated most of their soldiers, but they lost a third of its arms stockpile, as well as a critical supply line from the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. The incursion prevented the immediate takeover by Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge. Pot broke with his original North Vietnamese sponsors, and aligned with China.

Nixon ignored the protests and continued to Vietnamize the war. When he ordered a joint US-Vietnamese ground invasion of Cambodia in 1970, many of these events first became known in the U.S., and there were intense protests, including deaths in a confrontation between rock-throwing protesters and poorly-trained National Guardsmen at Kent State University.

The two dissenters to Nixon's plan were Saigon and Hanoi. President Thieu was, reasonably, concerned his fragile nation would not survive American withdrawal. Hanoi intended to conquer the South, with or without its Soviet and Chinese allies. It did start negotiations believing the sooner the Americans left the better.

With the Viet Cong forces depleted, Hanoi sent in its own PAVN troops, and had to supply them over the Ho Chi Minh Trail despite systematic bombing raids by the B-52s. American pressure forced Hanoi to reduce its level of activity in the South. In 1970 there were only 2 battles of any size.

1971

During the quiet year 1971, Hanoi was building up forces for conventional invasion, while Nixon sent massive quantities of hardware to the ARVN, and gave Thieu a personal pledge to send air power if Hanoi invaded. In 1971 all remaining American combat ground troops left, though air attacks continued.

The NLF and Viet Cong had largely disappeared. They controlled a few remote villages, and contested a few more, but the Pentagon estimated that 93% of the South's population now lived under secure GVN control.

The Vietnamization policy achieved limited rollback of Communist gains inside South Vietnam only, and was primarily aimed at providing the arms, training and funding for the South to fight and win its own war, if it had the courage and commitment to do so. By 1971 the Communists lost control of most, but not all, of the areas they had controlled in the South in 1967. The Communists still controlled many remote jungle and mountain districts, especially areas that protected the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Saigon's effort to strike against one of these strongholds, Operation Lam Son 719, was a humiliating failure in 1971. The SVN forces, with some U.S. air support, were unable to defeat PAVN regulars.

1972

In March, 1972 Hanoi invaded at three points from north and west with 120,000 PAVN regulars spearheaded by tanks. This was conventional warfare, reminiscent of North Korea's invasion in 1950. They expected the peasants to rise up and overthrow the government; they did not. They expected the South's army to collapse; instead the ARVN fought very well indeed. Saigon had started to exert itself; new draft laws produced over one million well-armed regular soldiers, and another four million in part-time, lightly armed self-defense militia.

LINEBACKER II

Nixon ordered Operation LINEBACKER I, with 42,000 bombing sorties over North Vietnam. Hanoi was evacuated. Nixon also ordered the mining of North Vietnam's harbors, a stroke LBJ had always vetoed for fear of Soviet or Chinese involvement, The ARVN, its morale stiffened by massive tactical air support from the US, held the line. As in Tet, the peasants refused to rise up against the GVN. "By God, the South Vietnamese can hack it!" exclaimed a pleasantly surprised General Abrams.

Since the PAVN's conventional forces required continuous resupply, the air campaign broke the momentum of the invasion and the PAVN forces retreated north. However they did did retain control of a slice of territory south of the DMZ. There the NLF, renamed the "Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam" (PRG) was established; it welcomed diplomats from the Communist world, including Fidel Castro, and served as one of the launch points of the 1975 invasion.^[110] ^[111]

The RVN relaxes

After the failed Easter Offensive the Thieu government made a fatal strategic mistake, going to a static defense and not refining its command and control for efficiency, not political reward. The departure of American forces and American money lowered morale in both military and civilian South Vietnam. Desertions rose as military performance indicators sank, and no longer was the US looking over the shoulder demanding improvement.

On other side, the PAVN had been badly mauled--the difference was that it knew it and it was determined to rebuild. Discarding guerrilla tactics, Giap three years to rebuild his forces into a strong conventional army. Without constant American bombing it was possible to solve the logistics problem by modernizing the Ho Chi Minh trail with 12,000 more miles of roads, as well as a fuel pipeline along the Trail to bring in gasoline for the next invasion.^[112]

LINEBACKER II

Late in 1972 election peace negotiations bogged down; Thieu demanded concrete evidence of 's promises to Saignon. Nixon thereupon unleashed the full fury of air power to force Hanoi to come to terms. Operation Operation LINEBACKER II, in 12 days smashed many targets in North Vietnam cities that had always been sacrosanct. 59 key targets were attacked, often using new weapons. In particular, precision guided munitions destroyed bridges previously resistant to attack. US policy was to try to avoid residential areas; the Politburo had already evacuated civilians not engaged in essential war work.

