Russian Liberation Army

Formed from a nucleus of Soviet soldiers captured by the German Wehrmacht in the Second World War, the Russian Liberation Army (RLA), (ROA) [Russian abbreviation] achieved neither German nor anti-Soviet objectives. While it had its supporters in the German command structure, it never received full support due to Nazi anti-Slavic doctrine. Suffering from a lack of effective German support, it never was more than a "symbolic initiative versus a real fighting force." After the war's end, the Soviets were harsh on its members, whom it considered to be enemies of the state.

Relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, leading up to the German and invasion and in the first years of fighting, were complex. Germany had achieved strategic surprise with its attack, with success in both the diplomacy of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 and clandestine deception.

In the invasion planning, then-MAJ Bob Willis, of the U.S. Army, observed "very little effort was expended on the transition between the destruction of the Red Army and the establishment of the security necessary to realize the ultimate political and economic goals." His paper for the School of Advanced Military Studies draws parallels between the effective military operations in this operation, as well as the U.S. advance in the Iraq War, and the failure to establish the post-high-intensity-combat environment.

Soviet context

Prior to the invasion, there had been a brief period of relatively warm German-Soviet relations. Soviet citizens, independent of ethnic Russian patriotism, had had much reason, however, to distrust their own government. Memories of the "Great Terror", or massive purges of the 1930s, were fresh, and both Soviet leadership and ordinary citizens lived in fear of the Organs of State Security. As long as the Soviet government could not stimulate patriotic sentiment, there indeed were conditions where Germany might turn opposition to its advantage. Ironically, Stalin was probably more concerned about this threat than was Hitler.

Invasion

Stalin received a warning document, in May 1939, about The Future Plans of Aggression by Fascist Germany, based on a German briefing obtained by Soviet spies in Warsaw. A Soviet agent first reported that Hitler planned to declare war on the Soviet Union in March 1941, and refined the estimate, by February 28, to May 20. Confirmation came from sources in Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia and Rome, and especially the Richard Sorge (code-named Ramsay) espionage network in Tokyo; Sorge's cover identity was that of a German journalist and he had excellent contacts in German circles. . On April 17 a Prague informant predicted a German invasion in the second half of June. The precise date and time of the invasion were revealed by a reliable source in Berlin fully three days before the Germans attacked: June 21.

Stalin refused to believe the threat. Typically, he scrawled on the bottom of the Prague report: English provocation! Investigate! On May 19, Sorge predicted that 150 divisions were being readied by the Germans for an invasion of the Soviet Union. Stalin retorted with an expletive.

Literally nothing was done to prepare for the German assault. Soviet planes were not camouflaged. Troops were not in defensive positions; indeed they were ordered not to occupy such positions, for fear of provoking the Germans. Worse, Stalin responded to the gathering storm with yet another purge of suspected threats to his own authority. Stalin had previously, in 1937, purged the senior command staff of the Red Army, leaving a leadership vacuum when the Germans launched the Operation Barbarossa invasion.

Security operations

Even though the Soviets did not do well in preventing the formation of the RLA, they had significant intelligence penetration of German-sponsored resistance movements. Boris Miklashevsky was a former boxing champion and clandestine intelligence officer, resident in Berlin between 1941 and 1944. After the war's end, he was assigned to hunting down RLA forces; he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and returned to boxing in 1947.

Early defeats and Vlasov

After the invasion on June 21, Soviet defenses were ineffective. The Volkhov Front had been formed in late 1941. It was positioned to support the Leningrad Front, and later as a counterattack force to help break the siege of Leningrad. Red Army lieutenant general Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov (1900-1946) was made its deputy commander of the Front in March 1942, arriving directly from General Headquarters, accompanied by Georgi Malenkov, a member of the inner cabinet, and Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, chief of the general staff. This indicated he was regarded well at the high command level; subsequent criticism of his military skills are likely to be part of the Soviet effort to discredit a traitor.

The Volkhov Front, however, was dissolved on 23 April, and subordinated to the Leningrad Front. Vlasov was reassigned, after its commander became seriously ill, to command one of major counterattack forces, the Second Shock Army. It was overrun in late June. There are reports that Merentsov tried to rescue Vlasov with a tank unit, but he preferred to share the fate of his men. He was captured during this time.

While the RLA was under the command of Vlasov , the Germans never fully armed it nor gave it an adequate command structure. Instead, they regarded it as the putative military wing of the German-created Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR). Vlasov was tried by the Soviets and executed in 1946. The Soviet trial record says "Here is where things got bogged down. The prisoners of war refused to serve in the ROA. With the greatest of effort, Vlasov was able to recruit people for the second division. Hitlerites who were aware of the pro-Soviet mood among the majority of the soldiers in this division, provided them with no weapons until the end of the war."

No personal papers of Vlasov are known to exist. Even though the number of anti-Soviets may have been in the millions, Vlasov was only allowed to form a two division force in January 1945. Earlier, some of the ROA troops were used against Soviet guerrillas in the Balkans and against the Warsaw ghetto uprising in 1944.

