Asset price bubble: Difference between revisions

From Citizendium
Jump to navigation Jump to search
imported>Nick Gardner
imported>Nick Gardner
Line 14: Line 14:
==Consequences==
==Consequences==
Frederic Mishkin has identified two categories of asset-price bubble<ref>[http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/98e7c192-cd5f-11de-8162-00144feabdc0.html Frederic Mishkin: ''Not all Bubbles Present a Risk to the Economy'', Financial Times, 9th November 2009]</ref>:-
Frederic Mishkin has identified two categories of asset-price bubble<ref>[http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/98e7c192-cd5f-11de-8162-00144feabdc0.html Frederic Mishkin: ''Not all Bubbles Present a Risk to the Economy'', Financial Times, 9th November 2009]</ref>:-
*"credit boom bubbles", in which  expectations of increases in the price of some assets lead to a credit boom in which  increased demand raises the price of those assets, leading to more lending against the security of  these assets, further increasing demand, and creating a ''positive feedback'' loop. That prompts investors to increase their  leverage,  and the cycle continues until the bubble bursts. The losses then suffered by investors lead to reductions in business investment and consumer expenditure, and a fall in economic activity.  
*"credit boom bubbles", in which  expectations of increases in the price of some assets, lead investors to borrow against the security of  those assets, increasing their demand, and enabling  them to use the assets  to obtain more credit and increase their leverage, in a ''positive feedback'' loop which continues until the bubble bursts. The losses then suffered lead to de-leveraging, a ''credit crunch'',  reductions in business investment and consumer expenditure, and a fall in economic activity.  
* "pure irrational exuberance bubbles",  not  involving leveraging cycles, which do not threaten  the integrity of the financial system or cause any substantial reduction in economic activity.  
* "pure irrational exuberance bubbles",  not  involving leveraging and de-leveraging, which do not result in a credit crunch or cause any substantial reduction in economic activity.  
The "dot.com bubbleand the stock market bubble that burst in  1987 were examples of the second category, and neither led to worse  than a relatively mild recession.
The house price bubble  that led to the [[crash of 2009]] was an example of the former category, and the  relatively benign "dot.com"  bubble  was an example of the second category.


==Leading indicators==
==Leading indicators==

Revision as of 05:56, 2 December 2009

This article is developing and not approved.
Main Article
Discussion
Related Articles  [?]
Bibliography  [?]
External Links  [?]
Citable Version  [?]
Addendum [?]
 
This editable Main Article is under development and subject to a disclaimer.

An asset price bubble is characterised by a surge in prices that raises expectations of further increases that generate a succession increases until confidence falters, the bubble "bursts", and prices rapidly revert to an objectively-based level. Asset price bubbles can cause extensive economic damage and can even threaten the integrity of the financial system.

The nature of asset price bubbles

A steep and sustained price rise and then its precipitous collapse, both unrelated to the asset's properties - that is the pattern of events which has characterised hundreds of episodes from the "South Sea Bubble" of the 17th century to the housing bubbles of the early 21st century. There is no objective way of assessing the truth of any of the various explanations that have been advanced for them. Their "information cascade" component has been observed in other contexts [1], and the "herding" behaviour that they exhibit[2] has characterised the conduct of the subjects of many experimental studies of human behaviour[3]. One surge in share prices has been termed "irrational exuberance"[4], and that term has since been applied to other episodes, but whether the word "irrational" is really justified turns on the choice of interpretation. Such behaviour has been attributed to ill-informed noise traders, but John Maynard Keynes, himself a successful investor, has attributed it also to professional investors:

"professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view." [5]

Keynes' insight was supported by an NBER paper by David Scharfstein and others, which demonstrates by means of a model that herding can occur even if all the investors act rationally [6], and by another model created by Andrei Shleifer, showing the effect s of introducing noise traders [7].

The routine use of stop-loss orders (that probably contributes strongly to the speed of decline when a stock exchange bubble bursts, and is itself a form of herding behaviour), is widely practised by professional investors [8].

History

An account of bubbles in the 18th century, including "The Mississippi Scheme", "The South-Sea Bubble", and "Tulipomania" was published in 1852 [9]

Consequences

Frederic Mishkin has identified two categories of asset-price bubble[10]:-

  • "credit boom bubbles", in which expectations of increases in the price of some assets, lead investors to borrow against the security of those assets, increasing their demand, and enabling them to use the assets to obtain more credit and increase their leverage, in a positive feedback loop which continues until the bubble bursts. The losses then suffered lead to de-leveraging, a credit crunch, reductions in business investment and consumer expenditure, and a fall in economic activity.
  • "pure irrational exuberance bubbles", not involving leveraging and de-leveraging, which do not result in a credit crunch or cause any substantial reduction in economic activity.

The house price bubble that led to the crash of 2009 was an example of the former category, and the relatively benign "dot.com" bubble was an example of the second category.

Leading indicators

Notes and References