The Soviets had sold Hanoi 1,200 S-75 Dvina/NATO: SA-2 GUIDELINE surface-to-air missiles (SAM) that proved effective against the B-52s for the first three days. In a remarkable display of flexibility, the Air Force changed its bomber tactics overnight--and Hanoi ran out of SAMs. An American negotiator in Paris observed that, "Prior to LINEBACKER II, the North Vietnamese were intransigent... After LINEBACKER II, they were shaken, demoralized, and anxious to talk about anything." Beijing and Moscow advised Hanoi to agree to the peace accords;they did so on January, 23, 1973.

The Air Force interpreted the quick settlement as proof that unrestricted bombing of the sort they had wanted to do for eight years had finally broken Hanoi's will to fight; other analysts said Hanoi had not changed at all.^[113]^[114]^[115]

Peace accords and invasion, 1973-75

Peace accords were finally signed on 27 January 1973, in Paris. There would be an immediate in-place permanent cease-fire. The U.S. agreed to withdraw all its troops in 60 days (but could continue to send military supplies); North Vietnam was allowed to keep its 200,000 troops in the South but was not allowed to send new ones. Prisoners were exchanged. Although a low-intensity war continued, the world rejoiced. In February 591 surviving POWs (mostly pilots) came home to a joyous welcome.

After Nixon resigned in 1974, the US was legally unable and psychologically unwilling to fight in Indochina. The 1973 Peace Agreement, instead of ending a war. made continuation inevitable, for it allowed North Vietnam to keep troops in the South. The North, badly damaged by the bombings of 1972, recovered quickly and remained committed to the destruction of its rival. The main reason for the fall of South Vietnam in 1973 was the continued failure of the Saigon government to run an effective administration. Its weaknesses were compounded by exaggerated confidence that the U.S. would return if and when needed.^[116]Although it was well-armed — its 2100 modern aircraft comprised the fourth largest air force in the world — the ARVN had never learned to fight large-scale operations against a conventional enemy.

Invasion and the fall of the south, 1975

North invades South, 1975, using bases in Cambodia and Laos, and across DMZ

Starting in March, 1975, Hanoi sent 18 divisions, with 300,000 of its 700,000, soldiers to invade the South again, in conventional fashion with marching armies spearheaded by 600 Russian-built tanks and 400 pieces of artillery. Instead of crawling along jungle trails they used 12,000 miles of roads they had built (and even a pipeline) since the truce. The U.S had provided South Vietnam with $4.9 billion in military supplies since the truce, giving it a powerful army and the world's fourth strongest air force.

The air force, however, performed poorly, and often abandoned its bases. For the time, the PAVN had competent mobile anti-aircraft artillery. ^[117]^[118]

The ARVN, with 1.1 million soldiers, still had a 2-1 advantage in combat soldiers and 3-1 in artillery, but it misused its resources badly. The South's doctrine was called "light at the top, heavy at the bottom", meaning that it would resist lightly in the northern party of the country (I Corps), but stiffen resistance as the North extended. That was an attritional strategy, and the DRV had not broken under the much heavier attrition imposed by U.S. troops.

Some ARVN units fought well; most collapsed under the 16-division onslaught. The North Vietnamese regular army, the PAVN, began a full-scale offensive by seizing Phuoc Long Province in January, 1975. In March, 1975, they continued their offensive campaigns by conducting diversionary attacks in the north threatening Pleiku and then attacking the lightly defended South Vietnamese rear area.

The PAVN captured the Central Highlands and moved to the sea to divide the country. The PAVN blocked the South Vietnamese attempt to retreat from the Central Highlands and destroyed the ARVN II corps. Of the 314 M-41 and M-48 ARVN tanks assigned to the Highlands, only three made it through to the coast.^[119]

ARVN resistance was sometimes heroic, but it kept losing. In three weeks lost half its main force units, and more than half its aircraft. Hundreds of thousands of refugees clogged the roads making retreat nearly impossible. Many ARVN units disintegrated as soldiers deserted to care for their families.

President Thieu released written assurances, dated April 1973, from President Nixon that the U.S. would "react vigorously" if North Vietnam violated the truce agreement. But Nixon had resigned in August 1974 and his personal assurances were meaningless; After Nixon made the promises, Congress had prohibited the use of American forces in any combat role in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam without prior congressional approval. This was well known to the Saigon government. ^[120] President Gerald R. Ford tried to get new money for the South, but refused to consider any military action whatever.

About 140,000 refugees managed to flee the country, chiefly by boat. The PAVN then concentrated its combat power to attack the six ARVN divisions isolated in the north. After destroying these divisions, the PAVN launched its "Ho Chi Minh Campaign" that with little fighting seized Saigon on April 30, ending the war.^[121]

No American military units had been involved until the final days, when Operation FREQUENT WIND was launched to evacuate Americans and 5600 senior Vietnamese government and military officials, and employees of the U.S. Vietnam was unified under Communist rule, as nearly a million refugees escaped by boat. Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City.

