U.S. intelligence activities in Iraq

U.S. support was predicated upon the notion that Iraq was a key buffer state in geopolitical relations with the Soviet Union.

Intelligence played an important and generally effective role in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, but was much more controversial with respect to justifying and planning the operations beginning in 2003. See the appropriate chronological entries below.

Specific activities

Iraq 1958

Saddam Hussein's first contacts with U.S. officials date back to 1959, when he was part of a CIA-authorized six-man squad tasked with assassinating then Iraqi Prime Minister Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim.

In July 1958, Saddam failed to assassinate, on Baathist orders, Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim Saddam found asylum in Cairo, under the patronage of Gamel Abdel Nasser. According to Said Aburish, Saddam, as a minor Baath official, may well have been in contact with U.S. embassy personnel in Cairo, personnel who may have been CIA. Egyptian security organizations advised him to stop. "This is not strange, because alliances of convenience were taking place every day, and the United States was afraid that Iraq, under Qasim, might be going communist. So was the Ba'ath Party. So they had a common enemy, a common target -- the possibility of a communist take-over of Iraq... He was not terribly important. And he was really following in the footsteps of other people who are much more important."ur Both the Ba'ath and U.S. considered Kassem an enemy, so there were grounds for cooperation.

Iraq 1963

In 1963, the United States backed a coup against the government of Iraq headed by General Qasim, who five years earlier had deposed the Western-allied Iraqi monarchy. Roger Morris, a former National Security Council official who became a journalist, states "The C.I.A.'s 'Health Alteration Committee,' as it was tactfully called, sent Qassim [Kassim in the article] monogrammed, poisoned handkerchief, though the potentially lethal gift either failed to work or never reached its victim." Feb. 8, 1963, the conspirators staged a coup in Baghdad. For a time the government held out, but eventually Kassem gave up, and after a swift trial was shot; his body was later shown on Baghdad television. Washington immediately befriended the successor regime. "Almost certainly a gain for our side," Robert Komer, a National Security Council aide," wrote to President John F. Kennedy on the day of the takeover.

The poisoned handkerchief is mentioned in the Church Committee report. The report included, "In February 1960, the Near East Division [of the Directorate of Plans (i.e., Clandestine Service)] sought the endorsement of what the Division Chief called the "Health Alteration Committee" for its proposal for a "special operation: to “incapacitate” an Iraqi Colonel believed to be "promoting Soviet bloc political interests in Iraq." The Division sought the Committee’s advice on a technique, "which while not likely to result in total disablement would be certain to prevent the target from pursuing his usual activities for a minimum of three months," adding:"We do not consciously seek subject’s permanent removal from the scene; we also do not object should this complication develop." Memo, Acting Chief N.E. Division to DC/CI [organization code not clear; it is the usual abbreviation for counter-intelligence.

In April, the [Health Alteration] Committee unanimously recommended to the DDP (Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell)that a "disabling operation" be undertaken, noting that the Chief of Operations advised that it would be “highly desirable.” Bissell’s deputy, Tracy Barnes, approved the action on behalf of Bissell. (Memo. Denuty Chief CI to DDP. 4/l/62)

The approved operation was to mail a monogrammed handkerchief containing an incapacitating agent to the colonel from an Asian country [i.e., country not yet named]. James Scheider, Science Advisor to Bissell testified that, while he did not now recall the name of the recipient, he did remember mailing from the Asian country. during the period in question, a handkerchief “treated with some kind of material for the purpose of harassing that person who received it.” (Scheider Affidavit. 10/20/75. pp. 52-56)

During the course of this Committee’s investigation, the CIA stated that the handkerchief was “in fact never received (if, indeed, sent).” It added that the colonel: “Suffered a terminal illness before a firing squad in Baghdad (an event we had nothing to do with) after our handkerchief proposal was considered.” (Memo from Chief of Operations, Near East Division to Assistant to the SA/DDO 10/26/75.)

According to Roger Morris, CIA helped the new Baath Party government in ridding the country of suspected leftists and Communists. The Baathist government used lists of suspected Communists and other leftists provided by the CIA, to systematically murder opponents Iraq's educated elite--killings in which Saddam Hussein himself is said to have participated. The victims included hundreds of doctors, teachers, technicians, lawyers and other professionals as well as military and political figures.

According to The New York Times, the U.S. sent arms to the new regime, weapons later used against the same Kurdish insurgents the U.S. supported against Qassim and then abandoned. American and UK oil and other interests, including Mobil, Bechtel and British Petroleum, were conducting business in Iraq. Aburish said the coup plotters offered technical intelligence to the US, in the form of certain models of Mig fighters and Soviet tanks.

