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Interim chronological organization

While there are background factors that go back to the rebellion, against China, of the Trung Sisters in the first century C.E., limits have to exist on the detailed chronology. There are important background details variously dealing with the start of French colonization in Indochina, including the present countries of Vietnam and Laos, the expansion of Japan into Indochina and the U.S. economic embargoes as a result, and both the resistance to Japanese occupation and the Vichy French cooperation in ruling Indochina.

Some general observations may be made about patterns in the war, once units of appreciable size, even guerilla, went into combat: there was generally a winter-spring offensive, sometimes starting as early as October. May and June, the monsoon season, was a time where the North could depend on weather to reduce air attacks on troops moving south. Another offensive would take place somewhere in the late summer.

Unlike the dispersed and disoriented leadership of the VNQDD and some smaller nationalist groups, the Indochinese Communist Party recovered quickly from the setback of 1931, relying on cadres trained in the Soviet Union and China. After 1936, when the French extended some political freedoms to the colonies, the party skillfully exploited all opportunities for the creation of legal front organizations, through which it extended its influence among intellectuals, workers, and peasants. When political freedoms were again curtailed at the outbreak of World War II, the Communist Party, now a well-disciplined organization, was forced back into hiding.

Under the French colonial rule, there was no single entity of Vietnam. There was Tonkin, centered around the Red River Delta in the north; Annam in the central lowlands (the Montagnard highlands were separate); and Cochinchina around the Mekong Delta of the south. Laos and Cambodia were separate.

World War II

Indochina, a French colony in the spheres of influence of Japan and China, was destined to be drawn into the Second World War both through European and Asian events.

Throughout East and Southeast Asia, tensions had been building between 1937 and 1941, as Japan expanded into China. The Franklin D. Roosevelt regarded this as an infringement on U.S. interests in China.[1]

When a new French government formed in August 1938, among its first acts was to name General Georges Catroux governor general of Indochina. He was the first military governor general since French civilian rule had begun in 1879, following the conquest starting in ____. It reflected French concern with the security of metropolitan France as well as its empire. [2]

The appointment of Catroux, the first military governor general since civilian rule began in 1879, reflected the single greatest concern of the new government: defense of the homeland, defense of the empire. Catroux's immediate concern was with Japan, who were actively fighting in nearby China.

After the defeat of France, with an armistice on June 22, 1940, roughly two-thirds of the country was put under direct German military control. The remaining part of southeast France, and the French colonies, were under a nominally independent government, headed by the First World War hero, Marshal Henri Petain, with its capital at Vichy. Japan, not yet allied with Germany, still asked for German help in stopping French supplies, coming from Indochina, to China. Catroux, who had no source of military assistance from outside France, stopped the trade to China to avoid further provoking the Japanese.

With the signing of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940, creating the Axis of Germany, Japan, and Italy, Catroux had new grounds for worry: the Germans could pressure the homeland to support their ally, Japan.

In September 1940, Vichy

The September 1940 accords signed by Japan and Vichy Indo-China which granted various basing and transit rights also limited to 6000 the number of Japanese troops which could be stationed in Indo-China, and set an overall cap of 25,000 on the total number of troops that, including basings and transit, could be in the colony at any given time. In addition, the final article of the agreement barred all Japanese land, air, and naval forces from Indo-Chinese territory except as explicitly authorized in the preceding articles.

Roosevelt formalized aid to China in 1940 and 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave credits to the Chinese Government for the purchase of war supplies, as it put economic pressure on Japan.[3]


The United States was the main supplier of the oil, steel, iron, and other commodities needed by the Japanese military as it became bogged down by Chinese resistance but, in January, 1940, Japan abrogated the existing treaty of commerce with the United States. Although this did not lead to an immediate embargo, it meant that the Roosevelt Administration could now restrict the flow of military supplies into Japan and use this as leverage to force Japan to halt its aggression in China. After January 1940, the United States combined a strategy of increasing aid to China through larger credits and the Lend-Lease program with a gradual move towards an embargo on the trade of all militarily useful items with Japan.

Through much of the war, the French colonial government had largely stayed in place, as the Vichy government was on reasonably friendly terms with Japan. Japan had not entered Indochina until 1941, so the conflicts from 1939 to the fall of France had little impact on a colony such as Indochina.

1941

A contributing factor to the 1941 escalations by Japan, however, resulted when Japan expanded its position in Indochina.