References

↑ "Ha Noi celebrates Trung sisters 1,968th anniversary", Viet Nam News, 14 March 2008
↑ By the 1960s, Ho was primarily a symbol rather than an active leader. William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life (2000)
↑ Patti, Archimedes L. A (1980). Why Viet Nam?: Prelude to America's Albatross. University of California Press.
↑ Globalsecurity, First Indochina War
↑ Harrison, James P. (1982), The Endless War, originally Free Press, Columbia University reissue, Harrison, p. 120
↑ United States Department of State, East Asia and the Pacific Volume VI, vol. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, pp. 690-691
↑ FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, p. 697
↑ FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, p. 701
↑ FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, p. 716
↑ Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, 27 February 1950
↑ Bradley, Omar (10 April 1950), Memorandum...to the Secretary of Defense on the Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia
↑ Castle, Timothy N. (May 1991), At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: United States Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government 1955-75 (doctoral thesis), Air Force Institute of Technology, Castle 1991, ADA243492 Castle, p. 11
↑ Fall, p. 32-33
↑ Fall, pp. 36-37
↑ Fall, p. 39-40
↑ Currey, Cecil B. (2005), Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Brassey's, Currey, pp. 172-174
↑ Currey, p. 175
↑ Patti, p. 425
↑ HistoryNet Staff (6/12/2006), The Hoa Binh Campaign
↑ Fall, pp. 53-55
↑ Fall, pp. 59-60
↑ Chapuis, Oscar (2000), The Last Emperors of Vietnam, Greenwood Press, Chapuis pp. 166
↑ Fall, pp. 64-76
↑ Fall, pp. 92-95
↑ Leulliot, Nowfel & Danny O'Hara, Op Lorraine, 29th October-8 November : Salan strikes at Giap's supply lines
↑ Fall, pp. 103-106
↑ Chapuis, p. 166
↑ Chapuis, pp. 166-167
↑ Sorley, Lewis (Summer 1999), "Courage and Blood: South Vietnam's Repulse of the 1972 Easter Invasion", Parameters, p. 15
↑ Bernard, Fall (1972), Street without Joy, Schocken, pp. 185-186
↑ Fall, p. 315-316
↑ Fall, p. 318
↑ Chapuis, p. 166
↑ Chapuis, p. 166
↑ Fall, pp. 209-219
↑ ^36.0 ^36.1 ^36.2 ^36.3 ^36.4 , Volume 1, Chapter 4, "U.S. and France in Indochina, 1950-56", Section 3, pp. 314-346, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "PntV1Ch05Sec0314-346" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "PntV1Ch05Sec0314-346" defined multiple times with different content
↑ Sorley, pp. 14-15
↑ ^38.0 ^38.1 Document 95, Lansdale Team's Report on Covert Saigon Mission in 1954 and 1955,, at 573-83
↑ ^39.0 ^39.1 Human Rights Watch (April 2002), III. A History of Resistance to Central Government Control, Repression of Montagnards: Conflicts over Land and Religion in Vietnam's Central Highlands
↑ ^40.0 ^40.1 , Volume 1, Chapter 5, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960 Section 1, pp. 242-69, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1
↑ ^41.0 ^41.1 Mao Tse-tung (1967), On Protracted War, Foreign Languages Press, pp. 136-137 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "MaoProtracted" defined multiple times with different content
↑ Eckhardt, George S. (1991), Vietnam Studies: Command and Control 1950-1969, Center for Military History, U.S. Department of the Army, pp. 68-71
↑ Pike, PAVN (1986)
↑ Goscha, Christopher E. (April 2002), The Maritime Nature of the Wars for Vietnam (1945-75)
↑ Hanyok, Robert J. (2002), Chapter 3 - "To Die in the South": SIGINT, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Infiltration Problem, [Deleted 1968], Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency
↑ Holman, Victor (1995). Seminole Negro Indians, Macabebes, and Civilian Irregulars: Models for the Future Employment of Indigenous Forces.
↑ Collins, James Lawton, Jr., Chapter I: The Formative Years, 1950-1959, Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972, p. 16
↑ Collins, James Lawton, Jr., Chapter II: The Crucial Years, 1960-1964, Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972, pp. 17-18
↑ Collins, pp. 9-10
↑ Rusk/McNamara memorandum.Nov. 11, 1961, online at Pentagon Papers
↑ Shultz, Richard H., Jr. (2000), the Secret War against Hanoi: the untold story of spies, saboteurs, and covert warriors in North Vietnam, Harper Collins Perennial, p. 3
↑ ^52.0 ^52.1 Whitcomb, Darrel (December 2005), "Farm Gate: In 1961, the Air Force took its first step into a very long war.", Air Force Magazine 88 (12)
↑ Shultz 2000, pp. 17-23
↑ McClintock, Michael (2002), Chapter 9, The Heart of Doctrine, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990, Pantheon Books, Division of Random House
↑ Kelly, Francis John (1973), Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, Center for Military History, Department of the Army, CMH Publication 90-23, p. 4
↑ Collins 1974, p. 70
↑ Kelly 1974, p. 19
↑ Eckhardt, p. 25
↑ Rusk, Dean & Robert McNamara (November 11, 1961), United States National Interests in South Viet-Nam; report to the President
↑ Tolson, John J. (1974), Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971, Center for Military History, Department of the Army, Tolson 1974, p. 4
↑ Gibbs, James William (1986), The Perfect War: Technolwar in Vietnam, Atlantic Monthly Presspp. 70-71
↑ Samson, Robert L. (1970), The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, MIT Press p. 29
↑ Gibson, pp. 71-72
↑ Brush, Peter, Battle of Khe Sanh: Recounting the Battle’s Casualties
↑ , Chapter 3, "Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces, 1962-1964," pp. 160-200., The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2
↑ Knight, Judson, Army Security Agency
↑ Australian War Memorial, Impressions: Australians in Vietnam. Overview of Australian military involvement in the Vietnam War, 1962 - 1975
↑ Sheehan, Neil (1989), A Bright and Shining Lie, Vintage
