Monetary policy: Difference between revisions
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==Quantitative easing== | ==Quantitative easing== | ||
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==Dissenting views== | |||
Revision as of 08:21, 27 November 2009
Monetary policy has become the preferred policy instrument that is used in the pursuit of economic stability. It is implemented for regulatory purposes by open market operations in support of discount rate rate changes made in response to the degree of capacity utilisation in the economy. It has also been used for the purpose of expanding the money supply as a temporary expedient to counter the threat of deflation - a practice termed quantitative easing or credit easing (and popularly known as "printing money"). The practice of routinely targeting of monetary policy on the money supply in order to counter inflationary tendencies has generally fallen into disuse, however.
Some authorities are considering the use of monetary instruments to prevent the potentially destabilising buildup of speculative asset-price bubbles.
The monetary policy consensus
The Deputy Governor of the Bank of England has traced the evolution of monetary policy from the early post-war years when it was assigned only a marginal stabilisation role in favour of what was then thought of as the Keynesian use of fiscal policy - through the unsuccessful attempts [1]in the 1980s to target the money supply, that he attributes to monetarism - to the current consensus, which he classifies as "the neo-classical synthesis" or as "new Keynesian"[2]. That "new consensus" gives monetary policy the central stabilisation role, and - with rare exceptions - assigns a marginal role to fiscal policy. It adopts the classical contention of long-run neutrality of money and the sensitivity of expectations to the policy regime, together with the Keynesian theory's contention that market rigidities result in a short-term trade-off between economic activity and inflation [3]. The magnitude of that tradeoff (termed the sacrifice ratio) depends primarily upon labour market price flexibility[4]. The existence of a trade-off can reduce the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy if it is believed that policy action will subsequently be relaxed when the regulatory authority comes under political pressure to avoid any further reduction in economic activity (a problem that is termed time inconsistency).
Regulatory policy
Policy objectives and their implementation
It is now generally accepted practice for the state's role in monetary policy to be confined to the stipulation of objectives, leaving the implementation of policy entirely in the hands of the central bank. This has been referred to as "indirect implementation" because it involves action designed to influence the conduct of the banks rather than the imposition of instructions concerning their conduct. Conventional "free market" arguments have been advanced in favour of that option[5] and it can also be argued that it increases the credibility of policy action by reducing the risk of time inconsistency in face of pressure to relax an unpopular measure.
The remits of the major central banks differ mainly in respect of the relative weights to be given to their main objectives. The remit of the United States Federal Reserve Board is "to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates" [6]. The remit given to the European Central Bank, on the other hand, assigns overriding importance to price stability by requiring it "without prejudice to the objective of price stability" to "support the general economic policies in the Community" including a "high level of employment" and "sustainable and non-inflationary growth". [7]. The British Government's 1997 remit to the Bank of England also gives priority to the control of inflation by requiring it to "deliver price stability" ..."and without prejudice to that objective to support the Government's policies including its objectives for growth and employment" [8].
Choice of the target discount rate is usually guided by empirical data concerning the relation between interest rates, the inflation rate and the output gap such as is embodied in the "Taylor Rule"[9][10][11]. Since it takes about a year for interest rate changes to affect output and about two years to affect inflation, the decision depends upon judgements concerning the future of the economy. The authorities make use of economic forecasting models to assist those judgements, but they usually take account also of a range of factors including inflationary expectations (as indicated by the differences between the prices of fixed-interest and index-linked bonds) and the state of the housing market. Having taken the decision, the central bank normally announces its intended discount rate and supports the announcement by open market operations, including temporary loans of money by repurchase operations and the buying or selling of securities. The techniques employed differ only in detail as between the major central banks [12] [13][14].
In most countries, discount rate decisions are taken by committees of experts chosen for that purpose. In the United States they are taken by "Federal Open Market Committee[15][16], in the Eurozone the decisions are taken by the European Central Bank Governing Council[17][18]., and in Britain they are taken by the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee [19]. In the United States and Britain, each decision is followed after an interval by the publication of an account of the reasons for taking it.
The monetary transmission mechanism
The term "monetary transmission mechanism" refers to the ways in which discount rate changes contribute to policy objectives.
The Bank of England has identified the expected effects of an increase in its discount rate on the British economy as
- a general increase in short-term interest rates;
- a rise in the exchange rate as the interest rate increase raises the relative returns on domestic assets, making imported goods cheaper;
- a reduction in consumer spending because it stimulates saving and discourages borrowing;
- an increase in mortgage rates, leaving householders with less to spend;
- a fall in house prices as the mortgage rate raises the cost of buying a house, which reduces homeowners' opportunities to finance their purchases by extending their mortgages [20]
(the last two effects are, of course, peculiar to countries in which flexible mortgage rates are customary)
The Bank estimates the full effect on prices price inflation to take up to about two years and the maximum effect on output to take up to about one year (the output effect is generally expected to be transitory).
An account of the monetary transmission mechanism issued by the European Central Bank[21] states that changes to its discount rate are expected to:
- affect banks and money-market interest rates;
- influence expectations of future inflation, which promotes price stability by reducing people's motives to raise their prices for fear of higher inflation or reduce them for fear of deflation;
- affect asset prices for comparable reasons;
- affect saving and investment decisions since higher interest rates make it less attractive to take out loans for financing consumption or investment;
- have have an impact on aggregate demand via the value of collateral that allows borrowers to get more loans and/or to reduce the risk premia demanded by lenders/banks, and by creating tighter or looser conditions in the labour and intermediate product markets;
- affect the supply of credit as higher interest rates increase the risk that borrowers may default on repayment of loans, and banks cut back on loans to households and firms.
The Federal Reserve Board has issued a statement on similar lines [6].
Quantitative easing
Proposals for asset-price regulation
Dissenting views
Notes and References
- ↑ For an account of the British experiment in money supply targeting see Nick Gardner Decade of Discontent, Chapeter 5, Blackwell 1987
- ↑ Charles Bean Is There a Consensus in Monetary Policy?
- ↑ Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali; and Mark Gertler, The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, December 1999
- ↑ Laurence Ball: What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994
- ↑ William A Allen: Implementing Monetary Policy, July 2004
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Monetary Policy and the Economy, United States Federal Reserve Board, 2009
- ↑ Objective of Monetary Policy, European Central Bank, 2009
- ↑ Letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Governor of the Bank of England dated 6th March 1997 Monetary Policy Framework, Bank of England, 2009, supplemented by the stipulation of a target range for the inflation rate
- ↑ John B Taylor "Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice", in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy no 39 1993 John Taylor
- ↑ Stanford University Monetary Policy Rule Homepage
- ↑ Antonio Forte The European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England: is the Taylor Rule an useful benchmark for the last decade?, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, November 2009
- ↑ Cheryl L. Edwards: Open Market Operations in the 1990s, Federal Reserve Bulletin November 1997
- ↑ The Development of the Bank of England’s Market Operations, A consultative paper by the Bank of England, October 2008
- ↑ Open Market Operations, European Central Bank, 2009
- ↑ The Federal Open Market Committee, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009
- ↑ Federal Open Market Committee: Frequently Asked Questions, Federal Reserve Board, 2009
- ↑ The ECB Governing Council, European Central Bank, 2008
- ↑ The Implementation of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area, European Central Bank, November 2008
- ↑ The Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England, 2009
- ↑ How Monetary Policy Works, Bank of England, 2009
- ↑ The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy, European Central Bank