Iraq 1968

The leader of the new Baathist government, Salam Arif, died in 1966 and his brother, Abdul Rahman Arif, not a Ba'athist, assumed the presidency.

Iraq 1968, Saddam takes power

In 1968, again with the alleged backing of the CIA, Rahman Arif was overthrown by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr of the Baath Party, bringing Saddam Hussein to the threshold of power. To carry out the coup, Ba'athists donned military uniforms, attacked the presidential palace and occupied it. The president surrendered immediately. "You're going with me to the airport because you're leaving this country", said Saddam Hussein to the prime minister as Saddam held a gun to his head.

The Asia Times reported that the CIA deputy for the Middle East Archibald Roosevelt (grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt and cousin of Kermit Roosevelt, Jr.) stated, referring to Iraqi Ba'ath Party officers on his payroll in the 1963 and 1968 coups, "They're our boys bought and paid for, but you always gotta remember that these people can't be trusted" General Ahmed Bakr was installed as president. Saddam Hussein was appointed the number two man, security chief for the newly installed ruler, and became his protege.

U.S. support of Saddam was predicated upon the notion that Iraq was a key buffer state in geopolitical relations with the Soviet Union.

Iraq 1979

Said Aburish, Saddam made a visit to Amman in the year 1979, before the Iran-Iraq war, where he met three senior CIA agents. He discussed with them his plans to invade Iran.

Iraq 1980

Beginning in 1980, the CIA militarily and monetarily assisted Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. .

This was the province of the South Asia Operations Group headed by Gust Avrakotos. Author George Crile, in his book Charlie Wilson's War, writes:

There was little the Agency could do directly against Khomeini. But indirectly it was doing tremendous damage by providing covert assistance to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis for their bloody war with Iran. As explained by Ed Juchniewicz -- Avrakotos's patron and the number two man in the Operations Division at that time -- they were just leveling the playing field: "We didn't want either side to have the advantage. We just wanted them to kick the shit out of each other".

This support continued until the end of the war in 1988.

Iraq 1990

Mohammed Abdullah Shawani's "saga illustrates a little-understood part of the Iraq story -- the CIA's attempt to mobilize Iraqi officers. At the center was Shahwani, a Sunni from Mosul and a charismatic commander who made his reputation in 1984 with a helicopter assault on Iranian troops atop a mountain in Iraqi Kurdistan. His popularity made him dangerous to Saddam Hussein, and he was arrested and interrogated in 1989. He fled the country in May 1990, just before Iraq invaded Kuwait.

On the US side, there was no single targeting organization for planning air campaigns at the theater level, as there is for the nuclear Single Integrated Operational Plan. "Targeting for the Gulf War air campaign encompassed the first modern joint effort to integrate and employ the joint services’ air power. While generally perceived as a doctrinal and operational success, widespread parochialism between and within service components adversely affected air campaign planning, targeting, and execution." "The national intelligence agencies are comprised of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Political and economic intelligence fall under the purview of the CIA. DIA provides all-source intelligence and operational support to unified commands, while NSA provides signals and electronic intelligence. Prior to 1990, no central authority existed to coordinate interagency target intelligence and combat assessments to support unified commands’ operations.

"A critical shortfall that would impact the air campaign targeting for Operation DESERT STORM was the initial lack of a single focal point organization for providing interagency coordinated target intelligence and battle damage assessments. At the initiative of Rear Admiral "Mike" McConnell, JS-J2 [then Intelligence Director for the Joint Staff, now Director of National Intelligence], the National Military Joint Intelligence Center was established to act as a clearinghouse for all national-level intelligence support to CENTCOM. The NMJIC was manned by CIA, DIA, and NSA personnel with the intent to coordinate and pass all-source intelligence to CENTCOM J2. What actually happened was that these same organizations bypassed CENTCOM J2 and forwarded--via direct communications links--uncoordinated target intelligence to CENTAF. Resulting uncoordinated national intelligence efforts caused the emergence of conflicting and erroneous targeting data. This, in turn, would later lead to contradictory battle damage assessment reports that impaired CINCCENT’s decision-making processes, causing a 3-day delay in the ground forces offensive.

Iraq 1991

CIA provided intelligence support to the military in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. In 1991, Shahwani began efforts to organize a military coup utilizing former members of the special forces, which Hussein had disbanded.

Iraq 1992

After the Gulf War, CIA took steps to correct the shortcomings identified during the Gulf war and improve its support to the US military, beginning improved communications with major US military commands. In 1992, CIA created the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to enhance cooperation and increase information flow between CIA and the military. OMA is subordinate to the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support and is jointly staffed by CIA officers from all directorates and military personnel from all the services.