↑ ^69.0 ^69.1 McMaster, H. R. (1997), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, Harpercollins Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "McMaster" defined multiple times with different content
↑ Shultz, pp. 32-33
↑ ^71.0 ^71.1 Adams, Sam (1994), War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir, Steerforth Press
↑ Vo Nguyen Giap (2001), People's War People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries, University Press of the Pacific
↑ Shultz, pp. 38-39
↑ William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life (2001), pp 534-37 online; Ilya Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, F1954-1963 (2003) online pp 203-4
↑ Shultz, pp. 45-46
↑ ^76.0 ^76.1 ^76.2 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Command History Chronology - 1964
↑ Shultz, pp. 46-48
↑ Shultz, pp. 45-46
↑ Director of Central Intelligence for the U.S. Intelligence Board (May 25, 1964), Special National Intelligence Estimate 50-2-64: Probable Consequences with Respect to Certain U.S. Actions toward Vietnam and Laos, in Prados, John, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later: Flawed Intelligence and the Decision for War in Vietnam
↑ Sherman Kent for the Board of National Estimates, Memo 6-9-64 (for the Director of Central Intelligence): Would the Loss of South Vietnam and Laos precipitate a "Domino Effect"
↑ Collins, p. 64
↑ ^82.0 ^82.1 McNamara, Robert S. (20 July 1965), Notes for Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam,"
↑ Neuman, Stephanie G. (2001), Macmillan, p. 65-66
↑ Nagl, John A.; David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos et al. (December 2006), Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, US Department of the Army
↑ Mao, pp. 175-176
↑ ^86.0 ^86.1 Carland, John M. (2004), "Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents.", Journal of Military History" 68 (2): 553-574
↑ United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition)
↑ The normal Marine term is "Marine Expeditionary Force", but "Expeditionary" had unfortunate colonialist connotations in Vietnam. Current USMC terminology is MEF.
↑ David M. Berman, "Civic Action," in Spencer Tucker, ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War p. 73-74
↑ Tucker, ed., Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (2000) pp 74-75, 276-77
↑ The History Channel (September 22, 1964), Goldwater attacks Johnson's Vietnam policy
↑ Defence Canada, The Use of Herbicides at CFB Gagetown from 1952 to Present Day
↑ Quoted in Clodfelter, p. 134
↑ Gibson, p. 170
↑ Moore, Harold & Joseph Galloway (1992), We were soldiers once, and young: Ia Drang--The Battle That Changed The War In Vietnam, Random House
↑ Eckhardt, pp. 64-68
↑ Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for pacification support (1982) online edition
↑ Michal R. Belknap, The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley (2002). excerpt and text search; "Famous American Trials: The My Lai Courts-Martial 1970" online
↑ Shulimson, Jack, The Marine War: III MAF in Vietnam, 1965-1971, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center
↑ William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (1976), pp 164-66. Marine General Victor Krulak devotes ch 13 of his memoirs, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (1984) to the dispute. First to Fight pp 195-204 online; see also Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers American Generals Reflect on Vietnam (1991) discusses the tension on p 60-1, online
↑ John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh (2004)
↑ Don Oberdorfer, Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War (2001) excerpt and text search; James H. Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History (2006) excerpt and text search
↑ Elliott, The Vietnamese War: (2002) p. 1128
↑ Quoted in Robert D. Schulzinger, Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (1997) p. 261 online
↑ Tran Van Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Vol. 5: Concluding the 30-Years War (1982), pp. 35-36.
↑ Fiedler, David (Spring, 2003), "Project touchdown: how we paid the price for lack of communications security in Vietnam - A costly lesson", Army Communicator
↑ Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency (1993), PURPLE DRAGON: The Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC Program, vol. United States Cryptologic History, Series VI, The NSA Period, Volume 2
↑ Purple Dragon, p. 64
↑ Donaldson, Gary (1996), America at War Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, Greenwood Publishing Group, pp.120-124
↑ Dale Andradé, Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle (1995) 600pp.
↑ For firsthand accounts by a ARVN general see Lam Quang Thi, The Twenty-Five Year Century: A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon (2002), online edition.
↑ Bruce Palmer, 25 Year War 122; Clodfelter 173; Davidson ch 24 and p. 738-59.
↑ Karl J. Eschmann, Linebacker: The Untold Story of the Air Raids over North Vietnam (1989)
↑ Henry Kissinger, White House Years 1:1454
↑ Clodfelter, Limits of Air Power" ch 6
↑ William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (1998) pp 497-500
↑ Ray L. Bowers, "Air Power in Southeast Asia" in Alfred F. Hurley and Ehrhart, eds. Air Power & Warfare: The Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium: United States Air Force Academy: 18-20 October 1978 (1978) pp 309-29 esp p. 323-4 full text online
↑ Momyer, William W. (1985), The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951 - 1975: An Analysis of Its Role in Combat
↑ William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power, (2nd ed. 1996) 335, 338-42
↑ "Seeking the Last Exit from Viet Nam", Time Magazine, April 21, 1975
↑ Duiker, The Communist Road to Power, 341-49; David Butler, Fall of Saigon, (1986); Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975 (2002), Hanoi's official historyexcerpt and text search