In February, Ho Chi Minh returned and established his base in a cave at Pac Bo, near the Sino-Vietnamese border. [4]

The Eighth Plenum of the Indochinese Communist Party convened in May. It decided that independence was its first priority rather than ideology, so established the "League for the Independence of Vietnam" (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, Viet Minh for short) was established. All political factions were welcome if they supported action against the Japanese and French; the Communist revolution could occur later.

1942

During the Japanese occupation, even during French administration, the Viet Minh exiled to China had an opportuntity to quietly rebuild their infrastructure. They had been strongest in Tonkin, the northern region, so moving south from China was straightforward. They had a concept of establishing "base areas" (Chien Khu), often mountainous jungle.[5] Of these areas, the "homeland" of the VM was in the Viet Bac near around Bac Can.[4] (see map [6]

Additional Chien Khu developed in Yen Bai, Thai N'Guyen (the "traditional" stronghold of the PCI), Quang N'Gai, Pac Bo, Ninh Binh and Dong Trieu. As did many revolutionary movements, part of building their base was providing "shadow government" services. They attacked landlords and moneylenders, as well as providing various useful services. They offered education, which contained substantial amounts of political indoctrination.

They collected taxes, often in the form of food supplies, intelligence on enemy movement, and service as laborers rather than in money. They formed local militias, which provided trained individuals, but they were certainly willing to use violence against reluctant villagers. Gradually, they moved this system south, although not obtaining as much local support in Annam, and especially Cochinchina. While later organizations would operate from Cambodia into the regions of South Vietnam that corresponded to Cochinchina, this was well in the future.

Some of their most important sympathizers included educated civil servants and soldiers, who provided clandestine human-source intelligence from their workplaces, as well as providing counterintelligence on French and Japanese plans.

In August, Ho, while meeting with Chinese Communist Party officials, was held, for two years, by the Kuomintang.[4]

1944

In 1944, Ho, then in China, had requested a United States visa to go to San Francisco to make Vietnamese language broadcasts of material from the U.S. Office of War Information, the U.S. official or "white" propaganda. The visa was denied. [7]

By August, Ho convinced the Kuomintang commander to support his return to Vietnam, leading 18 guerillas against the . Accordingly, Ho returned to Vietnam in September with eighteen men trained and armed by the Chinese. Discovering that the ICP had planned a general uprising in the Viet Bac, he disapproved, but encouraged the establishment of "armed propaganda" teams. [4]

1945

The Japanese, on March 9, revoked the French administrative control and took them prisoner. This had the secondary effect of cutting off much Western intelligence about the Japanese in Indochina. [8] They retained Bao Dai as a nominal leader.

Ho's forces rescued an American pilot in March. Washington ordered Patti to do whatever was necessary to reestablish the intelligence flow, and the OSS mission was authorized to contact Ho. He asked to meet Chennault, the U.S. air commander, and that was agreed, under the condition he did not ask for supplies or active support.

The visit was polite but without substance. Ho, however, asked for the minor favor of an autographed picture of Chennault. Later, Ho used that innocent item to indicate, to other Northern groups, that he had U.S. support. [9]

Just after the Japanese surrender, before the Japanese-imprisoned French returned to their desks, Vietnamese guerillas, under Ho Chi Minh, had seized power in Hanoi and shortly thereafter demanded and received the abdication of the apparent French puppet, Emperor Bao Dai.[10] This would not be the last of Bao Dai.

References

  1. Arima, Yuichi (December, 2003), "The Way to Pearl Harbor: US vs Japan", ICE Case Studies, The American University (no. Number 118)
  2. Vets with a Mission, World War II - Ocupation and Liberation
  3. United States Department of State, Japan, China, the United States and the Road to Pearl Harbor, 1937–41
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Cima, Ronald J., ed. (1987), Establishment of the Viet Minh, Vietnam: A Country Study, Library of Congress
  5. Leulliot, Nowfel & Danny O'Hara, The Tiger and the Elephant: Viet Minh Strategy and Tactics
  6. Thomas Hodgkin (1981), Vietnam, the Revolutionary Path
  7. Patti, Archimedes L.A. (1980), Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America's Albatross, University of California Press, p. 46
  8. Patti, p. 41
  9. Patti, pp. 57-58
  10. , Chapter I, "Background to the Crisis, 1940-50" Section 2, pp. 12-29, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 1