According to Robert Baer, a former CIA officer and current critic, the CIA orchestrated a bomb and sabotage campaign between 1992 and 1995 in Iraq via one of the resistance organizations, Ayad Allawi, leader the Iraqi National Accord, was installed as prime minister by the U.S.-led coalition after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The campaign had no apparent effect in toppling Saddam Hussein's rule.

According to Baer, the bombing campaign against Baghdad included both government and civilian targetsm. The civilian targets included a movie theater and a bombing of a school bus and schoolchildren were killed. No public records of the secret bombing campaign are known to exist, and the former U.S. officials said their recollections were in many cases sketchy, and in some cases contradictory. "But whether the bombings actually killed any civilians could not be confirmed because, as a former C.I.A. official said, the United States had no significant intelligence sources in Iraq then."

Iraq 1993

Funding Kurdish organizations, the CIA worked to create a new Kurdish-led intelligence agency in Iraq called Asayesh (Kurdish for "security".

Iraq 1994

U.S. and Iraqi sources provided an account of the unsuccessful strategy of deposing Saddam by a coup d'état during the 1990s, an effort reportedly known within CIA by the cryptonym "DBACHILLES" . The failed coup efforts carry some important lessons. They show that Iraqi intelligence penetrated the Iraqi exile-based operations. And they illustrate the damage caused by a long-running feud between Iraqi exile groups and their patrons in Washington. A media-based report follows.

According to the Washington Post, the CIA appointed a new head of its Near East Division, Stephen Richter, who assumed that large parts of the Iraqi army might support a coup. A team met with Gen. Mohammed Abdullah Shawani later installed as interim prime minister by the U.S.-led coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003.

Iraq 2003

Prior to the overt 2003 invasion, an anonymous source, quoted in The Washington Post, says the CIA was authorized to execute a covert operation, if necessary with help of the Special Forces, that could serve as a preparation for a full military attack against Iraq.

U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction(WMD) had been the focus of intense scrutiny in the U.S. See Iran Intelligence Commission for after-the-fact analysis of this threat. Successive chronological entries deal with the resistance in Iraq.

Richard Kerr, a 32-year CIA veteran who served three years as deputy director for intelligence, was commissioned to lead a review of agency analysis of Iraqi WMD claims, and produced a series of reports, one of which is unclassified. Kerr told journalist Robert Dreyfuss that CIA analysts felt intimidated by the Bush administration, saying,

A lot of analysts believed that they were being pressured to come to certain conclusions … . I talked to a lot of people who said, 'There was a lot of repetitive questioning. We were being asked to justify what we were saying again and again.' There were certainly people who felt they were being pushed beyond the evidence they had.

In a January 26, 2006 interview, Kerr acknowledged this had resulted in open antagonism between some in the CIA and the Bush White House, saying, "There have been more leaks and discussions outside what I would consider to be the appropriate level than I've ever seen before. And I think that lack of discipline is a real problem. I don't think an intelligence organization can kind of take up arms against politics, or a policy-maker. I think that will not work, and it won't stand."

Evidence against Iraq having a WMD program included information from CIA officer Valerie Plame Wilson, who, in a newspaper column by Robert Novak, was identified publicly as "an agency operative on weapons of mass destruction." Plame's husband, Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV had been sent by CIA to the African nation of Niger to investigate claims that Iraq intended to purchase uranium yellowcake from that country, which was incorporated in President George W. Bush's 2003 State of the Union address to support waging a preventive war against Iraq. See Iraq 2007 investigations for the aftermath of this claims and disclosures about them.

Kenneth Pollack, a former National Security Council expert on Iraq, who generally supported the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein, told Seymour Hersh that what the Bush administration did was

"... dismantle the existing filtering process that for fifty years had been preventing the policymakers from getting bad information. They created stovepipes to get the information they wanted directly to the top leadership.... They always had information to back up their public claims, but it was often very bad information," Pollack said.

Some of the information used to justify the U.S. invasion of Iraq came from a discredited informant codenamed Curveball by CIA, who falsely claimed that he had worked as a chemical engineer at a plant that manufactured mobile biological weapon laboratories as part of an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. Despite warnings to CIA from the German Federal Intelligence Service regarding the authenticity of his claims, they were incorporated into President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address and Colin Powell's subsequent presentation to the UN Security Council.

Iraq 2004

In 2004, the lack of finding WMD, the continuing armed resistance against the U.S. military occupation of Iraq, and the widely-perceived need for a systematic review of the respective roles of the CIA, the FBI, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. On July 9, 2004, the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq of the Senate Intelligence Committee reported that the CIA exaggerated the danger presented by weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, largely unsupported by the available intelligence.

On July 9, 2004, the Senate Report of Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq of the Senate Intelligence Committee reported that the CIA exaggerated the danger presented by weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, largely unsupported by the available intelligence.