[VNN2008-03-14-1] "Ha Noi celebrates Trung sisters 1,968th anniversary", Viet Nam News, 14 March 2008

[2] By the 1960s, Ho was primarily a symbol rather than an active leader. William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life (2000)

[Patti-3] Patti, Archimedes L. A (1980). Why Viet Nam?: Prelude to America's Albatross. University of California Press.

[GS-1Indo-4] Globalsecurity, First Indochina War

[Harrison-5] Harrison, James P. (1982), The Endless War, originally Free Press, Columbia University reissue, Harrison, p. 120

[FRUS-6] United States Department of State, East Asia and the Pacific Volume VI, vol. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, pp. 690-691

[7] FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, p. 697

[8] FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, p. 701

[9] FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, p. 716

[TruNSC64-10] Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, 27 February 1950

[CJCS1950-04-10-11] Bradley, Omar (10 April 1950), Memorandum...to the Secretary of Defense on the Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia

[Castle1991-12] Castle, Timothy N. (May 1991), At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: United States Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government 1955-75 (doctoral thesis), Air Force Institute of Technology, Castle 1991, ADA243492 Castle, p. 11

[13] Fall, p. 32-33

[14] Fall, pp. 36-37

[15] Fall, p. 39-40

[Currey-16] Currey, Cecil B. (2005), Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Brassey's, Currey, pp. 172-174

[17] Currey, p. 175

[18] Patti, p. 425

[HN-HoaBinh-19] HistoryNet Staff (6/12/2006), The Hoa Binh Campaign

[20] Fall, pp. 53-55

[21] Fall, pp. 59-60

[Chapuis-22] Chapuis, Oscar (2000), The Last Emperors of Vietnam, Greenwood Press, Chapuis pp. 166

[23] Fall, pp. 64-76

[24] Fall, pp. 92-95

[Nowfel-Lorraine-25] Leulliot, Nowfel & Danny O'Hara, Op Lorraine, 29th October-8 November : Salan strikes at Giap's supply lines

[26] Fall, pp. 103-106

[27] Chapuis, p. 166

[28] Chapuis, pp. 166-167

[Sorley-29] Sorley, Lewis (Summer 1999), "Courage and Blood: South Vietnam's Repulse of the 1972 Easter Invasion", Parameters, p. 15

[Fall-30] Bernard, Fall (1972), Street without Joy, Schocken, pp. 185-186

[31] Fall, p. 315-316

[32] Fall, p. 318

[33] Chapuis, p. 166

[34] Chapuis, p. 166

[35] Fall, pp. 209-219

[PntV1Ch05Sec0314-346-36] 36.0 ^36.1 ^36.2 ^36.3 ^36.4 , Volume 1, Chapter 4, "U.S. and France in Indochina, 1950-56", Section 3, pp. 314-346, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "PntV1Ch05Sec0314-346" defined multiple times with different content Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "PntV1Ch05Sec0314-346" defined multiple times with different content

[37] Sorley, pp. 14-15

[PPv1D95-38] 38.0 ^38.1 Document 95, Lansdale Team's Report on Covert Saigon Mission in 1954 and 1955,, at 573-83

[HRW-RoM-Ch03-39] 39.0 ^39.1 Human Rights Watch (April 2002), III. A History of Resistance to Central Government Control, Repression of Montagnards: Conflicts over Land and Religion in Vietnam's Central Highlands

[PntV1Ch05Sec01-40] 40.0 ^40.1 , Volume 1, Chapter 5, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960 Section 1, pp. 242-69, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1

[MaoProtracted-41] 41.0 ^41.1 Mao Tse-tung (1967), On Protracted War, Foreign Languages Press, pp. 136-137 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "MaoProtracted" defined multiple times with different content

