Great Depression in the United States: Difference between revisions

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==Overview==
==Overview==


==The early 1920s==
==The early and mid-1920s==
The condition of the United States  in the 1920s differed markedly from its pre-war condition. The wartime destruction of much of Europe's productive capacity had made it the richest country in the world and Europe's  wartime borrowing had made it the largest creditor. The full convertability  of the dollar into gold under the [[gold standard]] which  had been suspended during the war, was immediately resumed. There was a minor recesssion immediately after the war, followed by a resumption of strong output growth. The severest bout of deflation ever experienced in the United States was not during the Great Depression, but a decade earlier in 1920-21 when wholesale prices fell by 56% in a little over a year following a tightening of the federal budget, increases in Federal Reserve discount rates and a very sharp reduction in the ''monetary base''. <ref name=Friedman> Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz ''A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960'' (p. 289), Princeton University Press for NBER, 1963</ref>
The condition of the United States  in the 1920s differed markedly from its pre-war condition. The wartime destruction of much of Europe's productive capacity had made it the richest country in the world and Europe's  wartime borrowing had made it the largest creditor. The full convertability  of the dollar into gold under the [[gold standard]] which  had been suspended during the war, was immediately resumed. There was a minor recesssion immediately after the war, followed by a resumption of strong output growth. The severest bout of deflation ever experienced in the United States was not during the Great Depression, but a decade earlier in 1920-21 when wholesale prices fell by 56% in a little over a year following a tightening of the federal budget, increases in Federal Reserve discount rates and a very sharp reduction in the ''monetary base''. <ref name=Friedman> Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz ''A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960'' (p. 289), Princeton University Press for NBER, 1963</ref>


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There was nothing unexpected about the later turndown in the economy. On the contrary, a great deal of thought had been put into how to counter its next occurrence. In 1923, a committee appointed by Herbert Hoover (then Commerce Secretary) had published a 300-page report on the subject <ref name=Hoover>[http://en.citizendium.org/wiki?title=Great_Depression_in_the_United_States&action=edit ''Business Cycles and Unemployment'',  Report and Recommendations of a Committee of the President's Conference on Unemployment, McGraw Hill, 1923]</ref>. The committee had regarded  it as inevitable that every boom would be followed by a slump, and had considered how a future boom could be restrained and how the following downturn could be countered. Among their recommendations were the postponment of commercial and public investment projects and the control of credit expansion by the banks.  Although he endorsed those recommendations at the time, he subsequently proposed severe limits upon the  government's ability to act upon them. He has been quoted as saying - at the depth of the depression - that there should be "...no tampering or inflation of the currency"; that the budget should be "unquestionably balanced, even if further taxation is necessary"; and that "the Government credit [should] be maintained by refusal to exhaust it in the issue of securities" - which John Kenneth Galbraith took to amount to the rejection of both  fiscal policy and monetary policy actions in face of a depression<ref> John Kenneth Galbraith ''The Great Crash 1929'', Penguin Books 1992</ref>
There was nothing unexpected about the later turndown in the economy. On the contrary, a great deal of thought had been put into how to counter its next occurrence. In 1923, a committee appointed by Herbert Hoover (then Commerce Secretary) had published a 300-page report on the subject <ref name=Hoover>[http://en.citizendium.org/wiki?title=Great_Depression_in_the_United_States&action=edit ''Business Cycles and Unemployment'',  Report and Recommendations of a Committee of the President's Conference on Unemployment, McGraw Hill, 1923]</ref>. The committee had regarded  it as inevitable that every boom would be followed by a slump, and had considered how a future boom could be restrained and how the following downturn could be countered. Among their recommendations were the postponment of commercial and public investment projects and the control of credit expansion by the banks.  Although he endorsed those recommendations at the time, he subsequently proposed severe limits upon the  government's ability to act upon them. He has been quoted as saying - at the depth of the depression - that there should be "...no tampering or inflation of the currency"; that the budget should be "unquestionably balanced, even if further taxation is necessary"; and that "the Government credit [should] be maintained by refusal to exhaust it in the issue of securities" - which John Kenneth Galbraith took to amount to the rejection of both  fiscal policy and monetary policy actions in face of a depression<ref> John Kenneth Galbraith ''The Great Crash 1929'', Penguin Books 1992</ref>


<ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5407/is_200004/ai_n21464816/pg_18?tag=content;col1 Priscilla Roberts: '' Benjamin Strong, the Federal Reserve, and the limits to interwar American nationalism: Part II: Strong and the Federal Reserve System in the 1920s'', Economic Quarterly - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond ,  Spring 2000]</ref>.  
Monetary policy in the 1920s was dominated by Benjamin Strong, a participant in the creation of the [[Federal Reserve System]] and first governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Strong maintained a close relationship with Montague Norman of the Bank of England, and in 1924 he  maintained low interest rates in the United States, which by making the dollar lesss attractive,  and sterling more attractive to investors, drove up the foreign exchange value of the British currency and facilitated Britain's return to the gold standard <ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5407/is_200004/ai_n21464816/pg_18?tag=content;col1 Priscilla Roberts: '' Benjamin Strong, the Federal Reserve, and the limits to interwar American nationalism: Part II: Strong and the Federal Reserve System in the 1920s'', Economic Quarterly - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond ,  Spring 2000]</ref>.  


