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==U.S. intelligence and planning==  
==U.S. intelligence and planning==  
===Communications intelligence===
===Threat assessment===
===Threat assessment===
Various intelligence officers, such as [[Edwin Layton]] and [[Ellis Zacharias]], strongly suspected that Pearl Harbor was a Japanese target, but were unable to turn their suspicions into useful warnings.
====Sabotage vs. air attack====
====Sabotage vs. air attack====
Short was convinced that the major threat to his aircraft was sabotage by residents of Japanese ancestry, so he had them parked in close formation for ease in guarding them against ground attack. This made them dense targets for strafing and bombing.
Short was convinced that the major threat to his aircraft was sabotage by residents of Japanese ancestry, so he had them parked in close formation for ease in guarding them against ground attack. This made them dense targets for strafing and bombing.
====Implications of the Battle of Taranto====
====Implications of the Battle of Taranto====
In 1940, the [[Royal Navy]], at the [[Battle of Taranto]], delivered a devastating night attack, by torpedo aircraft, to battleships in a harbor. The U.S. Navy,  in spite of knowing the details of that attack, still believed its ships were safe from aerial torpedoes in a harbor, although Taranto was as shallow as Pearl.  
In 1940, the [[Royal Navy]], at the [[Battle of Taranto]], delivered a devastating night attack, by torpedo aircraft, to battleships in a harbor. The U.S. Navy,  in spite of knowing the details of that attack, still believed its ships were safe from aerial torpedoes in a harbor, although Taranto was as shallow as Pearl.
 
===Communications intelligence===
Contrary to some popular opinion, U.S. communications intelligence &mdash; [[MAGIC (communications intelligence)|MAGIC]] did not give an unambiguous prior warning of the attack. Immediately before the attack, the U.S. became aware that the Japanese were issuing orders to destroy embassy cryptographic materials, and tell the United States that negotiations had failed, although diplomatic relations were not formally broken. The 14-part message had special instructions about the delivery time, suggestive of coordination with military operations.<ref name=Kahn1996>{{cite book
  | author = David Kahn
  | title = The Codebreakers - The Story of Secret Writing
  | publisher = Scribners
  | url = http://www.amazon.com/Codebreakers-Comprehensive-History-Communication-Internet/dp/0684831309/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/002-7164795-0653605?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1191257117&sr=8-1
  | date = 1996
  | isbn = 0684831309}}, pp. 2-5</ref>
 
Had the message been intercepted and its meaning known, a code phrase sent, in the clear, to the Japanese striking force did mean "attack Pearl Harbor".  The phrase, "Climb Mount Nitaaka", sent on 2 December (Tokyo time) would not have been meaningful. <ref>Kahn, p. 41</ref>
 
==Order of battle==
==Order of battle==
===Japan===
===Japan===

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For the geographic area, see Pearl Harbor

On December 7, 1941, units of the Imperial Japanese Navy conducted air and submarine operations against American forces in the Battle of Pearl Harbor. This battle was a key element in the major Japanese escalation of what they call the Pacific War.

While the United States had intelligence suggesting a high probability of Japanese attacks in December 1941, and some specific information that either did not reach the Pearl Harbor commanders, Admiral Husband Kimmel (Navy) or Lieutenant General Walter Short (Army), the attack was a tactical surprise.

Few battles, and the circumstances leading to them, have been studied as extensively as this one. Many concepts of the discipline of intelligence and warning resulted from this action.

Japanese operational concept

Japan opened World War Two in the Pacific with an offensive principally based on their Strike-South doctrine, seeking resources in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, they believed they had to deter U.S. forces from intervening. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet and an opponent war with the United States, insisted that the preventive attack on the fleet was necessary to protect his other operations.

U.S. intelligence and planning

Threat assessment

Various intelligence officers, such as Edwin Layton and Ellis Zacharias, strongly suspected that Pearl Harbor was a Japanese target, but were unable to turn their suspicions into useful warnings.

Sabotage vs. air attack

Short was convinced that the major threat to his aircraft was sabotage by residents of Japanese ancestry, so he had them parked in close formation for ease in guarding them against ground attack. This made them dense targets for strafing and bombing.

Implications of the Battle of Taranto

In 1940, the Royal Navy, at the Battle of Taranto, delivered a devastating night attack, by torpedo aircraft, to battleships in a harbor. The U.S. Navy, in spite of knowing the details of that attack, still believed its ships were safe from aerial torpedoes in a harbor, although Taranto was as shallow as Pearl.

Communications intelligence

Contrary to some popular opinion, U.S. communications intelligence — MAGIC did not give an unambiguous prior warning of the attack. Immediately before the attack, the U.S. became aware that the Japanese were issuing orders to destroy embassy cryptographic materials, and tell the United States that negotiations had failed, although diplomatic relations were not formally broken. The 14-part message had special instructions about the delivery time, suggestive of coordination with military operations.[1]

Had the message been intercepted and its meaning known, a code phrase sent, in the clear, to the Japanese striking force did mean "attack Pearl Harbor". The phrase, "Climb Mount Nitaaka", sent on 2 December (Tokyo time) would not have been meaningful. [2]

Order of battle

Japan

While the overall operational commander was Admiral Yamamoto, the officer in tactical command was Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagamo. Nagamo, a battleship and gunnery specialist, commanded the Mobile Fleet due to seniority rather than special qualifications.[3]

  • First Carrier Division (Vice Admiral Nagumo)
  • Second Carrier Division (Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi)
  • Sixth (Submarine) Fleet. Vice Admiral Mitsumi Shimizu
    • 1st Submarine Squadron, Rear Admiral Sato Tsutomu, four I-class submarines
    • 2nd Submarine Squadron, Rear Admiral Yamazaki Shigeaki, seven I-class submarines
    • 3rd Submarine Squadron, Rear Admiral Miwa Shigeyoski, nine I-class submarines
    • Special Attack Unit, Captain Sasaki Hanku (Mother Submarines Commander), Lt. Naoji Iwasa (Mini-submarines Commander); five midget submarines
    • Submarine Reconnaissance Unit, Commander Kashihara Yasuchika, two I-class submarines

United States

The attack

Preliminaries

Japanese torpedo bomber taking off to attack Pearl Harbor

First wave air attack

Japanese perspective approaching Battleship Row

The picture, taken from a Japanese aircraft, shows USS Nevada (BB-36) with flag raised at stern; USS Arizona (BB-39) with repair ship USS Vestal (AR-4) outboard; Tennessee (BB-43) with West Virginia (BB-48) outboard; USS Maryland (BB-46) with USS Oklahoma (BB-37) outboard; USS Neosho (AO-23) and USS California (BB-44).

West Virginia, Oklahoma and California have been torpedoed, as marked by ripples and spreading oil, and the first two are listing to port. Torpedo drop splashes and running tracks are visible at left and center. White smoke in the distance is from Hickam Field. Grey smoke in the center middle distance is from the torpedoed USS Helena (CL-50)

Second wave air attack

Arguments for and against a possible third strike

Aftermath

Changes in Command

Effect on naval doctrine

References

  1. ↑ David Kahn (1996). The Codebreakers - The Story of Secret Writing. Scribners. ISBN 0684831309. , pp. 2-5
  2. ↑ Kahn, p. 41
  3. ↑ Joseph Czarnecki, Richard Worth, Matthias C. Noch, Mark E. Horan and Tony DiGiulian, "Order of Battle: Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941", Navweaps.com
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