[Eckhardt-42] Eckhardt, George S. (1991), Vietnam Studies: Command and Control 1950-1969, Center for Military History, U.S. Department of the Army, pp. 68-71

[43] Pike, PAVN (1986)

[Goscha2002-44] Goscha, Christopher E. (April 2002), The Maritime Nature of the Wars for Vietnam (1945-75)

[NSAVN-3-45] Hanyok, Robert J. (2002), Chapter 3 - "To Die in the South": SIGINT, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Infiltration Problem, [Deleted 1968], Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency

[46] Holman, Victor (1995). Seminole Negro Indians, Macabebes, and Civilian Irregulars: Models for the Future Employment of Indigenous Forces.

[Collins1974-Ch01-47] Collins, James Lawton, Jr., Chapter I: The Formative Years, 1950-1959, Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972, p. 16

[Collins1974-Ch02-48] Collins, James Lawton, Jr., Chapter II: The Crucial Years, 1960-1964, Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972, pp. 17-18

[49] Collins, pp. 9-10

[50] Rusk/McNamara memorandum.Nov. 11, 1961, online at Pentagon Papers

[Shultz-51] Shultz, Richard H., Jr. (2000), the Secret War against Hanoi: the untold story of spies, saboteurs, and covert warriors in North Vietnam, Harper Collins Perennial, p. 3

[Whitcomb2005-52] 52.0 ^52.1 Whitcomb, Darrel (December 2005), "Farm Gate: In 1961, the Air Force took its first step into a very long war.", Air Force Magazine 88 (12)

[53] Shultz 2000, pp. 17-23

[McClintock2002Ch09-54] McClintock, Michael (2002), Chapter 9, The Heart of Doctrine, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990, Pantheon Books, Division of Random House

[Kelly1973-55] Kelly, Francis John (1973), Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, Center for Military History, Department of the Army, CMH Publication 90-23, p. 4

[56] Collins 1974, p. 70

[57] Kelly 1974, p. 19

[58] Eckhardt, p. 25

[RuskMac-59] Rusk, Dean & Robert McNamara (November 11, 1961), United States National Interests in South Viet-Nam; report to the President

[Tolson1974-60] Tolson, John J. (1974), Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971, Center for Military History, Department of the Army, Tolson 1974, p. 4

[Gibson-61] Gibbs, James William (1986), The Perfect War: Technolwar in Vietnam, Atlantic Monthly Presspp. 70-71

[Samson-62] Samson, Robert L. (1970), The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, MIT Press p. 29

[63] Gibson, pp. 71-72

[HN-KS-64] Brush, Peter, Battle of Khe Sanh: Recounting the Battle’s Casualties

[PntPapV4Ch2-160-200-65] , Chapter 3, "Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces, 1962-1964," pp. 160-200., The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2

[Knight-66] Knight, Judson, Army Security Agency

[AusInVN-67] Australian War Memorial, Impressions: Australians in Vietnam. Overview of Australian military involvement in the Vietnam War, 1962 - 1975

[Sheehan-68] Sheehan, Neil (1989), A Bright and Shining Lie, Vintage

[McMaster-69] 69.0 ^69.1 McMaster, H. R. (1997), Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, Harpercollins Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "McMaster" defined multiple times with different content

[70] Shultz, pp. 32-33

[Adams-71] 71.0 ^71.1 Adams, Sam (1994), War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir, Steerforth Press

[Giap-72] Vo Nguyen Giap (2001), People's War People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries, University Press of the Pacific

[73] Shultz, pp. 38-39

[74] William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life (2001), pp 534-37 online; Ilya Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, F1954-1963 (2003) online pp 203-4

[75] Shultz, pp. 45-46

[MACV-Chron64-76] 76.0 ^76.1 ^76.2 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Command History Chronology - 1964

[77] Shultz, pp. 46-48

[78] Shultz, pp. 45-46

[NSAEBB132-snie-79] Director of Central Intelligence for the U.S. Intelligence Board (May 25, 1964), Special National Intelligence Estimate 50-2-64: Probable Consequences with Respect to Certain U.S. Actions toward Vietnam and Laos, in Prados, John, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later: Flawed Intelligence and the Decision for War in Vietnam

[Kent1964-06-09-80] Sherman Kent for the Board of National Estimates, Memo 6-9-64 (for the Director of Central Intelligence): Would the Loss of South Vietnam and Laos precipitate a "Domino Effect"

[81] Collins, p. 64

[McNamara1965-07-20-82] 82.0 ^82.1 McNamara, Robert S. (20 July 1965), Notes for Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam,"

[Harkavy2001-83] Neuman, Stephanie G. (2001), Macmillan, p. 65-66

[FM3-24-84] Nagl, John A.; David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos et al. (December 2006), Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, US Department of the Army

[85] Mao, pp. 175-176

[Carland2004-86] 86.0 ^86.1 Carland, John M. (2004), "Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents.", Journal of Military History" 68 (2): 553-574

[USMC-SW-87] United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition)

[88] The normal Marine term is "Marine Expeditionary Force", but "Expeditionary" had unfortunate colonialist connotations in Vietnam. Current USMC terminology is MEF.