While the Soviet official position was that he was merely an opportunist, his commander, Marshal K. A. Meretskov, said the defeat of his force in 1942 was due to more than his choice. Vlasov, as opposed to his subordinates, never wore a German uniform. He joined the Red Army in 1919, and rose through the ranks, entering the Communist Party in 1930.

At his trial, which started on 30 July 1946, the Soviet record states all responses were voluntary. Vlasov was quoted as saying "I took advantage of the invasion of the Germans in the village where I was and surrendered voluntarily."

German context

With exceptions, Germany simply was unprepared to fight on an effective political and psychological level, dooming any Russian resistance.

Opposition

As an example, General Walter von Reichenau, commanding the German Sixth Army in the invasion, penned his own order that “historic and cultural values do not have any significance. The movement, surprisingly given the racial theories of the Schutzstaffel, did have the support of Heinrich Himmler, but "continuously derailed by Hitler’s refusal to alter his policy on limited self-rule and the creation of an autonomous Russian Army in the occupied areas...From historical hindsight however, it is clear that Stalin and the Soviet government effectively tapped into the Russian cultural consciousness whereas Hitler and the German Army proved unable, or unwilling, to do the same."

Support

Key to establishing the preconditions for the RLA was Captain Wilfried Strik-Strikfeldt, an ethnic Baltic German who had served in the Imperial Russian Army during World War I. He joined to join German Army Group Center in 1941, serving on Russian affairs as special advisor to Field Marshal Fedor von Bock. His official role was to train Russian propagandists for the German military. His personal goal, in the special camp he established at Dabendorf near Berlin, to form a resistance army.

Declared foundation of the Russian liberation movement: Proponent angle

An opportunity to achieve this goal was presented with the German invasion. In June 1942, leaflets encouraging Soviet soldiers to lay down their arms and welcome Adolf Hitler as the liberator were dropped at the front and in the areas being occupied. As a counter-move, the Soviet leadership attempted to paint a picture of the German as an evil enemy – the Germans, who were allies a short time ago. As Soviet citizens were accustomed to reading between the lines in the official statements, this campaign made little impression on the population. Part of the Soviet soldiers and civilians had had contact with Germans in the 1st World War and could not match their personal impression with the one offered in official publications.

Also, this alliance gone sour produced another alliance with the former (and later) arch enemies Great Britain and USA. This strengthened the impression that the priorities of the Soviet leadership were not in reality what they were officially.

And so, there was an interest in an alliance with the German state. This because it was impossible to imagine that it could be the intention of German leadership to conquer and continually occupy all of the Soviet Union, due to its massive size – not to mention the experience with the Russian geography done by Napoleon. Ergo, it would be in the interest of Nazi Germany to cooperate with a group interested in creating an alliance, in which the Soviet Union – or Russia, depending on which interest group was consulted – would exist as a democratic republic – or, as some suggested, a monarchy again – which would be a supportive military and trade ally of Germany.

Germany was seen as a nation with positive associations, because it was part of a European traditionally shared cultural community. It also had a certain effect that it was a practising Christian society, as opposed to the Soviet Union, in which the state had made a substantial and rather heavy-handed effort to eliminate religious practice.

After the defeat of his 2nd Shock Army in the summer of 1942, Vlasov was captured by German forces.

While working on this, he stresses some good things with the Soviet system as opposed to Imperial Russia, but he also stresses that which is unacceptable in the new system – that the system is not, what it is pretending to be.

The German army responded positively to the idea, but postponed taking full advantage of it due to the scepticism of the political leadership, based on ideological issues. Vlasov was allowed to travel to POW camps and occupied areas, where he presented his cause – which was popular, and the soldiers already active in the Wehrmacht, albeit not as part of a common coordinated force, started wearing the ROA insignia, as they saw themselves as part of a shared cause – a liberation army.

He was captured on the way to the American sector, where he was found to be in possession of a large amount of money. This is interpreted as meaning that he had gained what he could and was searching for a new winning master – yet another capitalist state, which the USSR had allied with temporarily, but which should be treated with caution.

The Soviet official position: Critical angle

A minor group of Soviet citizens cooperated with the German occupation force. The collaborators were either former prisoners of war or soldiers and civilians, who changed sides during the war.

Having surrendered to the invaders, the prisoners of war were already counted as traitors by Soviet definition, as these were considered people, who were not willing to make an effort and sacrifice to defend their country – who had let themselves get surrounded on the battlefield and taken the easy way out by surrendering instead of fighting to the end. Volunteering for the liberation movement after capture demonstrates their weakness, either by making the choice based on threats of physical abuse, or allowing themselves to be bribed with pay, food and relative freedom.

The soldiers and civilians, who changed sides, were perceived as cowards and opportunists in the same fashion, as people willing to sacrifice the future of their homeland to be on the (apparently) winning side, where it was possible to gain something for oneself. It was seen as typical for the kind of people who are weak and deceitful by nature – or as a variation of this, people who had lost land, fortune and privileges with the people's revolution, well-off families and large-scale farmers (kulaki), who had no interest in the preservation of the Soviet system.

During the final trial in 1946, he admitted to having lost heart, that he was offended by his country, and admitted to his treason. So, when he and his inner circle were hanged, they got the punishment which was to be expected and deserved for traitors of such a caliber.