New Iraqi intelligence forms

In February 2004, the new Iraqi National Intelligence Service, or INIS, was established in February 2004 "as a nonsectarian force that would recruit its officers and agents from all of Iraq's religious communities. Its chief, Gen. [[Mohammed Abdullah Shawani |Mohammed Shahwani]], is a Sunni from Mosul. He is married to a Shiite and his deputy is a Kurd. Shahwani, a commander of Iraqi special forces during the Iran-Iraq war, has worked closely with the CIA for more than a decade -- first in trying to topple Saddam Hussein, then in trying to build an effective intelligence organization."

There is a competing intelligence service "called the Ministry of Security, was created in [2003] under the direction of Sheerwan al-Waeli. He is a former colonel in the Iraqi army who served in Nasiriyah under the old regime. He is said to have received training in Iran and to be maintaining regular liaison with Iranian and Syrian intelligence officers in Baghdad. His service, like Shahwani's organization, has about 5,000 officers."

The CIA had hoped that Shahwani's INIS could be an effective national force and a deterrent to Iranian meddling. To mount effective operations against the Iranians, Shahwani recruited the chief of the Iran branch of the Saddam Hussein-era Mukhabarat. That made the Iranians and their Shiite allies nervous.

Shahwani's operatives discovered in 2004 that the Iranians had a hit list, drawn from an old Defense Ministry payroll document that identified the names and home addresses of senior officers who served under the former regime. Shahwani himself was among those targeted for assassination by the Iranians. To date, about 140 officers in the INIS have been killed.

Though many in Maliki's government regard Shahwani with suspicion, his supporters say he has tried to remain independent of the sectarian battles in Iraq. He has provided intelligence that has led to the capture of several senior al-Qaeda operatives, according to U.S. sources, as well as regular intelligence about the Sunni insurgency. Several months ago, Shahwani informed Maliki of an assassination plot by a bodyguard who secretly worked for Shiite militia leader Moqtada al-Sadr. Shahwani's service uncovered a similar plot to assassinate Iraq's deputy prime minister, Barham Salih, a Kurd.

"Shahwani's coup plans suffered a setback in June 1996, when the Mukhabarat killed 85 of his operatives, including three of his sons. But he continued plotting over the next seven years, and on the eve of the American invasion in March 2003, Shahwani and his CIA supporters were still hoping to organize an uprising among the Iraqi military. Shahwani's secret Iraqi network was known as "77 Alpha," and later as "the Scorpions."

"The Pentagon was wary of the Iraqi uprising plan, so it was shelved, but Shahwani encouraged his network in the Iraqi military not to fight -- in the expectation that the soldiers would be well treated after the American victory. Then came the disastrous decision in May 2003 by L. Paul Bremer#L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority to disband the Iraqi military and cut off its pay. The rest, as they say, is history.

"Instead of the one good intelligence service it needs, Iraq today has two -- one pro-Iranian, the other anti-Iranian. That's a measure of where the country is: caught between feuding sects and feuding neighbors, with a superpower ally that can't seem to help its friends or stop its enemies.

Abu Ghraib

Also in 2004, reports of Abu Ghraib prison abuse surfaced. In the subsequent investigation by MG Antonio Taguba, he stated "I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses." OGA is a common euphemism for the CIA. Further, "The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees "ghost detainees." On at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of "ghost detainees" (6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international law."

At the Abu Ghraib prison, while CIA interrogator Mark Swanner was supervising a prisoner named Manadel al-Jamadi, the prisoner died. Apparently, al-Jamadi was suspended from his wrists until he choked to death. Swanner was not charged with any crime.

Iraq 2006

Tyler Drumheller, a 26-year CIA veteran and former head of covert operations in Europe, told CBS News 60 Minutes correspondent Ed Bradley in an April 23, 2006 interview that there was widespread disbelief within the agency about the Bush administration's public claims regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. According to Drumheller, the CIA had penetrated Saddam Hussein's inner circle in the fall of 2002, and this high-level source told CIA "they had no active weapons of mass destruction program." Asked by Bradley about the apparent contradiction with Bush administration statements regarding Iraqi WMDs at that time, Drumheller said, "The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming. And they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy."

Iraq 2007

As of June 2007, "Shahwani is now in the United States. Unless he receives assurances of support from Maliki's government, he is likely to resign, which would plunge the INIS into turmoil and could bring about its collapse.

Iraq 2007 investigations

The disclosure of Mrs. Wilson's then-still-classified covert CIA identity as "Valerie Plame" led to a grand jury investigation and the subsequent indictment and conviction of Vice President Cheney's former chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Jr. on charges of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements to federal investigators.