[89] David M. Berman, "Civic Action," in Spencer Tucker, ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War p. 73-74

[90] Tucker, ed., Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (2000) pp 74-75, 276-77

[ThisDay-91] The History Channel (September 22, 1964), Goldwater attacks Johnson's Vietnam policy

[CForange-92] Defence Canada, The Use of Herbicides at CFB Gagetown from 1952 to Present Day

[93] Quoted in Clodfelter, p. 134

[94] Gibson, p. 170

[Moore-95] Moore, Harold & Joseph Galloway (1992), We were soldiers once, and young: Ia Drang--The Battle That Changed The War In Vietnam, Random House

[96] Eckhardt, pp. 64-68

[97] Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for pacification support (1982) online edition

[98] Michal R. Belknap, The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley (2002). excerpt and text search; "Famous American Trials: The My Lai Courts-Martial 1970" online

[III-MAF-99] Shulimson, Jack, The Marine War: III MAF in Vietnam, 1965-1971, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center

[100] William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (1976), pp 164-66. Marine General Victor Krulak devotes ch 13 of his memoirs, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (1984) to the dispute. First to Fight pp 195-204 online; see also Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers American Generals Reflect on Vietnam (1991) discusses the tension on p 60-1, online

[101] John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe, Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh (2004)

[102] Don Oberdorfer, Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War (2001) excerpt and text search; James H. Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History (2006) excerpt and text search

[103] Elliott, The Vietnamese War: (2002) p. 1128

[104] Quoted in Robert D. Schulzinger, Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (1997) p. 261 online

[105] Tran Van Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Vol. 5: Concluding the 30-Years War (1982), pp. 35-36.

[Fiedler-106] Fiedler, David (Spring, 2003), "Project touchdown: how we paid the price for lack of communications security in Vietnam - A costly lesson", Army Communicator

[PurpleDragon-107] Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency (1993), PURPLE DRAGON: The Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC Program, vol. United States Cryptologic History, Series VI, The NSA Period, Volume 2

[108] Purple Dragon, p. 64

[Donaldson-109] Donaldson, Gary (1996), America at War Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, Greenwood Publishing Group, pp.120-124

[110] Dale Andradé, Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle (1995) 600pp.

[111] For firsthand accounts by a ARVN general see Lam Quang Thi, The Twenty-Five Year Century: A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon (2002), online edition.

[112] Bruce Palmer, 25 Year War 122; Clodfelter 173; Davidson ch 24 and p. 738-59.

[113] Karl J. Eschmann, Linebacker: The Untold Story of the Air Raids over North Vietnam (1989)

[114] Henry Kissinger, White House Years 1:1454

[115] Clodfelter, Limits of Air Power" ch 6

[116] William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (1998) pp 497-500

[117] Ray L. Bowers, "Air Power in Southeast Asia" in Alfred F. Hurley and Ehrhart, eds. Air Power & Warfare: The Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium: United States Air Force Academy: 18-20 October 1978 (1978) pp 309-29 esp p. 323-4 full text online

[ADA439993-Monograph4-118] Momyer, William W. (1985), The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951 - 1975: An Analysis of Its Role in Combat

[119] William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power, (2nd ed. 1996) 335, 338-42

[120] "Seeking the Last Exit from Viet Nam", Time Magazine, April 21, 1975

[121] Duiker, The Communist Road to Power, 341-49; David Butler, Fall of Saigon, (1986); Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975 (2002), Hanoi's official historyexcerpt and text search