"The chief business of the American people is business."
The mid-1920s came to be known as the "Coolidge Prosperity". President Coolidge declared that "The chief business of the American people is business" and his administration gave  private business  substantial encouragement, including construction loans, profitable mail-carrying contracts and other indirect subsidies <ref>["War, Prosperity and Depression", Chapter 9, ''An outline of American History'', The United States Information Agency 2008]</ref>.
-- President Calvin Coolidge, 1925
 
<ref>["War, Prosperity and Depression", Chapter 9, ''An outline of American History'', The United States Information Agency 2008]</ref>


<ref name=Temin> Peter Temin ''Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression'', W W Norton, 1976</ref>
<ref name=Temin> Peter Temin ''Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression'', W W Norton, 1976</ref>

Revision as of 05:56, 11 February 2009

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For an annotated chronology of the main events, see the Timelines subpage;
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for definitions of terms shown in italics see the Glossary.

Overview

The early and mid-1920s

The condition of the United States in the 1920s differed markedly from its pre-war condition. The wartime destruction of much of Europe's productive capacity had made it the richest country in the world and Europe's wartime borrowing had made it the largest creditor. The full convertability of the dollar into gold under the gold standard which had been suspended during the war, was immediately resumed. There was a minor recesssion immediately after the war, followed by a resumption of strong output growth. The severest bout of deflation ever experienced in the United States was not during the Great Depression, but a decade earlier in 1920-21 when wholesale prices fell by 56% in a little over a year following a tightening of the federal budget, increases in Federal Reserve discount rates and a very sharp reduction in the monetary base. [1]


There was nothing unexpected about the later turndown in the economy. On the contrary, a great deal of thought had been put into how to counter its next occurrence. In 1923, a committee appointed by Herbert Hoover (then Commerce Secretary) had published a 300-page report on the subject [2]. The committee had regarded it as inevitable that every boom would be followed by a slump, and had considered how a future boom could be restrained and how the following downturn could be countered. Among their recommendations were the postponment of commercial and public investment projects and the control of credit expansion by the banks. Although he endorsed those recommendations at the time, he subsequently proposed severe limits upon the government's ability to act upon them. He has been quoted as saying - at the depth of the depression - that there should be "...no tampering or inflation of the currency"; that the budget should be "unquestionably balanced, even if further taxation is necessary"; and that "the Government credit [should] be maintained by refusal to exhaust it in the issue of securities" - which John Kenneth Galbraith took to amount to the rejection of both fiscal policy and monetary policy actions in face of a depression[3]

Monetary policy in the 1920s was dominated by Benjamin Strong, a participant in the creation of the Federal Reserve System and first governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Strong maintained a close relationship with Montague Norman of the Bank of England, and in 1924 he maintained low interest rates in the United States, which by making the dollar lesss attractive, and sterling more attractive to investors, drove up the foreign exchange value of the British currency and facilitated Britain's return to the gold standard [4].

The mid-1920s came to be known as the "Coolidge Prosperity". President Coolidge declared that "The chief business of the American people is business" and his administration gave private business substantial encouragement, including construction loans, profitable mail-carrying contracts and other indirect subsidies [5].

[6]


[7]

Boom

Slump

Rescue

References

  1. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960 (p. 289), Princeton University Press for NBER, 1963
  2. Business Cycles and Unemployment, Report and Recommendations of a Committee of the President's Conference on Unemployment, McGraw Hill, 1923
  3. John Kenneth Galbraith The Great Crash 1929, Penguin Books 1992
  4. Priscilla Roberts: Benjamin Strong, the Federal Reserve, and the limits to interwar American nationalism: Part II: Strong and the Federal Reserve System in the 1920s, Economic Quarterly - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond , Spring 2000
  5. ["War, Prosperity and Depression", Chapter 9, An outline of American History, The United States Information Agency 2008]
  6. Peter Temin Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression, W W Norton, 1976
  7. Historical Background and Development of Social Security, Social Security Administration 2008

Recovery