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@@ Line 213: / Line 213: @@
 The North Vietnamese began their attack on Dien Bien Phu on March 12, with a force of 50,000 regular troops, 55,000 support troops, and 100,000 transport workers, versus 15,000 French.  They had managed, quite beyond French expectation, to put well-protected artillery and air defenses into the surrounding high ground, making air resupply almost impossible. Brigadier General de Castries, commanding Dien Bien Phu, was a paratroop leader, skilled in the offensive but not an expert in dogged defense.
-By March 15, the French realized that it could not be held, and appealed for U.S. intervention. Admiral [[Arthur Radford]], [[Chairman of the Joint Staff]], [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam#MAAG-Indochina|recommended]], on five occasions, that the U.S. do so, but neither the other JCS members nor President Eisenhower supported him.
+By March 15, the French realized that it could not be held, and appealed for U.S. intervention. Admiral [[Arthur Radford]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff]] and [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam#MAAG-Indochina|recommended]], on five occasions, that the U.S. do so, but neither the other JCS members nor President Eisenhower supported him.
 When Colonel Piroth, the fortress artillery commander, realized the situation in which his weapons were outclassed, he committed suicide on the night of March 16. When the French Defense Minister and Chief of Staff inspected on February 9, he had refused more equipment, saying he had more than he needed; the French had no idea how much the Vietnamese had emplaced. <ref> Chapuis, p. 166</ref> While Chinese aid, literally carried 350 kilometers, reached 1,500 tons per month, the Viet Minh artillery closed the Dien Bien Phu airfield, the sole source of spply, on March 27.
@@ Line 219: / Line 219: @@
 Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7; the Geneva Conference began the next day.
 ====GM100 dies====
-GM 100 had had some success in relieving An Khe in April. On June 24, however, GM100 was ambushed and destroyed.<ref>Fall, pp. 209-219</ref> There was a [[#VC campaign in II Corps, 1965|different outcome]] at almost the same spot, in 1965.
+GM 100 had had some success in relieving [[An Khe]] in April. On June 24, however, GM100 was ambushed and destroyed.<ref>Fall, pp. 209-219</ref> There was a [[#VC campaign in II Corps, 1965|different outcome]] at almost the same spot, in 1965.
 ====War's end====
 Officially, the war ended on July 20.  Prisoner exchanges showed an unexpectedly high number of the French captives of the North Vietnamese had died in the prison camps, and that there had been, as in the [[Korean War]], systematic pressure for conversion to the Communist cause.
@@ Line 656: / Line 656: @@
 ===1965===
+On 13 April 1965, joint RVN-US discussions agreed that the ARVN force levels were inadequate. The manning level was increased, to increase RVN infantry battalions from 119 (93 infantry, 20 Ranger, and 6 airborne) to 150. The new battalions were generally added to existing regiments, to avoid the need of creating more headquarters units.  By the end of 1965, twenty-four were either in the field or in training areas.<ref> Collins, p. 64</ref>
 In July 1965, McNamara sent Johnson a set of notes proposing escalation of what he saw as a deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. "The situation in SVN is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. . . . The central highlands could well be lost to the NLF during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken...The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" for a directorate of generals."<ref name=McNamara1965-07-20>{{citation
   | first = Robert S. | last = McNamara
@@ Line 698: / Line 700: @@
 His strategy conflicted with alternatives from  the [[#Westmoreland vs. Marines|U.S. Marines]] (both the III Marine Amphibious Force in the northern South Vietnamese I Corps, as well as the higher command of the [[U.S. Marine Corps]], and from [[#Westmoreland vs. Taylor|Maxwell Taylor]], U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, former [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and [[General]], U.S. Army.  He also was suggesting to fight a war of attrition against a Communist force guided by the Maoist doctrine of Protracted War, which specifically included attrition as one strategic option. <ref>Mao, pp. 175-176</ref>
 =====Westmoreland's attritional strategy=====
-To reverse the downhill slide in the villages, Westmoreland called for 24 more maneuver [[battalion]]s (of approximately 800-1000 men each) added to the 20 he had, plus more artillery, aviation (helicopters), and support units; McNamara rounded the total to 175,000 troops, with 27 more maneuver battalions to come in 1966. Westmoreland's "ultimate aim",   was:
+To reverse the downhill slide in the villages, Westmoreland called for 24 more U.S. maneuver [[battalion]]s (of approximately 800-1000 men each) added to the 20 he had, plus more artillery, aviation (helicopters), and support units.   McNamara rounded the total to 175,000 troops, with 27 more maneuver battalions to come in 1966; there would then be approximately 150 ARVN and 47 US infantry battalions in 1966.    Westmoreland's "ultimate aim",   was:
 <blockquote>"To pacify the Republic of [South] Vietnam by destroying the VC—his forces, organization, terrorists, agents, and propagandists—while at the same time reestablishing the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the administrative machinery, and re-instituting the services of the Government. During this process security must be provided to all of the people on a progressive basis." Source: Directive 525-4  (MACJ3) 17 September 1965: Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in the Republic of Vietnam <ref name=Carland2004>{{citation |
   | first =  John M.| last = Carland
@@ Line 838: / Line 840: @@
   | date = 1993
   | url = http://www.nsa.gov/public/purple_dragon.pdf}}</ref>
+Some of the material from Touchdown also gave insight into the North Vietnamese intelligence system. For example, the NVA equivalent of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] was the Central Research Directorate (CRD) in Hanoi. COSVN intelligence staff, however, disseminated the tactically useful material. <ref>Purple Dragon, p. 64</ref>  Their espionage was under the control of the Military Intelligence Sections (MIS), which were directed by the Strategic Intelligence Section (SIS) of CRD.
 ===1970===
 Nixon's larger strategy was to convince Moscow and Bejing they could curry American favor by reducing or ending their military support of Hanoi. He assumed that would drastically reduce Hanoi's threat. Second, "Vietnamization" would replace attrition. Let the Vietnamese fight and die for their own freedom. Vietnamization meant heavily arming the ARVN and turning all military operations over to it; all American troops would go home.